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Abstract 
 
Information is increasingly being exchanged on a global stage, and so audiences are 
becoming more diverse through communication in varying digital modalities. 
Understanding persuasion is increasingly important, particularly in response to 
technological change regarding the way in which we communicate and increased usage in 
our daily lives. However, persuasion has yet to be fully explored in relation to gender, 
ethnicity, cognitive and linguistic style and their influence on decision-making in 
interactive, synthetic modalities. This thesis sought to address this gap by employing an 
interpersonal modernised persuasion paradigm across three distinct contexts. Accordingly, 
three experimental studies are presented: Study 1 is conducted face-to-face (FtF), Study 2 
utilises anonymous instant messaging software, and Study 3 introduces a novel, immersive, 
and collaborative virtual reality environment, which enables communication to occur in 
real-time via embodiment of avatars. The aims of the thesis were to a), investigate the 
effect of communication modalities on persuasion outcomes, b) to explore whether 
cognitive biases mediate persuasion outcomes, c) whether gender and ethnicity influence 
dyadic persuasive interactions, and d), to understand the impact, or otherwise, of linguistic 
style - comprising of quantitative analysis including linguistic synchronicity and epistemic 
modality, on persuasion outcomes. The combined results highlighted how the virtual 
environment was akin to the FtF modality, showing a propensity for successful persuasive 
outcomes and increased metacognitive confidence in attitude change. This has 
ramifications for real-world effects when researchers utilise virtual technology to observe, 
measure and train real-world performances. The anonymous instant messaging platform 
led to enhanced resistance across gender and ethnic groups, with males being significantly 
more likely to oppose the persuasive arguments as a result. Overall however, ethnicity and 
gender did not influence persuasion outcomes, nor did cognitive style mediate or predict an 
individual’s disposition to persuasion. Finally, linguistic style highlighted differences 
   
across participants, with persuaded individuals using more cognitive processing and 
informal language during exchanges. Expanding our understanding of how judgements are 
formed, influenced and modified can serve to widen discussion, and support applied 
understandings regarding the management of conversations both on- and offline. All 
findings are presented and discussed in relation to the relevant theoretical literature 
throughout this body of work.  
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 Chapter One: Persuasion and Language  
 
1.1   Overview of Thesis  
Persuasion is used for many professional and non-professional social exchanges 
and is considered a ubiquitous part of daily life. For example, it is often the foundation of 
political and diplomatic relations and decisions across the globe. Yet much of the literature 
focuses on unilateral face-to-face persuasion, often manipulating single processes such as 
credibility of sources and messages to investigate persuasion outcomes. Furthermore, the 
digital online space is changing the way in which we access information, interact with 
others, and form opinions towards current and political events. The expansion of online 
influence means that persuasive messages and content can reach larger, more diverse 
audiences in an increasingly rapid and interactive manner. As such, it is important to 
understand the theoretical accounts of social cognition and the role that digital modalities 
(DMs) have on persuasion.  
It is the aim of this thesis to investigate individual differences in persuadability 
across varying DMs, that have to date, received limited attention. This includes four 
distinct variables which will be measured and manipulated to gain an understanding of 
persuadability influences: these include gender, ethnicity, cognitive, and linguistic style. 
Each area will in turn, be described, critiqued, and expanded upon in subsequent chapters, 
with the current research studies focusing on a bilateral and interactive persuasive 
exchange, facilitating the observation of naturalistic persuadability and influence 
throughout this body of work.  
 
1.2   Overview of Chapter  
This first chapter will define persuasion and introduce the dominant dual process 
theories of persuasion of relevance to this thesis. The second half of this first chapter will 
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focus on the language of persuasion, with a particular focus on linguistic style and the 
effect of confidence on persuasion outcomes.  
 
1.3   Defining Persuasion  
The study of persuasion and attitude change has been a central focus of social 
psychology for many years (Allport, 1935; Ross, 1908). Persuasion and attitude change 
occur almost daily, and this type of cognition is important for a number of key issues such 
as education, the criminal justice system, political debate and economics. For example, 
politicians typically need to persuade voters and the public that their policies are just, 
honest and stand up to scrutiny. Health care providers and the relevant government public 
health organisations are often tasked with persuading people to change deep-seated and 
often enjoyable behaviours, such as smoking and eating sugary foods in order to remain 
healthy and live longer (e.g., Shen, Sheer, & Li, 2015). Similarly, prosecutors and defence 
barristers attempt to persuade juries of the guilt or innocence of a defendant, and jury 
members have to persuade each other to agree a majority verdict (see Leippe, 2016; Mauet, 
2017).  
Defining persuasion is challenging, with many definitions employed throughout the 
literature. For example, persuasion has been described as a “symbolic activity… effecting 
the internalisation or voluntary acceptance of new cognitive states or patterns of overt 
behaviour through the exchange of messages” (Smith, 1982, p.7). On the other hand, 
Andersen (1971) defines persuasion as a communication process, whereby “the 
communicator seeks to elicit a desired response from the receiver” (p.6). Alternatively, 
Perloff (2003) claims the main component of persuasion is the symbolic process, whereby 
a communicator actively attempts to convince another to change their attitude towards a 
specific issue, in contexts where that individual has free will, and so need not comply. The 
term persuadability is also often used in the literature.  Persuadability generally refers to an 
individual’s responsiveness to communication stimuli and is measured using persuasion 
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outcomes when all other communication stimuli are held constant (Cervin, Joyner, Spence, 
& Heinzl Jr., 1961). Thus, persuasion is the process of information change, whereas 
persuadability is an individual’s responsiveness to persuasive communication.  
Despite different definitions of persuasion, there is considerable consensus that 
persuasion is the communication process, which has the potential to change a response, 
attitude or belief. Fundamental to this process is i) the formation of a new judgment in the 
persuadee (the receiver of the message) in response to the advocacy of a persuader (the 
sender of the message), ii) that the persuasive message communicated is intended to 
change an attitude, related behaviour, belief or decision in the receiver, and iii) the receiver 
has free choice, and is actively processing the information. Persuasion is also considered 
an interactive communicative process (Dainton, 2005), which is social in nature with 
individuals often looking to others for advice and elaboration before a final decision and 
attitude is formed. For the purposes of this thesis, persuasion and attitude change are used 
interchangeably, and it is Perloff’s (2003) definition of persuasion that underpins the 
programme of research presented this thesis. From here on, persuasion is used to describe 
the process of convincing another to change his/her mind in conditions of free will. 
 
1.4   Models of Persuasion  
The prevalent models of persuasion are the Heuristic Systematic Model (Chaiken, 
1987; Chaiken, Liberman, & Eagly, 1989) and Elaboration Likelihood Model (Petty, 
Cacioppo, & Goldman, 1981; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986), and it is these models that 
underpin the research presented in this thesis. Both models propose two alternative 
cognitive pathways for processing a persuasive message, and the information contained 
within the message. Both argue that persuasion can arise either as a result of effortful and 
deliberate processing, or as a result of automatic heuristic forms of processing. However, 
there are some differences and so each are now introduced. 
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1.4.1   The heuristic-systematic model. The Heuristic-Systematic Model (HSM; 
Chaiken, 1987; Chaiken, Liberman, & Eagly, 1989) diverges from previous information-
processing theories which focus on ‘variable-orientated’ approaches such as the source or 
message, to instead embrace a ‘process-orientated’ approach (Booth-Butterfield & 
Welbourne, 2002). It suggests that attitudes can change in two fundamentally different 
ways and outlines two distinct processes involved in the processing of the persuasive 
message, namely systematic and heuristic. Systematic processing is seen as the more 
analytical and comprehensive pathway for assessing the validity of the information 
relevant to the judgement being made. It is argued that systematic processing requires 
cognitive ability and capacity, and so systematic processing is less likely in individuals 
who pose little knowledge of the subject/domain, or who have little time available to 
consider the persuasive message, for example. Individuals who process persuasive 
information systematically are thought to be able to differentiate between strong and weak 
message arguments, evaluating the advocated position in relation to previous knowledge 
(Chaiken, 1980; Chaiken & Maheswaran, 1994).  
Heuristic processing, on the other hand, is believed to require minimal cognitive 
effort. Here, individuals focus upon a subset of informational cues available to them, using 
simple inferential decision rules, schemata and cognitive heuristics to base subsequent 
decisions on. This more superficial assessment of persuasion cues and the persuasion 
message can include surface or structural characteristics of the message itself (e.g., number 
or length of arguments) or even communicator characteristics (such as likability, expertise 
etc.). Thus, individuals are more likely to endorse and accept information without fully 
processing the sematic content of the arguments, instead relying on easy-to-access 
peripheral content information, such as the likability of the source for example (Chaiken, 
1980; Roskos-Ewoldsen & Fazio, 1992).  
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The heuristic route is thought to rely on knowledge structures, learned and stored in 
memory from past experiences and observations (Nisbett & Ross, 1980). Three aspects of 
heuristic structures are believed to be key which include availability for future use 
(Tulving & Pearlstone, 1966), and accessibility of how easily/quickly a knowledge 
structure can be activated and made accessible for retrieval in memory (Sedikides & 
Skowronski, 1991). Heuristics are highly salient and are more accessible, meaning they are 
more likely to be used and available when forming individual judgements. Finally, 
applicability is important when discussing the heuristic route, referring to the 
appropriateness of the knowledge schemata to the task at hand, whereby a higher relevance 
for the accessible knowledge and stimulus leads to a stronger effect on the end judgement 
(Higgins, 1996). One early example of applicability and accessibility can be seen in 
Chaiken, Axsom, Liberman, and Wilson (1992) where the heuristic “message length 
implies message strength” was used. Individuals who perceived this cue as being reliable 
used the cue in assessing the task. However, priming concerning message length did not 
affect individuals who did not believe this to be a reliable cue in the first instance – 
indicating that applicability constrains accessibility in heuristic information processing.  
While HSM posits two distinct modes of processing, the model also assumes that 
these two processing modes can interact simultaneously. There are three hypotheses 
regarding the interaction relationship of the two routes. The first is known as the additivity 
hypothesis whereby when processing modes are congruent, this will result in additive 
effects on a receiver’s persuasion outcome (Chaiken & Maheswaran, 1994). In other 
words, when judgmental implications of message factors and heuristics are consistent, they 
can exert significant and additive effects on attitudes. Secondly, the attenuation hypothesis 
(Chaiken & Eagly, 1989) states that when heuristic and systematic processing are 
conflicting, implications derived from the systematic route will attenuate the impact of the 
heuristic route. Therefore, if attitudes are incongruent, systematic processing will override 
the impact of heuristic processing on attitude change.  
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Finally, the bias hypothesis (Bohner, Chaiken & Hunyadi, 1994) occurs when an 
ambiguous persuasive message stimulates heuristic cues, and these cues bias possible 
systematic processing despite high motivation from the receiver. For example, the contents 
of an ambiguous message may become more convincing when presented by an expert 
compared to a layperson (Chaiken & Maheswaran, 1994). The same ambiguous message 
however, can be interpreted differently depending on whether a person deems the message 
source reliable or not. Here, participants high or low in motivation were influenced by the 
‘reliable’ source. The authors showed that those high in motivation used systematic 
processing but were biased by the credibility of the source. Those low in motivation 
processed the message heuristically, biased by source reliability. Often such effects are 
implicit, with individual’s being unaware of the biasing influences, and instead believing 
their perceptions are based on systematic processing and reliable reading of reality (Trope 
& Gaunt, 1999). The bias hypothesis has received considerable support and indicates that 
biased processing can be independent of motivation (Chung & Waheed, 2016).  
HSM suggests therefore, that the likelihood of an individual engaging in in-depth 
cognitive processing relies on the sufficiency principle (Chaiken et al, 1989; Chaiken, 
Giner-Sorolla, & Chen, 1996). It is thought that systematic processing will increase when 
the difference between an individuals’ desired and actual confidence levels is large. 
Similarly, the principle also argues that individuals are likely to engage in heuristic 
processing when their desired and actual confidence levels are analogous (i.e., the 
difference in confidence is low). Individual desired confidence acts as the sufficiency 
threshold, triggering systematic processing of information when actual confidence is lower 
than desired by this threshold. This desire to reduce the discrepancy in confidence 
conceptualises the motivation to engage in information processing (Jonas, Diehl, & 
Bromer, 1997). Thus, enhancing cognitive processing can be stimulated by increasing an 
individual’s desired confidence, or reducing the individual’s actual confidence, or indeed 
both. This can be seen in Maheswaran and Chaiken’s (1991) study, whereby consensus 
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information was either congruent or incongruent to the valence of a persuasion message. 
They found in the incongruent condition, those that were not highly motivated showed 
substantial systematic processing due to the incongruent condition undermining their actual 
confidence (see Festinger, 1957).  
Cognitive, personal and environmental influences also affect an individual’s ability 
and motivation to process messages (Cialdini, 1984; Haddock, Maio, Arnold, & 
Huskinson, 2008). The cognitive miser (Fiske & Taylor, 1991) comes from the principle of 
least effort, whereby individuals invest cognitive effort only when given sufficient 
motivation and cognitive resources. This is not due to laziness, but through economically-
minded processers which enable expenditure of resources where they are needed, in an 
efficient manner (Bohner, Moskowitz, & Chaiken, 1995). Regarding motivation within the 
HSM, Chaiken (1987) initially claimed there was one dominant and core motivation that 
underpinned the processes of information: accuracy. The HSM claims people strive to 
achieve accurate attitudes and judgements, relevant and consistent with reality. This can be 
achieved via systematic processing, heuristic processing or both. Despite the assumption 
that heuristic processing often leads to less accurate judgements, this route is grounded in 
experience and can (under certain situations) be an accurate measure of judgement and 
attitude choice (Dillard & Pfau, 2002).  
        The HSM has undergone modifications, extending into a multiple-motive model 
which comprises two additional underlying motivations other than accuracy: defence-
motivation and impression-management motivation (Chaiken et al., 1996). Defence-
motivation is triggered when individuals try to defend pre-existing attitudinal positions. 
The goal being to confirm the validity of their positions and disconfirm other potential 
attitudes/opinions (Chaiken et al, 1989). Again, this can be processed either via the 
systematic route, heuristic route or both. The motivational processing employed is 
conditional on the sufficiency principle. When cues are incongruent to the preferred 
position, this will reduce an individual’s actual confidence and thus enhance the 
   8 
discrepancy between actual and desired confidence, leading to that individual engaging in 
systematic, yet biased processing (Ditto & Lopez, 1992; Pyszczynski & Greenberg, 1987; 
Lord, Ross, & Lepper, 1979). Additionally, heuristic processing is often employed when 
the incongruence between actual and desired is low. Therefore, effortful processing does 
not need to be employed to reduce any cognitive discomfort and so processing is often 
used in a selective fashion; choosing cues that are congruent with pre-existing attitudes and 
ignoring those that do not confirm beliefs. For example, Giner-Sorolla and Chaiken (1997) 
found that when participants with vested interests were presented with a supportive 
argument, they rated this as highly reliable.  
Finally, impression-management motivation refers to an individual’s immediate 
social goal, whereby they aim to hold socially acceptable beliefs and attitudes (Chaiken et 
al, 1996). It causes the desire to express beliefs that are deemed socially acceptable by the 
individual in the immediate context – be it real or imagined. Heuristic processing is used 
similarly to the defence-motivation, in that heuristics are selectively used and processed. 
For example, when conversing with another person with unknown beliefs, individuals 
often express moderate views to minimise disagreements (Cialdini, Levy, Herman, & 
Evenbeck, 1973). Again, the impression-management motivation follows the sufficiency 
principle: If heuristic processing does not sufficiently reduce the confidence gap, 
individuals are then biased towards achieving social goals via systematic processing. In  
conclusion, the HSM has advanced its model to include a total of three underlying 
motivations, with each type being independent to the mode of processing and guided by 
the sufficiency principle (see Figure 1.1 for a diagrammatic overview of the key principles 



































































































1.4.2   The elaboration-likelihood model. The Elaboration-
Likelihood Model (ELM; Petty & Cacioppo, 1981) provides a framework 
for organising, categorizing, and understanding the basic processes underlying persuasion. 
The central notion being that persuasion occurs along an elaboration continuum, 
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refers to the extent to which an individual engages in unique cognitive thought about issue-
relevant arguments contained in the persuasive message. ELM emphasises two different 
routes to persuasion – the central route and the peripheral route (see Figure 1.2 for a 
diagrammatic overview of the model).  
The central route is considered analytical in nature, requiring high motivation for 
processing of persuasive information. The core assumption being the higher an individual’s 
cognitive elaboration, the higher the likelihood that the individual will carefully process 
object-relevant information and access relevant associations and experiences from memory 
to carefully consider the merits of the persuasive message. The ability to scrutinize, 
elaborate critically upon the presented arguments, and draw personal inferences is the 
hallmark of this route (Shavitt & Brock, 1994). The ELM proposes that attitudes formed 
via the central route are enduring and predictive of future behaviour because they are more 
integrated within a person’s belief system (Cialdini, Petty, & Cacioppo, 1981), and so are 
more resistant to counter-persuasion compared to those formed via the peripheral route 
(see O’Keefe, 2008). 
Processing via the peripheral route is thought to be less cognitively demanding 
because simple cues and ‘rules of thumb’ are used to form decisions and judgments using 
the persuasive message and environmental characteristics provided (Cafferata & Tybout, 
1989). Cialdini (1984) identified six specific peripheral cues: reciprocation (feeling 
obligated to judge a message as credible based on past experience), liking (attractiveness or 
likability of message source), social proofing (feeling pressured by peers/source), 
consistency (relying on past thoughts and feelings), authority (perceived expert or authority 
figure and therefore considered trustworthy) and scarcity (message perceived to be present 
for a limited timeframe and hence, accepted swiftly).  
The peripheral route is often followed when motivation and/or ability to elaborate 
upon the message content is low. It allows a position to be adopted without the need for 
extensive and cognitively-demanding thought (low cognitive elaboration) using cognitive 
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short-cuts and heuristics (“I agree with people that I like”) that trigger acceptance without 
deliberate and conscious thinking (for example, if we are distracted or unmotivated). As 
such, these peripherally-processed attitudes and beliefs are relatively transient, susceptible 
to counter-persuasion and less predictive of subsequent behaviour (Petty, Cacioppo, & 
Schumann, 1983).  
However, environmental and personal factors can inhibit systematic and analytical 
processing (for example, environmental noise, lack of time or need for cognition) which 
leads to a reduction in cognitive resources (Fiske & Taylor, 1991). This reduction then 
limits the amount of elaboration individuals are able (and willing) to invest (Cacioppo & 
Petty, 1980). In these circumstances individuals increasingly rely on cues and heuristics to 
make decisions (Cafferata & Tybout, 1989). The cognitive elaboration continuum 
describes the amount of elaboration an individual gives to a persuasive message and how 
this can vary from one variable and contextual situation to another, dependent on 
motivation and cognitive ability of the individual. It proposes a trade-off whereby central 
and peripheral routes influence attitudes at different levels along the cognitive elaboration 
continuum (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986b).   
 At one end of the continuum, cognitive elaboration occurs when individuals are 
highly motivated and have the ability to engage in central route processing. At the other 
end of the scale, low elaboration likelihood occurs when an individual is low in motivation 
and/or cognitive capacity, processing message content in the form of peripheral cues (Petty 
& Cacioppo, 1986; Hamilton, 2004). Petty (1994) cites four hypotheses to explain why the 
impact of peripheral cues reduces as elaboration likelihood increases. The first of which is 
known as cue-salience hypothesis. Despite having potentially attended and processed the 
cue, individuals view this as less salient or accessible when expressing attitudes due to the 
effortful cognitive engagement they have engaged in. Secondly, Petty describes the cue-
loss hypothesis, whereby consideration and high elaboration reduces cue impact and 
undermines its influence on information processing. The cue-extremity hypothesis derives 
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from Tesser’s notion (Tesser & Conlee, 1975) that an attitude can be polarised due to 
increased thought. High elaboration likelihood leads to a reduction in thought about a 
peripheral cue, thus resulting in it being evaluated less extremely and having a reduced 
impact on the end attitude. Finally, cue-weighting hypothesis states when undergoing high 
elaboration processing, peripheral cues are seen as less relevant to the end result and thus 
reduces its impact on the cognitive elaboration process (Petty, 1994; Pierro, Mannetti, 
Kruglanski, & Sleeth-Keppler, 2004). 
It has been argued that as one moves up the elaboration continuum, specific 
features of the persuasive message such as argument quality will have a high impact on the 
decision-making process (Petty & Wegner, 1999). Similarly, as one moves down the 
elaboration continuum, increased weight is given to peripheral cues. In other words, ELM 
has been criticised for failing to account for multi-channel processing (Stiff, 1986). 
However, Petty and Wegener (1999) point out that this is not necessarily the case. The 
trade-off refers to the impact that communication variables have on attitudes. It specifies 
that a given variable can influence decision-making at different points along the 
continuum, serving as a cue, an argument, deterring the extent of cognitive elaboration, or 
producing bias in the processing.  
Such a hypothesis does make it difficult to predict the role a variable will have on 
the processing of persuasive information. For example, under low elaboration, source 
attractiveness can serve as a peripheral cue (‘all attractive people are trustworthy’). 
However, under high elaboration, this same source could serve as a persuasive message in 
favour of the argument (‘the product being advertised contributed towards her 
attractiveness’). Under moderate elaboration, the variable can serve as an elaboration 
moderator: i.e., a determinant of cognitive processing (Petty & Cacioppo, 1984; Petty, 
Kasmer, Haugtvedt, & Cacioppo, 1987). Finally, this same variable could cause biased 
processing, whereby the attractiveness of the source puts the individual in a positive mood 
and thus produces more favourable thoughts.  
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ELM offers a framework whereby a single variable can influence different 
processes along a continuum. The extent to which elaboration likelihood is triggered 
appears to depend on two things: motivation and ability. When motivation is high, the 
likelihood of high elaboration processing increases. However, this is directly affected by 
ability. If an individual is highly motivated but does not have the cognitive ability to 
scrutinise and elaborate on the persuasive content, then high elaboration processing via the 
central route will not occur. These can be influenced both by external (eg, distraction by 
noise) and internal events (eg, need for cognition; Petty & Cacioppo, 1984).  
Motivation can be seen by manipulating personal relevance of a persuasive topic. 
Petty and Cacioppo (1979) and Cafferata and Tybout (1989) found that when participants 
believed the study had little personal relevance, their attitudes remained neutral despite 
manipulation of strong and weak persuasive arguments. However, those in the highly 
relevant and strong argument condition showed an attitude shift in favour of the persuasive 
message. Those shown weak arguments produced a negative shift away from the 
persuasive message (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986b) which indicates the central route of 
processing increases as personal relevance increases, and as individuals become highly 
motivated. Personal importance is believed to increase motivation to be accurate, whereas 
low personal relevance is driven primarily by the desire for reduced cognitive work (the 
cognitive miser; Fiske & Taylor, 1991). On the other hand, it may be that high personal 
relevance conditions stimulate developed schema and knowledge frameworks within 
individuals and thus enhances elaboration (Markus, 1977).  
  The majority of research within the ELM determines that attitude change does not 
occur exclusively via issue-relevant or simple cue association. The ability for variables to 
influence processing the entire way along the elaboration continuum is highlighted 
throughout the research within ELM. Despite the benefits for central route processing 
(endurance of attitudes, predictive of behaviour), a critique is that this can be hard to 
induce. Individuals must have the ability and the motivation to think critically and 
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elaborate on the message content, and the arguments produced must be seen as persuasive 




















Figure 1.2    Diagrammatic overview of the Elaboration-Likelihood Model (ELM). Key 
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1.4.3   Comparison of dual-process theories. Evidence exists to provide support 
for the notion that persuasion occurs via one of two routes (Petty, 1977; Eagly & 
Himmelfarb, 1978; Chaiken, 1980; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986a; Chaiken, Liberman, & 
Eagly, 1989). The major assumptions of HSM and ELM are similar - that is, the existence 
of two qualitatively different persuasion routes. In both, one route assumes more 
cognitively extensive elaboration, critical thinking and processing of message 
arguments/content, with the resultant attitudes formed being highly predictive of 
subsequent behaviour, long-lasting and resistant to counter-persuasion. Conversely, the 
alternative processing route is less intensive, uses simple heuristics and peripheral cues for 
instant conclusions, and as a consequence is thought to be less cognitively demanding and 
often less effective in bringing about persuasion when individuals are highly motivated and 
able to process critically. Indeed, attitudes and beliefs formed via this route are believed to 
be much less predictive of behaviour, and much more susceptible to counter-persuasion.  
Both ELM and HSM theories assume that sufficient motivation and cognitive 
ability are primary determinants of information processing, with the ‘default’ motivation 
being the ability to hold accurate attitudes and beliefs, balanced with need to exert the least 
amount of cognitive effort to achieve this goal. In addition, they both agree that the two 
processing modes can co-occur, albeit in different ways. However, ELM argues the 
existence of an inverse relationship between central and peripheral processing whereby 
there is a trade-off: as the importance of one mode decreases, the importance of the other 
increases and vica versa. However, HSM assumes i) both processing routes can occur 
simultaneously, and can augment each other in an additive processing manner, or ii) the 
processing routes can clash on occasions, whereby one route becomes more influential 
than another, producing independent effects on influence according to which route 
prevails. Irrespective of the differences between the two models, it is clear that to leverage 
persuasion and maximise the chances that any resultant attitude change will endure, both 
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countenance the application of techniques to encourage cognitively extensive elaboration 
and in-depth processing of message arguments.    
 
1.5   Language, Confidence and Persuasion  
As outlined in the previous section, persuasion can occur via one of two routes. The 
route one takes to process persuasion is dependent on the variables being processed, the 
context, motivation and ability of the receiver, amongst many other factors. Both models 
state the peripheral/heuristic route is influenced by previous experiences, schema and cues 
which on their own are not enough to ‘persuade’, but can serve to add, attenuate or bias the 
more in-depth and critical thought processes. One such area which contribute to validating 
and biasing cognitive processing is language. Words translate internal thought into a 
format that others can understand, and so understanding the role of language in persuasion 
is important. People are often judged not only by what they say, but how they speak - their 
linguistic style (Ng & Bradac, 1993). 
The programme of research presented in this thesis concerns persuasion and the 
impact of communication modality, gender, ethnicity and cognitive style. Communication 
style may differ across modalities, gender, ethnicity and cognitive style, and so its impact 
could be a useful indicator/predictor of persuasion outcomes. Here, the emphasis is on 
linguistic style and confidence cues. The majority of research within the persuasion 
literature has tended to focus on message variables (e.g., message content, speed, tone, 
intensity etc.) and their effect on the persuasion process (Blankenship, 2001). Accordingly, 
research investigating the role of language and linguistic style on persuasion outcomes is 
sparse. However, there are a number of enduring findings that have been used to direct this 
thesis, as introduced below. 
 
1.5.1   Linguistic style and persuasion. The verbal content of speech can be 
directly measured using a variety of linguistic analyses.  A primary software system often 
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used within the literature is known as Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC), which 
can also support further analyses of linguistic data, such as linguistic style matching (LSM; 
Niederhoffer & Pennebaker, 2002; Pennebaker, Francis, & Booth, 2001). Speech and the 
content of communication has the potential to reveal much in terms of cognitive and 
emotional state. For example, reflecting where attention is directed, an individual’s 
cognitive thoughts and influences, as well as indicating affect and issues being avoided 
(Tausczik & Pennebaker, 2010). Person perception has been inferred from the use of 
pronouns (Ireland & Henderson, 2014), whilst word count has surmised domination of 
conversation and thus how engaged individuals are: The more communication and unity in 
speech, the more positive the group performance (Tausczik & Pennebaker, 2010).  
However, the timing of unity and agreement is important regarding the motivation 
of group members. The increased use of assents (‘okay’, ‘yes’, ‘hmm-mm’) towards the 
end of communication can suggest consensus between subjects, but early approvals can 
indicate blind agreement suggestive of unmotivated individuals (Leshed, Hancock, Cosley, 
McLeod, & Gay, 2007). Furthermore, cognitive mechanisms in speech (‘know’, ‘ought’) 
and prepositions (‘above’, ‘with’) are indicative of higher cognitive thought, often 
providing more complex information (Tausczik & Pennebaker, 2010). So, function and 
content words that make up linguistic word style is indicative of the cognitive processes 
occurring during communication, providing cues to psychological, cognitive and 
motivational states, independent of their semantic content.   
Research has indicated that perceived power affects impression formation and 
attitude change. Powerful speakers are perceived as more confident, competent, intelligent, 
likable and trustworthy than powerless speakers, an effect that has been found across a 
multitude of contexts including courtrooms, classrooms, and interviews (Conley, O’Barr, 
& Lind, 1978; Haleta, 1996; Holtgraves & Lasky, 1999; Parton, Siltanen, Hosman, & 
Lagenderfer, 2002). For example, during witness testimony, powerless speakers - 
exemplified by linguistic features such as hesitations (‘umm’, ‘err’, ‘you know’, ‘I mean’) 
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- are often perceived as having low competency and thus indicating a lack of confidence in 
their verbalisations (Parton et al., 2002). On the other hand, powerful language (which 
tends to be absent of the above linguistic features [Blankenship & Holtgraves, 2005; Carli, 
1990]) results in higher credibility and acceptance of information advocated by the witness 
compared to a powerless linguistic style (Erikson, Lind, Johnson, & O’Barr, 1978).  
The research concerning power in language for persuasion has, however, produced 
conflicting results, and so the picture is far from clear concerning its influence on 
information processing. Some have reported powerless language does not affect persuasion 
(Gibbons, Busch, & Bradac, 1991) whereas others have claimed that powerless language 
has a direct effect on susceptibility of persuasion (Holtgraves & Lasky, 1999). More 
recently, Hosman, Huebner, and Siltanen (2002) found that powerless language decreased 
persuasion suggesting that a lack of power reduces perception of confidence and 
knowledge in the subject area, encouraging the receiver to generate counterarguments and 
thus resist persuasive attacks (Bradac & Mulac, 1984). These differences may, however, be 
the result of different modes of communicating so when arguments are presented in hard 
copy print and written down, powerless language has less impact on persuasion compared 
to spoken communication which occurs either via audio or video formats.  
Sparks, Areni, and Cox (1998) found very little effect of power differences when 
messages were presented in print format. Print format has the limitation of not transferring 
paralinguistic aspects of speech through the medium. Such properties within powerless 
language cannot be adequately transferred in a written context (‘umm’, ‘err’, tone of voice 
or pauses in speech for example). Thus, receivers process the information based on 
argument quality and linguistic style in the form of language power appears to have very 
little effect within this medium. Additionally, responding to the persuasive message does 
not have to occur in real-time, allowing receivers to read through and process the relevant 
arguments at a pace which suits them. Conversely, in real-time interaction formats (audio, 
video or FtF), the salience of the speaker is enhanced and diverts attention away from 
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message arguments, possibly reducing cognitive elaboration (Petty, Cacioppo, & Goldman, 
1981). Consequently, the impact of an individual’s linguistic style appears dependent on 
context.  
Research has failed to ‘find’ the exact powerless markers used to investigate 
persuasion, assuming measures to be roughly equivalent and can, therefore, be combined 
with equal weighting (Blakenship & Holtgraves, 2005). In an attempt to explain the 
multitude of findings surrounding linguistic power within the persuasion process, the ELM 
(Petty & Cacioppo, 1986a & b) reports power can act as a peripheral cue (Holtgraves & 
Lasky, 1999). When cognitive elaboration is low, linguistic power limits the processing of 
message details and focusses decision-making on the perception of the speaker or source 
(Sparks & Areni, 2008). The confidence heuristic (see Section 1.5.2) suggests that a 
powerless speech style represents a lack of knowledge and confidence on behalf of the 
speaker, thus resulting in a resistance to persuasion. On the other hand, when argument 
quality and power in speech style are consistently high, the confidence heuristic results in 
increased perceptions of accuracy and intelligence, resulting in higher persuasion 
susceptibility (Areni & Sparks, 2005). In other words, a confident speaker using a powerful 
speech style induces the confidence heuristic.  
 Alternatively, linguistic style can induce central processing via high cognitive 
elaboration, biasing and inhibiting the processing of persuasive arguments. Biasing 
influence occurs when recipients elaborate on the arguments being made, engaging in 
counter-argumentation when powerless language is used, and can even produce boomerang 
effects (Hovland, Janis, & Kelley, 1953). Additionally, when recipients are motivated and 
engaged in high cognitive elaboration, the use of a powerless speech style can distract the 
receiver, focussing cognitive thoughts towards the speaker in order to explain their 
perceived lack of confidence and therefore producing less message-related thoughts 
(Gibbons et al., 1991; Sparks & Areni, 2002).  This serves to limit elaboration of the 
content of the message and biases information processing. 
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1.5.2   The confidence heuristic. The confidence heuristic initially proposed by 
Thomas and McFadyen (1995) posits that communication of strength and confidence in 
beliefs and attitudes is portrayed via the expression of degrees of confidence relative to that 
belief or attitude. The reliability of an expressed attitude is based on the expression of 
confidence given to it. Confidence is often a way to assess the quality and reliability of a 
speaker’s information, with those expressing high levels of confidence habitually seen as 
more accurate and correct in their information and knowledge. Those who express higher 
levels of confidence enable the exertion of subjective views onto others and are more likely 
to persuade others to change their attitudes (Sniezek & van Swol, 2001). Often, in real-life 
tasks and decisions, an accurate answer is not always apparent or directly observable. 
Thus, the confidence of a person is frequently used to make inferences regarding the 
speaker’s accuracy (Paese & Kinnaly, 1993). As a result, a highly confident speaker is 
often perceived to be competent, knowledgeable, likable, intelligent and credible compared 
to that of a low confident or doubtful speaker (Leippe, Manion, & Romanczyk, 1992; Price 
& Stone, 2004). Additionally, the confidence heuristic has been reported to behave 
similarly in both face-to-face and instant-messaging contexts (Pulford, Colman, Buabang, 
& Krockow, 2018). This is similar to the self-validation hypothesis, which claims 
confident thoughts (metacognition) guides attitudes, when can subsequently guide 
behaviour (Briñol & Petty, 2004). 
Wesson (2005) investigated the influence of confidence on decision-making and 
found that those with a high level of uncertainty in their choices were more likely to use 
the confidence heuristic and base their subsequent choice decisions on sources with a 
higher confidence. This provides credibility to the suggestion that those who are persuaded 
have a lower initial confidence prior to a persuasion discussion as suggested by London, 
Meldman, and Lanckton (1970a&b). However, as with any heuristics, the confidence 
heuristic is prone to error and can produce negative results, especially in the criminal 
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justice system. For example, juries often view a confident and assertive witness as accurate 
and trustworthy (Erickson, Lind, Johnson, & O'Barr, 1978). This can then impact on 
potential miscarriages of justice if the witness is incorrect (Krug, 2007; Wells, Small, 
Penrod, Malpass, Fulero, & Brimacombe, 1998).  
Loftus (1974) demonstrated this effect in the research of an eye-witness account 
which was either seen as credible, discredited or where no eye-witness was provided at all. 
Her results showed that the discredited witness was almost as influential in terms of 
producing a guilty verdict as the credible eye-witness, when compared to having no 
witness at all. The confidence heuristic is employed, even when the credibility of a speaker 
is damaged. Whitley Jr. (1987) suggests this is perhaps due to the act of perceiving a 
witness as credible even if discredited, compared to having no witness at all. Thus, the 
confidence heuristic can bias judgements in decision-making, relying on the 
communication of confidence rather than competence. Therefore, it seems that the 
expression of confidence is not necessarily an expression of accuracy or quality (Wesson, 
2005). 
On the other hand, some researchers have noted an interaction between confidence 
and argument quality, whereby argument quality interacts and moderates the effect of the 
confidence heuristic. For example, Zarnoth and Sniezek (2002) found that a highly 
confident speaker was more influential than a low confident speaker when presenting a 
strong argument. However, when a low confident speaker presents a low-quality argument, 
their influence on persuasion is higher than that of a highly confident speaker presenting 
the low-quality argument. Thus, a relationship appears to exist between argument quality 
and the confidence heuristic, whereby argument quality needs to match the confidence 
expressed. It may be that a speaker’s language style needs to represent their perceived 
confidence, thus satisfying the language expectancy theory (LET; Burgoon, 1995). The 
results can be compared to London, McSeveney, and Tropper’s (1971) research, whereby 
participants were seen in a negative light when overconfident in their communication, 
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perhaps due to the mismatch in argument quality and subsequent confidence, leading to 
assumptions that the speaker is over-confident and unlikable (Wesson, 2005).  
Research supports the notion that individuals use expressions of confidence to 
guide judgements and decisions via the confidence heuristic. However, confidence appears 
to influence persuasion when argument quality matches linguistic confidence perceptions. 
Thomas and McFadyen (1995) question the assumption that this heuristic is indeed a 
general cognitive heuristic, as differences have been found in gender. For example, 
findings have revealed that women often use language which portray higher amounts of 
doubt and express uncertainty to a greater extent than men (Furrow & Moore, 1990). 
However, it should be noted that much of this research is now over twenty years old. One 
key issue which should be noted regarding epistemic modality and the confidence heuristic 
is the issue of a ‘preciseness paradox’ (Teigen, 1990). Individuals are not always truthful in 
their portrayal, bluffing or guessing can still occur in a confident linguistic style, despite 
false information being told. Additionally, this can go the opposite way, where a lack of 
self-confidence leads to a miscommunication of epistemic modality.  
 Epistemic modality is considered a part of linguistic modality, which relates to the 
speaker’s state of knowledge, certainty, belief and degree of likelihood about a topic, 
expressed through the use of words within linguistic style (Rubin, 2010). It refers to the 
way in which a speaker communicates their doubts, deductions and subjective conviction, 
existing on a continuum and ranging from doubt, to intermediate probability and through to 
certainty (think, probably, might, it’s possible, know, certain, positive; Berry, 1960; Fabre, 
1991; Westney, 1986).  Due to the complex nature of language, there are often a multitude 
of words and expressions individuals can use to express their subjective confidence in 
speech, thus making it difficult to accurately measure and comprehensively cover (Hamm, 
1991). 
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1.5.3   Expressed confidence.  Expressed confidence consists of linguistic content 
whereby individuals attempt to resolve a disagreement (Maslow, Yoselson, & London, 
1971). London, Meldman, and Lanckton (1970a & b) distinguished expressed confidence 
as a message variable during observations using The Jury Method (JM) - an enduring 
paradigm for investigating persuasion (see Chapter 3). Expressed confidence encompasses 
confidence in self (Cs) as well as doubt in others (Do). On the opposite end of this 
continuum, doubt consists of is confidence in others (Co) and doubt in self (Ds). London et 
al. (1970a) calculated a ‘vector of persuasion’ which allows the measurement of expressed 
confidence in speech using the 4 confidence markers described, whereby: 
 
Vector of Persuasion = Confidence – Doubt = (Cs + Do) – (Ds + Co) 
 
This vector allows simultaneous measurement of persuasive force and resistance to 
persuasion within naturalistic and dyadic face-to-face communication. Despite individuals 
not differing on argument quality, persuaders were found to have a significantly higher 
vector of persuasion (30.6) compared to persuadees’ (12.5). Thus, the larger the vector, the 
higher the likelihood the individual will become a persuader. Maslow, Yoselson, and 
London (1971) systematically investigated expressed confidence by manipulating the 
amount a confederate portrayed whilst keeping all other elements constant. Thus, if 
persuasion occurs within conditions of higher expressed confidence, greater credibility is 
gained for the expressed confidence hypothesis. Maslow et al. (1971) used an adapted JM 
paradigm, whereby participants were given a ‘transcript’ of another student’s views 
regarding the criminal case study. To manipulate expressed confidence, slots were created 
to include the confidence/doubt words without altering the argument’s structure or 
meaning. For example, “(Obviously/I don’t know) my first (concern/conflict) is deciding 
what to base liability on” (p. 236). Persuasion was measured by calculating the confidence 
levels of participants pre- and post- exposure to the transcript. This produced a significant 
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result, revealing those who received the confident transcript were more persuaded than 
those who had received the doubtful transcript.  
 Expressed confidence does not only occur via language and speech. Other channels 
can contribute to this persuasive effect. Maslow et al. (1971) investigated expressed 
confidence using body language. A neutral speech, which consisted of the same argument 
as their first study was audio-recorded to control for content and para-language. An actor 
then recorded three videos, miming the argument throughout the three conditions, whereby 
he was instructed to portray confidence, doubt and neutral body language. The neutral and 
controlled argument was subsequently dubbed over the top and given to participants (who 
later noted no awareness of the actor being dubbed). The authors found that increased 
kinesic confidence increased persuasion despite the fact the argument stayed constant. 
London (1973) expanded on the concept of multiple channels and investigated 
paralinguistic doubt by observing the recorded tapes from London et al.’s (1970a) original 
JM paradigm. He found that doubt, when expressed paralinguistically, (‘umm-ing’, ‘er-
ing’, repeating words and pausing) was significantly more likely to occur in persuadees’, 
whilst individuals expressing reduced paralinguistic doubt were more likely to become the 
persuader.  It can therefore be reasoned that confidence, when expressed verbally, 
paralinguistically and/or via body language is a significant predictor of persuasion.  
Having indicated that confidence has a significant effect on the persuasion outcome 
within the JM, London et al. (1970a) decided to break down the concept of expressed 
confidence into three distinct segments of time to understand its influence and progression 
through the dyadic discussion. They revealed that both the persuader and persuadee vector 
of persuasion increased between times 1 and 2. However, vectors for both subjects 
decreased dramatically at time 3. This is interesting, especially when applied to London, 
McSeveney, and Tropper’s (1971) study, which found that the articulation and coherence 
of arguments were not fully formed until the last third of the discussion, at which point the 
cumulative mean vector had reduced dramatically for both persuader and persuadee. 
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Following on from these results, there have been two suggestions in an attempt to 
understand the fluctuations in the vectors of persuasion over the jury discussion.  
Firstly, the persuader decreases their expressed confidence due to the knowledge 
that the persuadee is changing their attitudes and thus further persuasion attempts would be 
futile and a waste of energy. Secondly, a reduction in expressed confidence occurs in order 
to reduce a negative affect whereby over-confidence occurs. The persuader lets the 
persuadee down gently and precludes their persuasion attempts. London et al. (1971) 
investigated these two hypotheses using an adapted JM paradigm. Participants, rather than 
engaging in a dyadic discussion, were asked to pass notes to and from another participant. 
However, the ‘other’ participant did not exist and the notes were pre-written, differing only 
in terms of expressed confidence (low, moderate and high). London et al. (1971) claim the 
low confidence (LC) condition represents the expressed confidence of a typical persuadee. 
The moderate confidence condition (MC) representing a typical persuader, and the high 
confidence (HC) condition representing ‘much more confidence’ than a typical persuader 
(p. 362). They report that the participants in the MC condition became less confident over 
the discussion period of their initial verdict, indicating persuasion with participants at least 
weakening in their confidence for their initial verdict choice. 
However, both LC and HC participants became more confident in their initial 
verdict choices, showing a resistance to persuasion. Consequently, the assumption is made 
that persuaders reduce their confidence in the last third segment of the discussion (as seen 
in London et al., 1970a) due to the implicit or explicit knowledge that expressing ‘too 
much confidence’ can cause the persuadee to resist their persuasive attempt. London et al. 
(1971) went further and revealed that a high level of antagonism was felt in participants 
within the HC condition. Their data reveals that an increasing level of HC left participants 
feeling increasingly negative towards the persuader. Wesson (2005) supports these 
findings. Manipulation of confidence using high, moderate and low testimonies were used, 
and too much confidence had a detrimental effect on social attractiveness ratings by 
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participants. Low and moderately confident speakers were perceived as more friendly and 
trustworthy compared to the highly confident speaker. However, this did not carry over to 
other attributes, with intelligence, optimism, knowledge, self-confidence, professionalism 
and a lack of nervousness all increasing with enhanced confidence, supporting the 
confidence heuristic.  
At first glance, these studies seem contradictory. However, the previous study 
(London et al., 1970a) simply observed confidence within the persuasive context and did 
not manipulate it directly. Therefore, what might have been perceived as high confidence 
in London et al.’s study (1970a) was simply considered moderate confidence in the 
London et al.’s (1971) later study. As a direct result of London et al.’s (1971) findings, a 
curvilinear relationship was postulated regarding expressed confidence and persuasion.  
Expressed confidence has a positive correlation with persuasion up until a certain point, at 
which stage a negative correlation is established (increased expressed confidence leading 
to a resistance to persuasion attempts). Taking this one step further and drawing on the 
work of Abelson and Miller (1967), negative persuasion is hypothesised to occur at the 
extreme end of the curvilinear relationship. Abelson and Miller report that not only do 
participants resist persuasion, but they are persuaded to change their opinion contrary to 
that advocated by persuader; resulting in negative impressions of the persuader and 
boomerang effects (Brehm, 1996; Hovland, Janis, & Kelley, 1953). In other words, certain 
linguistic features can cause resistance in the receiver. For example, research has shown 
that a dogmatic linguistic style can induce psychological reactance (Quick & Stephenson, 
2008). Dogmatic language is considered to be forceful, controlling and explicit in its usage, 
pressuring the listener to conform and change their behaviour and attitudes in line with the 
message advocated (Miller et al., 2007). Words include imperatives like ‘must’, ‘need’, 
and absolute allegations such as, ‘cannot deny’, ‘is extremely serious’ (Bushman, 1998). 
Such linguistic style is thought to elicit reactance in the listener, creating a perceived threat 
to autonomy of opinion choice and thus lead to negative persuasion and boomerang effects 
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in the receiver (Cohen, 1962). This effect has been found in a wide range of studies 
including reactance to the curbing of alcohol consumption (Dillard & Shen, 2005; Rains & 
Turner, 2007) and increasing exercise regime (Quick & Considine, 2008). 
 
1.5.4   Linguistic style matching (LSM).  
Confidence in speech is not the only aspect of linguistic style which can feasibly influence 
persuasion. Linguistic style matching (LSM) has previously been investigated with regards 
to rapport and negotiation outcomes, finding successful interactions are often correlated by 
a high LSM score (indicating a highly similar linguistic style). Being mindful that 
correlation does not predict causation, and little research has investigated persuasion 
outcomes with regards to LSM, it nevertheless lends itself to further exploration utilising 
dual-process models of persuasion.  
During communication, linguistic patterns are often mimicked and coordinated by 
individuals, and this concept of coordination is thought to be essential to the success of an 
interaction (Taylor & Thomas, 2008). Convergence on accents, rate of speech, and 
syntactic categories such as pronouns and verb tense can enhance the ease of interaction, 
and increase efficiency (Gonzales, Hancock, & Pennebaker 2010). One hypothesis that 
helps to explain the link between a successful interaction and linguistic matching is the 
coordination-rapport hypothesis (Tickle-Degnen & Rosenthal, 1987). This hypothesis 
reports a correlation between enhanced coordination during communication and the 
increase in perceived attraction and rapport of the conversational partner. Park and Burgess 
(1924) define rapport as “the existence of a mutual responsiveness, such that every 
member of the group reacts immediately, spontaneously, and sympathetically to the 
sentiments and attitudes of every other member” (p. 893). In other words, coordination 
leads to enhanced likability, creating a friendly connection and rapport (Tickle-Degnen & 
Rosenthal, 1990). Therefore, the more two people like and respect each other, the higher 
the rapport and consequently, coordination. However, one issue with this hypothesis is that 
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it is based on the coordination of non-verbal behaviour and therefore has not focused on 
speech mimicry.  
Communication-accommodation theory (CAT; Coupland & Giles, 1988; Giles & 
Coupland, 1991) on the other hand, focusses on the strategic accommodation individuals 
make in their speech whilst interacting in a social context. The theory proposes that 
individuals continually alter their linguistic convergence/divergence to increase, decrease 
or maintain social distance between conversational partners. Linguistic convergence can 
cover a range of linguistic elements, such as pitch, tone, rate of speech and word use 
(Scissors, Gill, Geraghty, & Gergle, 2009). For example, similarity in speech has been 
found to increase perceived supportiveness and predictability and thus reduce social 
distance and negative outcomes as they converge on linguistic style (Berger & Bradac, 
1982). This can be seen in criminal trials, where witnesses alter their answering style as 
each question is phrased and heard, accommodating more or less coercive questioning by 
barristers (Gnisci, 2005). Equally, research has shown that distancing oneself from social 
interaction decreases linguistic style matching where insiders, who were attempting to steal 
confidential documents from fellow work colleagues, reduced their linguistic matching 
over time compared to non-insiders (Taylor et al., 2013). 
In a similar vein, interactional alignment theory (IAT; Pickering & Garrod, 2004) 
places emphasis on an individual’s innate tendency to align their linguistic style such as 
grammar and word choice during interactive dialogue. IAT claim such language style 
matching is linked to a common understanding between the conversational partners, and 
thus leads to enhanced cooperation and goal achievement (Menenti, Pickering, & Garrod, 
2012). An individual’s speech is thought to prime the listener to subsequently speak in a 
similar style, which in turn, primes the previous speaker and so on. This circle of linguistic 
influence and convergence effects cognition; priming the conversational partners to begin 
to think in similar ways, such as their speech converges. People who use the same 
linguistic style to describe things often think about things in the same way too, having 
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implications within the persuasive literature: high linguistic style matching leads to 
enhanced comprehension and persuasion over time (Markman and Makin, 1998). For 
example, Pennebaker and King (1999) found that language reflects individual differences 
in personality and self-expression, so language convergence would therefore imply 
perceptions of the topic being discussed are similar, signifying harmony and parallel 
attitudinal beliefs.  
IAT has found that imitation occurs at varying levels of linguistic style, including 
grammar (Branigan, Pickering & Cleland, 2000), syntax (Levelt & Kelter, 1982) and 
phonetics (Pardo, 2006). Again, this is deemed to be an automatic process, requiring little 
cognitive effort on behalf of the speaker, leading to individuals often unaware of their 
converging speech styles. It is argued that such innate mimicry is due to an evolutionary 
desire to foster and maintain social relationships (Lakin, Jefferis, Cheng, & Chartrand, 
2003). Researchers have used linguistic mimicry to predict social interactions and even 
shape the nature of collaborations (Tausczik & Pennebaker, 2013). LSM (Niederhoffer & 
Pennebaker, 2002) uses a computerised analysis software which calculates the distance 
between two subject’s linguistic styles, measuring and predicting social dynamics during 
discussions (Gonzales, Hancock, & Pennebaker 2010; Pickering, & Garrod, 2004).  
The degree to which coordination of word usage occurs can be measured during 
naturalistic conversations using this unobtrusive analysis software, primarily using 
function words such as prepositions, conjunctions and pronouns, which are often collected 
using LIWC software. It is estimated that 0.05% of vocabulary within English consists of 
function words, and yet these make up 55% of all speech: written, read or heard (Tausczik 
& Pennebaker, 2010). Function words are considered context-free, therefore allowing LSM 
to be used for a variety of speech topics and discussions, whilst contexts such as 
computer—based communication, formal interviews and informal dialogue can be 
interpreted effortlessly and efficiently (Gonzales, Hancock, & Pennebaker, 2010). In 
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addition, function words are non-consciously produced and therefore very difficult to 
manipulate and alter in speech patterns (Pennebaker & King, 1999).  
Research investigating the matching of function words within interaction has 
generally found that increased LSM leads to enhanced team performance, rapport and 
negotiation (Ireland & Pennebaker, 2010; Pickering & Garrod, 2006; Richardson, Taylor, 
Snook, Conchie, & Bennell, 2014). More in-depth research has resulted in specific 
linguistic-style matching, as first-person pronouns (such as ‘I’, ‘we’) have been found to 
heighten the cohesiveness of a group, often after a tragedy has occurred. For example, after 
9/11, American’s linguistic style was reported to change, consisting of an increased usage 
of first-person pronouns, both in FtF and online contexts (Cohn, Mehl, & Pennebaker, 
2004).  
LSM seems to occur in a variety of different contexts. Gonzales, Hancock and 
Pennebaker (2010) found that a higher score on LSM was correlated with likability of 
group members across both FtF and CMC conditions. In the FtF condition, a high score on 
LSM was significantly related to task performance. Yet this did not occur in the online 
condition, suggesting that reduced media richness inhibits certain aspects of LSM on 
behaviour and cognition. Online communication is difficult, as there is only one channel in 
which to observe and mimic behaviour. Accents, pitch and tone of voice, as well as non-
verbal behaviours such as smiling cannot be converted or observed through this channel.  
Niederhoffer and Pennebaker (2002) initially investigated LSM in a computer-based 
environment, using turn-by-turn interactions as well as conversational FtF interaction using 
the Watergate tapes to retroactively investigate LSM. The results showed that dyadic 
interactions exhibited high LSM for both scenarios, regardless of context or social status. 
However, they did find that anonymous participants interacting via the computer had 
significantly lower speech style matching than those who were identifiable, perhaps due to 
a perceived lack of responsibility and deindividuation. As a result, Niederhoffer and 
Pennebaker (2002) claim that engagement, rather than rapport (as stated in the 
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coordination-rapport hypothesis) is the key to coordination. They found that when LSM 
was applied to a computer-based interaction, LSM was not correlated to subjective ratings 
of rapport. Instead, LSM was high for pairs who reported positive and negative 
interactions. This coordination-engagement hypothesis implies that high engagement in a 
conversation (be it positive or negative) influences and positively correlates with verbal 
(and non-verbal) coordination. Due to engagement being the central element in this 
hypothesis, it is a lack of interest and engagement that leads to reduced coordination, rather 
than low rapport as previously suggested (Tickle-Degnen & Rosenthal, 1990). 
Alternatively, perhaps the concept of anonymity and not knowing the other conversational 
person leads to reduced levels of rapport which in turn, leads to a reduced LSM result. This 
research lends itself to the suggestion that as the likelihood of elaboration increases and the 
central route is engaged in processing persuasion (via high motivation and engagement), 
LSM will increase.  
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Chapter Two: Influences on Persuasion 
 
2.1   Overview of Chapter Two  
Chapter two will introduce four key areas relevant to the programme of research 
presented in this thesis, which are believed to impact on persuasion outcomes. These are as 
follows: i) context, specifically the mode of presentation of the persuasive message. For 
example, synthetic environments versus face-to-face contexts, ii) cognitive style, 
specifically Need for Cognitive Closure (NfCC) and Delusional Thinking, iii) ethnicity 
and, iv) gender.  
 
2.2   Digital Modalities (DMs) 
Technology is becoming increasingly integrated into our everyday lives. Digital 
modalities (DMs) allow interactions that overcome traditional barriers of distance and 
time. Yet, intelligence interviewing outside of traditional face-to-face environments has yet 
to be fully explored, either theoretically or empirically despite communication increasingly 
utilising DMs at an unprecedented rate. In 2017, over 55% of the population had access to 
the internet (Internet World Stats, 2018) and so investigating the feasibility of persuasion 
in various synthetic environments is timely. For example, in 2015, the National Security 
Strategy reaffirmed cyber threat as a Tier One threat status, considered the highest priority 
for action (Cabinet Office, 2011; HM Government, 2016).  
 Online environments enable communication to occur widely, effectively and 
consistently. This allows for interaction and deliberation between conversational partners 
across large geographical distances. DMs encompass online synthetic environments, 
virtual reality environments, text-only computer mediated communication, and video-
enabled communication, amongst many others. However, collaborative DMs are the focus 
of this thesis, specifically the use of text-only computer mediated communication and 
communication in an immersive virtual reality environment, via avatars. The primary aim 
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is to address the clear gap in the persuasion literature concerning cognition in online 
environments. 
 
2.2.1   Social cognition within digital modalities. Social cognitive theory argues 
that cognition is a product of a reciprocal interplay between intrapersonal, behavioural and 
environmental determinants (Bandura, 1991; Fiske & Taylor 2013). Accordingly, 
understanding the reciprocity between intrapersonal (internal to the communicator) aspects 
and external environments offers exciting opportunities for the understanding of persuasion 
within different and novel modalities. Environmental contexts are professed to greatly 
influence the effectiveness of the communication process (Guadagno & Cialdini, 2007; 
Wilson, 2003; Zanbaka, Goolkasian, & Hodges, 2006). A digital medium can significantly 
alter and constrain social, contextual and perceptual cues that influence perceptions of 
behaviour, intentions and personality within face-to-face (FtF) interactions (Walther, 
2011). A key aspect thought to affect social cognition is anonymity: the ability to hide, or 
significantly alter your perception of self to others.  
Anonymity within digital modalities allows the freedom of communication without 
influence from physical attributes such as gender, ethnicity and age, amongst others. 
Identities are fluid inside DM’s, with individuals having the possibility to experience and 
create persona’s online which do not reflect their true-life selves (Joinson, McKenna, 
Postmes, & Reips, 2009; Yee & Bailenson, 2007). This privacy can reduce the expression 
of stereotypical behaviour, in effect ‘even the playing field’. This theory is often better 
known as the Equalisation Hypothesis (Dubrovsky, Kiesler, & Sethna, 1991) which can 
promote gender equality as stereotypes can no longer be projected. This is evident in a 
study conducted by Matheson (1991), who manipulated the availability of gender cues 
within a synthetic environment. No significant difference in person perception was 
observed when gender cues were made unavailable. However, in a second study when 
gender cues were apparent, perceptions differed; with women seen as more cooperative 
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and men as more exploitive in line with traditional stereotypes (Thayer & Ray, 2006). The 
findings support the equalisation hypothesis in that anonymity excludes gender 
stereotypical expectations when conversing anonymously. However, some evidence 
suggests that gender stereotypical behaviour is heightened when using digital modalities 
(Postmes, Spears, Sakhel, & de Groot, 2001), undermining the equality of online contexts. 
Postmes and Spears (2002) reported that anonymous individuals had pronounced 
differences in linguistic dominance in relation to typical gender stereotypes. In other 
words, a lack of identifiability resulted in greater gender differences, promoted via the 
exchange of linguistic style.   
Anonymity can alter cognition and the resultant behaviour, with research providing 
evidence of visually anonymous interactions leading to higher levels of self-disclosure 
compared to identifiable discussions (Joinson, 2001; 2007). It seems that the lack of 
identifying features within the medium facilitates honest and open discussions that would 
not have been possible when interacting FtF (see Taylor & Dando, 2018). Likewise, the 
elimination of cues often means reduced social comparisons, and thus the persuasiveness 
of arguments presented are at the forefront in terms of opinion shifts within such 
modalities (El Shinnawy & Vinze, 1998). A compromise for anonymity leads to arguments 
presented deemed less credible (the discounting hypothesis; see Rains, 2007), thus 
reducing influence on personal opinions (McLeod, 2000).  Reduced social presence often 
seen within DMs means there is reduced ‘loss of face’ effect, whereby anonymity allows 
individuals to change their opinion without judgment from self or others, leading to 
enhanced persuasion and often more extreme decisions, particularly when taken as a 
collective (Isenberg, 1986).   
The absence of paralinguistic and contextual cues within DMs means that 
communicators often become more forceful and uninhibited in their linguistic style in 
order to get their point across. The level of anonymity the medium provides facilitates 
unregulated behaviour (McGuire, Kiesler, & Siegal, 1987). As a result, a lack of self-
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awareness and increase in deindividuation serves to enhance polarisation (Isenberg, 1986). 
The act of having lower social presence when communicating online leads to enhanced 
contribution of extreme arguments, changing the opinion towards the collective. Group 
behaviour becomes more extreme and impulsive, whilst behaviour becomes decreasingly 
socially distinct (Diener, Fraser, Beaman, & Kelem, 1976). In direct contrast however, 
Haines, Hough, Cao, and Haines (2014) investigated the effect of anonymity using a 
synchronous DM and found that anonymous arguments were less likely to shift opinions 
than arguments that were identifiable. Likewise, increasing the number of supporting 
arguments did little to shift intentions, suggesting that identified arguments are more 
persuasive than anonymous arguments (Rains, 2007).    
 
2.2.2   Media richness theory. Media Richness Theory (MRT: Daft & Lengel, 
1986) is the degree to which a medium allows direct, personal and instant feedback, and 
comprises of four sub-dimensions: 1) the number of cue systems that the modality 
supports, 2) immediacy of feedback, 3) potential for natural language, and 4) 
personalisation of the message to the individual (Walther, 2011). The theory posits that FtF 
is a richer social medium than the limited communication channel of DMs, whereby non-
verbal and paralinguistic cues are absent. Media-rich modalities allow for unconstrained 
transmission, reducing ambiguity and facilitating the clarification of message content in an 
instantaneous manner; in turn, leading to better performance on decision-making tasks 
(McGrath & Hollingshead, 1993, Mohammadi, Park, Sagae, Vinciarelli, & Morency, 
2013). For example, individuals on a day-to-day basis regularly process and evaluate face, 
body and voice cues, often at a subconscious level and with a great deal of accuracy 
(Ambady & Gray, 2002). Hammick and Lee (2014) who compared individual differences 
within FtF and virtual reality environments found that media richness played a large part in 
behavioural change, with participants reporting less intention to alter their behaviour when 
there was a lack of visual and/or auditory cues. Conversely, there is also research that 
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opposes the MRT, finding that decisions and attitudes remain unchanged when various 
DMs are manipulated (Suh, 1999; Walther, 1996; 2011). However, the DM paradigms 
utilised vary (blogs, IM, email, chat rooms, VR etc.), and so it is difficult to generalise 
findings across studies. This may be why support for the media richness theory is mixed: 
digital modalities exist on a continuum of media richness leading to a lack of clarification 
when it comes to ascribing a unitary richness value. 
 
2.2.3   Computer-mediated communication. Computer-mediated communication 
(CMC) is an umbrella term, used to describe long-distance communication via a connected 
computer. This aspect of communication is no longer a novel experience, with the majority 
of individuals exploiting CMC for social and business everyday - answering emails, 
texting or blogging online (Brignall III & van Valey, 2005). Its appeal lies in the fast 
exchange of information and data over large distances, often at low costs. In recent years, 
social media has played a large part in the promotion, mobilisation and influencing of 
public opinion via online persuasion and propaganda (see Raymer & Harris, 2017). In an 
era where discussions are increasingly conducted online, and owing to the lack of 
perceived repercussions and enhanced anonymity this medium affords (Lea & Spears, 
1991), it is important and timely to understand persuasion in this modality.  
 Nguyen, Bin, and Campbell (2012) conducted a meta-analysis and found an equal 
number of papers supporting and refuting enhanced self-disclosure online. One reason for 
this discrepancy could lie within the variation of the synchronicity of the CMC medium. 
Synchronicity refers to the timing of message exchanges, with highly interactive and 
relatively quick exchanges considered synchronous in nature (Instant Messaging [IM] for 
example). This level of synchronicity is seen to enhance involvement and interaction 
coordination (Reardon, 1991). On the other hand, asynchronous CMC (such as email) is 
broken up into distinct and discontinuous time fragments. IM is higher in media richness 
than asynchronous CMC and evokes higher trust in communication partners, enhancing 
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self-disclosure rates (Burgoon, Chen, & Twitchell, 2010). Burgoon and colleagues found 
that dyads reported enhanced trust and were viewed as more sociable when communication 
was instant and immediate. The more involvement and similarity members felt with others 
(ie, FtF), the more they perceived them as trustworthy, sociable and persuasive. 
Okdie, Guadagno, Bernieri, Geers, and Mclarney-Vesotski (2011) found that 
compared to FtF interactions, individuals communicating via CMC formed enhanced 
negative impressions of their conversational partner and found it difficult to sustain the 
conversation or to generate topics. CMC is thought to be much more effortful than FtF 
interactions - it doesn’t enable the rapid exchange of information as easily as FtF, nor does 
it facilitate intuitive exchanges. Nowak, Watt, and Walther (2009) note that people are 
cognitive and behavioural misers, thus preference for a task that requires the least amount 
of effort and cognitive load is often seen as the preferable option. It is therefore reasonable 
to assume reduced rates of likability and persuasion when communicating using CMC than 
FtF.  
However, Bargh, McKenna, and Fitzsimons (2002) found that during first-time 
encounters, individuals were liked better by their conversational partner when 
communicating in an internet chat room compared to FtF. Likewise, McKenna, Green, and 
Gleason (2002) controlled the conversational partner, meaning that in both conditions the 
participants were conversing with the same person but were unaware of this fact. 
Participants reported enhanced liking of the individual when they chatted online than when 
they met FtF.  This seemingly contradictory research supports the notion of equalisation 
online (Dubrovsky, Kiesler, & Sethna, 1991) whereby the quality and content of the 
conversation forms the basis of liking the individuals. This is compared to FtF interactions, 
which are formed, in part, on superficial features such as attractiveness to influence 
positive affect. Dual process models of persuasion state less rich mediums (such as 
asynchronous CMC) have fewer heuristic cues available and therefore individuals process 
the persuasive message content using a systematic style of cognitive reasoning (Chaiken & 
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Eagly, 1983). Peripheral cues such as attractiveness, ethnicity and status cannot be used to 
justify decisions, therefore differences in cognition and persuasion arguably occur when 
compared to traditional FtF contexts.   
Much of the research using CMC has been dominated by the use of asynchronous 
mediums, making it difficult to expand to synchronous CMC contexts. Early research 
conducted by Chaiken and Eagly (1983) show how an easy-to-comprehend message was 
more persuasive when presented using rich mediums (video condition), whereas a difficult-
to-comprehend message was more persuasive when presented in a written format, where 
cues become less salient. In addition, when the communicator was deemed ‘likable’, 
higher persuasion effects were seen within the video and audio conditions. This indicates 
that the peripheral route of processing was taken compared to when the persuasive 
arguments were written, and implies that the type of medium directly affects the degree of 
attitude change. Non-verbal behaviour has been directly linked to liking and rapport-
building (Ambady, Bernieri, & Richeson, 2000) indicting that restriction of non-verbal 
cues will lead to reduced persuasion, with the peripheral route favoured in such situations. 
In addition, lower levels of ‘liking’ from conversational partners whilst using CMC 
suggests a reduction in persuasion overall.  
A key issue relates to generalisability of the findings from Chaiken and Eagly 
(1983). For example, employing a unilateral persuasive interaction is difficult to generalise 
to a two-way dyadic persuasive communication style. Guadagno and Cialdini (2002) 
investigated persuasion using a bilateral persuasive interaction, manipulating gender and 
the medium in which participants communicated, using a confederate to form the dyadic 
pairings. They found that women were less likely to be persuaded via email compared to 
FtF, whereas men did not differ in persuadability across the mediums. The asynchronous 
CMC does not encourage or enhance the ability to form a personal bond with the 
communication partner, resulting in women becoming less agreeable in this medium. Men 
however, are seen to be task-oriented and seek independence, thus producing no difference 
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in agreeableness between the two mediums (Kimbrough, Guadagno, Muscanell, & Dill, 
2013). 
Di Blasio and Milani (2008) developed a study looking at opinion change in small 
groups across FtF and CMC modalities. By introducing a novel and contradictory piece of 
information into the discussion, they observed fewer opinion changes and thus higher 
resistance to persuasion within the CMC modality when compared to the FtF modality. 
This is reasoned to be due to the CMC modality activating the central/systematic route of 
processing more easily when discussing messages via a written format than when directly 
conversing FtF. Text-based CMC restricts non-verbal cues, leaving individuals to focus 
heavily on the written content and the arguments presented during the conversational 
exchanges, assessing the quality and content of the messages. As a result, this leads to 
engagement of the critical and elaborate route of processing and thus a systematic 
persuasion outcome which focusses on the arguments presented. Therefore, individuals 
using CMC had the opportunity to reflect on the content of the messages being exchanged 
and thus the ability to process the content at a much deeper level of cognitive processing 
than the FtF modality.  
The methodologies used to investigate CMC research varies drastically from study 
to study; self-reports, unilateral persuasion online and dyadic effects of persuasion. 
Furthermore, studies investigate the impact of CMC using individuals who know each 
other offline, whilst others using strangers who have never met before. This lack of 
consistency could account for the mixed research findings and lack of a unified theory 
towards persuasive communication within DMs.  
 
2.2.4   Virtual reality environments (VREs). It is no longer the case that virtual 
reality environments (VREs) are of primary interest to hard-core gamers. Research 
investigating the application of VREs is increasing, particularly with a view to better 
understanding how technology might enhance real world effects. Recent applications 
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include training, education and therapy, with virtual recreation of crime scenes and remote 
video witness evidence in courts all benefiting from advances in synthetic environments 
(e.g. Bailenson, Blascovich, Beall, & Noveck, 2006).  However, very little research has 
observed or measured the influence of persuasion using interactive virtual reality 
technology. 
A VRE is a synthetic, computerised representation of a natural or created world 
consisting of 3-D representations, which are presented to the user in such a way that they 
temporarily suspend belief of their real environment (Bailenson et al., 2006; Rizzo, Difede, 
Rothbaum, Daughtry, & Reger, 2013a). VREs allow individuals to interact and embody 
avatar representations and thus allow a creative and interactive space that can have the 
potential to be novel, fictitious and unrepresentative of the offline world (Dando & Tranter, 
2016). VREs are highly customisable spaces and facilitate a high degree of interactivity, 
despite potential geographical restrictions (Atlas & Putterman, 2011).  
A user’s experience within immersive virtual reality is often controlled through the 
use of head-mounted display (HMD) technology which projects the synthetic environment 
stereoscopically (Guadagno, Blascovich, Bailenson, & McCall, 2007). This means that the 
participant’s movements are interpreted by the computer and allow appropriate parallel 
movements within the VR modality. VR is considered immersive when the participant is 
said to inhabit the avatar. In other words, the participant’s point of view is through the eyes 
of the avatar and the field of view changes when the participant moves their head which in 
turn, changes the digital direction of gaze. In addition, a digital environment is considered 
collaborative when it allows multiple users to interact in the same digital space irrespective 
of real-life location.       
It is estimated that there was a market size of 27 million for augmented and virtual 
reality in 2018, and this is forecast to reach 209.2 million by 2022 (Statista, 2018a). 
However, research does not seem to reflect this growth. Studies conducted into persuasion 
have been directed to traditional FtF modalities, with comparisons (if made) often using 
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CMC asynchronous mediums. This is a clear gap in the literature, with research needed 
that explores such VREs in order to understand cognition within these ever-growing and 
increasingly popular DMs.  
Players within VR are increasingly communicating, playing and conversing as 
avatars. Avatars are a digital projection of the self, representing a synthetic reality (Fox & 
Ahn, 2013). They allow individuals to customise their social identity to become less 
identifiable, or even create an entirely fictitious, novel and unrepresentative online identity; 
customising features such as eye colour, hair colour, height, gender and race etc. It is 
reported that individuals utilising avatars in DMs often do so to be unique and creative in 
their representations, thus allowing them to explore and interact in a way that reality would 
not allow (Lin & Wang, 2014). Due to the enhanced realism and interactivity that these 
mediums afford, it is conceivable that avatars have a direct influence on social cognition, 
effecting attitudes and behaviours on- and offline. This is highlighted in a study by Yee 
and Bailenson (2007), whereby participants were found to change their behaviour and 
merge their cognitive style in alignment with the avatar they were assigned. For example, 
when assigned an attractive avatar, participants were reported to be more intimate when 
interacting inside the immersive VRE. Similarly, when assigned taller avatars, participants 
behaved more confidently during a negotiation task compared to individuals assigned to 
shorter avatars.  
The act of conforming one’s behaviour in accordance to their representation is 
referred to as the Proteus Effect (Yee & Bailenson, 2007). This stems from Bem’s (1972) 
self-perception theory, which claims that attitudes are inferred and developed from 
observations of one’s own behaviour.  A virtual environment enhances the ability for self 
perception to occur, making it easier to externally observe one’s own behaviour via an 
avatar. Festinger (1957) reports that humans strive for cognitive consistency and therefore 
manipulate their cognitive states and subsequent attitudes in line with their observed 
behaviours. The Proteus effect is additionally present in language style, observed via the 
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use of CMC. Palomares and Lee (2010) coded written interactions between participants 
who embodied an avatar of the opposite-gender. They found that the language used by 
individuals was stereotypically associated with that of their avatar’s gender, as opposed to 
the language of their own gender.  
Yee and Bailenson (2009) expanded on this concept. They found that conformity to 
individual identity cues extends to real-life interactions post VR. For example, those given 
taller avatars in the VRE negotiated more aggressively in subsequent FtF exchanges 
indicating that cognitive behavioural changes in DMs extend to subsequent FtF 
interactions. However, it should be noted that this was an immediate transition and thus it 
is not known for how long this cognitive transference lasts. However, it is important to 
note that this research deliberately manipulated the avatars given to participants. In most 
cases, individuals are free to choose their digital representation online, and research 
suggests that most choose to express themselves in a manner similar to their everyday self 
(Taylor, 2002). It insinuates that potential changes to social cognition based on avatar 
representation in VR is dependent on a multitude of contextual factors: the ability to 
customise effectively, the number of possibilities available, the purpose of the game or 
exercise, knowing who they are speaking to versus being anonymous, confidence in self or 
awareness of outgroup and/or minorities.  
Zanbaka, Goolkasian, and Hodges (2006) report that college students found avatars 
just as persuasive as real people: virtual characters are just as effective at changing 
attitudes as real people in face-to-face settings. Cross-gender interactions were also found, 
whereby male speakers were more persuaded by female speakers, and vice versa compared 
to same-gender dyads. This is in alignment with the FtF literature on gender and 
persuasion and shows that virtual avatars using human voices are just as affective in 
persuading opinion change as FtF exchanges. This feasibly expands into the dual-process 
models of persuasion, implying that VREs follow a similar path of processing as FtF: the 
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default being the heuristic route to persuasion where available, applicable, and accessible 
(see Figure 1.1). 
Immersion is a psychological state, perceiving oneself as enveloped by and 
interacting in a VRE which provides a constant stream of stimuli and experiences (Witmer 
& Singer, 1998). Higher immersion leads to higher rates of social presence. A sense of 
presence is considered a fundamental component of VREs - a belief that the participant is 
present in the DM despite being physically present elsewhere (Witmer & Singer, 1998). 
This is often enhanced with a HMD, whereby the individual’s physical presence and 
movements are translated seamlessly in the synthetic environment, blurring the line 
between reality and digital (Usoh, Alberto, & Slater, 1996) which leads to a greater sense 
of connection to their environment and to the avatar.  
Witmer and Singer (1998) developed a presence questionnaire, yielding high 
internal consistency. They found that control was just as important as involvement to 
create a sense of immersion in the VRE, and thus a sense of presence. A highly immersive 
VR provides much more realistic experiences and thus more realistic reactions with a high 
degree of presence. This has been applied to real-world research using highly immersive 
VR as an affordable pain management solution. A recent case study by Hoffman and 
colleagues (Hoffman, Doctor, Patterson, Carrougher, & Furness III, 2000) revealed a 50% 
reduction in pain and anxiety ratings from burn-care patients when fully immersed in a 
VRE compared to when they were distracted by a video game task. The conclusion is that 
the highly immersive experience reduces awareness of real-life self; increased immersion 
is negatively correlated with pain reduction (Hoffman, Patterson, & Carrougher, 2000). 
Grigorovici (2003) proposed a two-step model of VR on persuasion, whereby more 
presence leads to enhanced arousal. This in turn reduces the impact of depth of processing 
for persuasive messages leading to decision-making becoming more implicit and 
heuristically processed. This mirrors the persuasion route observed in FtF interactions. 
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Indeed, Usoh, Alberto and Slater (1996) found that a highly present individual is more 
likely to behave in a similar manner in VR as everyday FtF interactions.  
VREs allow researchers to control confounds but is deemed more realistic than a 
typical laboratory study. It is a half-way point between a highly-controlled but unrealistic 
laboratory study, and a field experiment which is highly realistic but heavily influenced by 
extraneous and confounding variables. There is an upsurge in research which suggests that 
social interactions using VRE are governed by the same principles as social interactions in 
the real world (Banakou & Chorianopoulos, 2010; Morina, Ijntema, Meyerbröker, & 
Emmelkamp, 2015). This has significant implications when it comes to researching 
hypotheses previously limited in terms of reality constrictions, now being studied in VR 
and generalised towards real-world applications (Yee, Bailenson, Urbanek, Chang, & 
Merget, 2007).  
Moritz et al. (2014) captured this concept when investigating error feedback on 
delusional thinking patients. Moritz and colleagues developed a task which involved 
individuals walking down a virtual street and later describing the characters of fellow 
pedestrians. The aim is to make the participants aware of the fallibility of their judgements, 
thus reducing delusional ideation through the exposure of multiple errors. Indeed, the 
authors reported that this brief VR experiment led to a reduction in paranoid severity in 
individuals with delusional ideation. This is in direct comparison to the control group 
consisting of depressed individuals, who remained unchanged in their cognitive style. 
Similarly, recent research into virtual reality cognitive therapy has shown that new learning 
can take place when fears are presented to patients with persecutory delusions. 
Additionally, and perhaps more importantly, this learning can be transferred to the real 
world (Freeman et al., 2016). This highlights the practicality of VR research and the 
potential uses in social cognitive research.   
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2.2.5   Linguistic style in digital modalities. Despite people being under the 
impression that they are anonymous on the internet, true anonymity is, in fact, hard to 
achieve. For example, linguistic features are argued to be specific to gender inside CMC in 
a similar manner to FtF interactions (Herring & Stoerger, 2014). Research also supports 
the claim that gender stereotypical behaviours continue to occur, with males posting 
lengthier exchanges in asynchronous CMC; typically beginning and closing the 
conversations and asserting opinions as facts. Females on the other hand, will post shorter 
messages, apologise more often and express support for others (Herring, 1993; 1996; 
Savicki, Lingenfelter, & Kelley, 1996). Yet in synchronous CMC, men and women behave 
similarly in terms of message length and response rates (Herring, 2003). However, this 
does not simply mean that men and women do not differ when using IM. It is thought that 
the use of emoticons in synchronous CMC differs between the genders. Women have been 
shown to increase their uses of emoticons in CMC in an attempt to ‘make up’ for the lack 
of social cues available within this medium, and this is shown to occur in both same and 
mixed-sex dyads (Lee, 2003). Fullwood, Orchard, and Floyd (2013) looked at the use of 
emoticons in chat rooms and concluded emoticons are significantly more likely to be used 
by women, reflecting the enhanced emotional expressivity typically seen in traditional FtF 
contexts (Brody & Hall, 1993). 
 
2.2.6   Summary. Considering that digital and FtF modalities have differences in 
visual and auditory cues, as well as variances in message delivery, it can be assumed that 
such modalities will affect the persuasion process differently, and thus alter an individual’s 
intention to change their behaviour, attitudes and/or opinions. However, in terms of the 
direction of this effect, the jury is still out. There is mixed support for the majority of 
media-effect theories previously stated within this chapter. For example, support for 
increased persuadability using DMs derives from a lack of social accountability and ‘loss 
of face’ observed within this primarily anonymous medium. This serves to increase 
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persuasion on the merit of the arguments presented, and the changing of one’s thoughts 
and decisions without the ‘loss of face’ often seen FtF. In addition, there is a lack of effect 
arising from stereotypical influences which has been shown to decrease the susceptibility 
to persuasive arguments FtF if such cues are part of an outgroup membership, for example 
(Dubrovsky, Kiesler & Sethna, 1991). Furthermore, persuasive argument theory (PAT; 
Kaplan, 1977) states that the use of novel and systematic arguments are more likely to 
sway opinion and decisions and the change is more likely to last in comparison to changes 
made via the peripheral route. It is hypothesised that DMs facilitate cognitive processing 
via the central/systematic route due to an enhanced focus on the messages exchanged and a 
lack of identifiable contextual and paralinguistic cues.  
 Alternatively, some research provides support for the view that persuasion 
decreases whilst conversing in DMs. Compliance is no longer a dominant and contributing 
factor to opinion changes. Individuals have the ability to be domineering and forceful 
without the perceived ‘negative social consequences’ observed FtF and are therefore less 
likely to simply agree and become swayed by their conversational partner simply because 
of ‘societal pressure’. Moreover, media richness theory (MRT; Daft & Lengel, 1986) 
posits that DMs have reduced media richness, leading to constrained exchanges of 
information, which in itself, can be viewed as frustrating and challenging. Expanding on 
the idea that DMs facilitate a systematic processing style to persuasive arguments, such 
exchanges would need to stand up to scrutiny to a higher extent than FtF in order to 
facilitate persuasion or an opinion shift. Consequently, DM messages may serve to 
decrease persuasion in such contexts. It is evident that the persuasion literature surrounding 
differential modalities is contentious and inconsistent. Further research into this area, with 
a view of expansion to novel VR environments would serve to clarify the persuasion 
literature, investigating the role of persuasion within ever-increasing popular modalities. 
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2.3   Cognitive Style 
Differences in thinking style (better known as cognitive style) concerns an 
individual’s way of managing cognitive tasks, particularly in terms of acquiring and 
processing information (Kozhevnikov, Evans, & Kosslyn, 2014). In other words, cognitive 
style refers to the way in which individuals perceive, think and problem solve 
(Kozhevnikov, 2007; Witkin, Moore, Goodenough, & Cox, 1977). For example, delusional 
thinking or the need for cognitive closure are thought to directly influence the decision-
making process, influenced not only by innate individual differences but also as a direct 
result of contextual environments (Freeman, Pugh, & Garety, 2008; Webster & 
Kruglanski, 1997). The tendency to seize upon readily available information and freeze 
further cognitive processing to achieve a rapid is a hallmark of these two measures, which 
are thought to complement each other and provide a range in which one can assess 
cognitive biases for persuasion outcomes. These two elements of social cognition will be 
now be discussed with regards to attitude change and the decision-making process.  
 
2.3.1   Delusional thinking. Delusional thinking is typically described as the 
maintenance of false beliefs, arising from an atypical evaluative judgment using reasoning 
biases (Garety & Hemsley, 1994). These beliefs are firmly sustained despite what is 
considered incontrovertible evidence to the contrary (American Psychiatric Association, 
1994). For example, Buchy, Woodward, and Liotti (2007) found schizotypy subjects were 
unwilling to reduce the plausibility of their decisions based on disconfirmatory evidence. 
Psychotic symptoms refer to quantitatively less severe traits of schizotypy within the 
general population, measured on a continuum rather than at extreme poles whereby 
delusional thinking is considered a primary symptom (Peters, Joseph, Day, & Garety, 
2004; Poulton et al., 2000).  
Delusional thinking is well established within the literature for both clinical and 
non-clinical populations and can be quantitatively and psychometrically measured within 
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the normal population using the revised Peter’s Delusional Inventory (PDI-R: Peters et al., 
2004). Peters and colleagues initially administered the measure to both healthy and 
psychotic subjects, and despite showing higher scores within the psychotic sample, the 
range of scores collected were almost identical between the two groups. They cite nearly 
10% of the healthy adults scoring higher than the average of the psychotic sample, 
supporting the notion of a continuum scale and a degree of overlap between healthy and 
deluded symptoms (Peters, Joseph, & Garety, 1999). As a result, individuals can be 
measured on the delusional ideation scale to investigate and measure decision making and 
subsequent heuristic biases associated with delusional thinking. 
Originally a 40-item measure, the PDI-R currently comprises an abbreviated 21 
items, measuring the multi-dimensionality of delusional thinking comprising 11 
components. The three sub-themes include distress, preoccupation and conviction, which 
have been shown to provide greater discrimination between ‘healthy’ and deluded 
populations (Peters et al., 2004). However, the majority of the sample used to develop the 
PDI-R were white British. This is not representative of wider ethnicities and could thus 
imply that delusional ideation is a Western phenomenon. Increases in delusional thinking 
is correlated with a number of biases within cognition, such as jumping to conclusions and 
being rigid in attitude change (Colbert & Peters, 2002; Colbert, Peters, & Garety, 2006). 
These cognitive biases are often the extent of research within the area of delusional 
ideation for both the general and clinical populations. A focus on these biases within the 
general population will be focused upon for the remainder of this thesis.  
 
  2.3.1.1   Cognitive biases. Cognitive biases are distortions in acquiring, processing 
and interpreting information from the immediate environment, and are thought to 
contribute not only to the formation of delusions, but also to their maintenance (Bell, 
Halligan & Ellis, 2006; Garety & Freeman, 1999; Moritz & Woodward, 2006; van der 
Gaag, 2006). The most common bias within the field of delusional thinking is known as 
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the Probabilistic Reasoning Bias whereby individuals employ a number of heuristic 
devices to guide their expectations and reasoning (Garety, Hemsley, & Wessely, 1991). 
The Probabilistic Reasoning Bias is measured using the Beads Task (Huq, Garety, & 
Hemsley, 1988) where individuals are asked to observe two glass jars containing different 
coloured beads at a ratio of 85:15 and vice versa in the second jar. These are then removed 
from view and a random selection of beads are drawn. The individual must guess which jar 
the beads are likely to have been drawn from (participants are permitted as many draws as 
they wish before making their final decision – however, the sequence of each draw is often 
pre-determined). Huq and colleagues found that clinically-deluded subjects required, on 
average, less evidence of further draws before making their judgments (mean of 1.22 
compared to healthy and psychiatric control groups: 2.60; 3.58 respectively). They also 
had a higher level of certainty that their judgment was the correct one, indicating a 
probabilistic reasoning bias when making judgments.  
This is a robust finding, which has been replicated on numerous occasions (Fear & 
Healy, 1997; Garety et al., 1991). The cognitive style associated with probabilistic 
reasoning bias (forming irrational and superfluous conclusions based on significantly 
reduced information) is better known as a jumping to conclusion bias (JTC; Garety & 
Freeman, 1999) and is thought to be pivotal both in the formation and the maintenance of 
delusional thinking. The literature robustly claims that on average, 50% of people with 
delusional thinking show a JTC bias in comparison to just 10-20% of people without 
delusions (Freeman et al., 2008). This statistic implies that the cognitive bias is not the sole 
cause of delusional thinking, but more than likely contributes to the acceptance of 
delusions in cognitive style. In addition, longitudinal analysis has shown JTC is a robust 
and stable measure of delusional thinking style (Peters & Garety, 2006).  
An updated version of the Beads Task utilising digital modalities was used to 
investigate delusional patients, alongside a psychiatric control and the healthy population 
(Speechley, Whitman, & Woodward, 2010). Here, the delusional group showed an 
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exaggerated preference for colour matching, which supports hypersalience of evidence-
hypothesis matches (Balzan, Delfabbro, Galletly, & Woodward, 2012). This result appears 
to be specific to delusions, as the effect was not found when the deluded schizophrenic 
group were subdivided on the severity of hallucinations. Peters, Thornton, Siksou, Linney, 
and MacCabe (2008) support this finding when they split psychotic patients into deluded 
vs. not-deluded symptoms and investigated JTC using a number of different tasks. 
Delusional thinking style did not show any difference when participants were grouped 
based on a diagnosis for schizophrenia. Balzan et al. (2012) investigated the hypersalience 
mechanism by examining ‘rule of thumb’ heuristics. They reported that deluded 
individuals had greater susceptibility to reasoning heuristics supporting the presence of a 
hypersalience mechanism. This in turn is reasoned to amplify spontaneous heuristic 
reasoning compared to a deliberate and cautious cognitive style observed in non-deluded 
participants. It implies that individuals high in delusional thinking have a cognitive bias 
towards accepting information that implies a certain viewpoint, and rapidly seizing on this 
information.  
Hypersalience of hypothesis-evidence matching indicates the impulsive termination 
of evidence collection in delusional individuals and supports a bias against disconfirmatory 
evidence (BADE), which is a hallmark of delusional patients, given that they refuse to 
reduce their plausibility ratings for lure items over a task, when disconfirmatory evidence 
becomes apparent (Zawadzki et al., 2012). This cognitive bias of inferential reasoning has 
been investigated in delusional-prone individuals using the BADE paradigm (Buchy, 
Woodward, & Liotti, 2007; Woodward, Moritz, Cuttler, & Whittman, 2006; Woodward, 
Moritz, Menon, & Klinge, 2008). Participants are given a series of online statements 
followed by 4 interpretations; 1 truthful, 1 absurd and 2 lure items. It is designed to test 
whether individuals are able to accept new and disconfirmatory evidence. Compared to 
controls, delusional participants are less likely to accept the final ‘truthful’ item post-lure 
items; in other words, they are unable to reduce their initial confidence levels when their 
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principal belief is strong, even when the delusional scenario extends to affectively neutral 
material (Moritz & Woodward, 2006; Woodward et al., 2008). However, delusional 
individuals scored equal to controls when their initial beliefs were weak suggesting a 
reasoning bias against disconfirmatory evidence is specific for strongly held beliefs (as is 
the case in delusions). Furthermore, the notion that the BADE paradigm produces a 
significant difference between schizophrenic patients, healthy delusional thinking subjects 
and a psychotic control supports the view that this cognitive bias is not simply a construct 
of psychotic illness in general (Woodward, Buchy, Moritz, & Liotti, 2007).  
 The beads task comes from the theoretical underpinnings of the Bayesian formula, 
assessing the way in which conclusions are reached on the basis of empirical evidence and 
provides an optimal strategy for probabilistic reasoning, which can be mathematically 
calculated (Moutoussis, Bentall, El-Deredy, & Dayan, 2011). However, the current Beads 
task indicates that delusional populations actually reason according to rational judgments, 
whereas healthy populations (control) are instead overly cautious in their reasoning styles. 
Maher (1992) points out that delusional patients had better Bayesian reasoning (and made 
few errors) due to the probability after just 2 draws being 97% that the 2 same-coloured 
beads originated from the higher ratio jar with the equivalent colour. It indicates the 
normal population are (in direct contrast) overly cautious compared to the delusional 
sample, who arguably reached a decision at the earliest, ‘objectively rational’ point. 
However, it should be noted that there was considerable variability within the deluded 
group, with 47% making a decision after the first draw (showing an 85% Bayesian 
probability) and thus highlighting the impulsive decision-making characteristic of 
delusional thinking - something that only happened once in the control group (Huq et al., 
1988). Additionally, the common draw ratio of 85:15 leaves little discrimination and 
actually favours a rapid decision style, with the ratio allowing Bayesian reasoning after just 
2 draws (Dudley, John, Young, & Over, 1997). This could be considered psychometrically 
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inadequate to test the JTC hypothesis and further studies are needed to change the 
reasoning ratio to allow for enhanced discrimination between the samples.  
Alternatively, a review carried out by Garety and Freeman (1999) concluded that 
11 out of 14 studies showed evidence of a cognitive bias not due to a general deficit in 
probabilistic reasoning, but rather a specific data-gathering bias. Psychiatric groups have 
been found to adjust their information requests depending on the probability ratio 
presented indicating impulsivity is not the cause. For example, Dudley et al. (1997) found 
that when evidence gathered was predetermined by the experimenter, delusional subjects 
did not differ in probability judgment reasoning compared to non-delusional participants. 
Peters and Garety (2006) also found delusional subjects remained unchanged when 
presented with a memory aid, indicating that the JTC bias is not directly related to either 
impulsiveness or a memory deficit but instead is a specific bias in data-gathering rather 
than any difficulty in cognitive reasoning (Peters & Garety, 2006). There is a tendency for 
delusional individuals to choose to seek less information, supporting the hypothesis of a 
data-gathering bias rather than a specific deficit in reasoning.  
Cognitive biases in delusional thinking (confirmation bias, hypersalience of 
hypothesis matches, BADE and JTC) point to another well-known cognitive bias: the need 
for cognitive closure (NfCC; Kruglanski, 1989). For example, the JTC in delusion-prone 
individuals has been shown to be driven by a motivation to hastily confirm beliefs (Bentall, 
Corcoran, Howard, Blackwood, & Kinderman, 2001). Colbert and Peters (2002) found that 
healthy individuals who scored high in delusional ideation also scored significantly higher 
on the need for cognitive closure scale, which is consistent in that there is a stable 
cognitive style contributing to the development of delusional traits.  
 
2.3.2   Need for cognitive closure. The need for cognitive closure (NfCC) refers to 
an individual’s discomfort in experiencing cognitive uncertainty or ambiguity and often 
results in quick formulations of opinions, regardless of subsequent reduction in decision 
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quality (Webster & Kruglanski, 1994). It is considered an epistemic motivation (arising 
from Lay Epistemological Theory; see Kruglanski, 1990). Epistemic motivation is aptly 
defined by De Dreu, Nijstad, and van Knippenberg (2008) as “a willingness to expend 
effort to achieve a thorough, rich, and accurate understanding of the world, including the 
group task or decision problem at hand” (p. 23). It is primarily concerned with how people 
acquire and form knowledge bases and consists of two distinct phases, a) hypothesis 
generation (whereby individuals form the basic cognitive structure using accessible 
information), and b) evaluation generation (assessing the validity of the constructed 
contents and thus their confidence in the information). NfCC is inversely correlated to the 
motivational underpinning of epistemic knowledge formation leading to the desire for any 
answer that avoids ambiguity, inducing urgent and permanent tendencies. Individuals 
‘seize’ upon readily available informational cues and subsequently ‘freeze’ on that 
information, ensuring the safeguarding of the acquired decision and maintaining cognitive 
closure.  
Despite the need for cognitive closure implying an active search and cognitive 
motivation to achieve the correct answer, once a decision has been made, individuals often 
‘crystalise’ this decision and prevent further information processing, thus freezing their 
cognition and lowering epistemic motivation (Roets, van Hiel, & Cornelis, 2006). The 
higher the individual scores on the NfCC scale (Webster & Kruglanski, 1994), the shorter 
the sequences (hypothesis generation and evaluation generation) and the faster the heuristic 
phenomena (seizing and freezing: Kruglanski, Orehek, Dechesne, & Pierro, 2010) in social 
situations. An individual high on NfCC has a strong desire to reach any conclusion 
resulting in a primacy effect upon available cues; they are less likely to embrace opinion 
deviates. It allows for quick decision-making but results in rigid thinking styles. 
Individuals are thought to desire order and structure alongside secure and stable 
knowledge, as ambiguity and a perceived lack of closure cause cognitive discomfort 
(Festinger, 1957).   
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However, individuals high in their need to avoid closure (low NfCC) are orientated 
towards gathering and processing information, and are more willing to change existing 
knowledge structures (Webster & Kruglanski, 1997). These individual differences are 
thought to exit on a continuum, a spectrum ranging from one extreme (motivated to 
achieve closure urgently and permanently) to another (motivated to avoid commitment to a 
definitive opinion). This is considered to reflect findings from delusional thinking, 
whereby a score high on NfCC scale leads to impulsivity and a jumping to conclusions 
bias, often on the basis of inconclusive and incomplete evidence (Kruglanski & Webster, 
1996). The dominant epistemic process that determines an individual’s NfCC on this 
continuum is dependent on an inherent and consistent personality tendency or an 
inconsistent situational constraint on cognitive capacity (Webster & Kruglanski, 1997).  
The preliminary motivation for closure being proportionate to the perceived costs 
and benefits such closure will achieve and thus can be manipulated by direct situational 
factors. For example, when a task is particularly time-contingent, a heightened NfCC is 
advantageous, freeing up cognitive capacity to engage in continued information processing 
of alternate tasks. Additional variants of situational constraints include dull, unattractive or 
otherwise cognitively effortful tasks, time pressures, environmental noise, proximity to 
deadlines, mental fatigue and alcoholic intoxication; all serving to enhance an individual’s 
NfCC and subsequently influencing cognitive and social functioning (Kruglanski & 
Webster, 1996).  
Alternative to situational constraints, Webster and Kruglanski (1994; Kruglanski, 
Webster, & Klem, 1993) developed the NfCC scale where they found motivated closure 
varied as a stable individual difference which can be reliably measured. It is widely 
assumed that those who score highly on NfCC scale exhibit similar behaviours and 
processing patterns as those situationally induced to increase their NfCC. The scale itself is 
a widely used 42-item measure, specifically identifying five psychometric properties 
(desire for predictability, preference for order and structure, discomfort in ambiguity, 
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decisiveness and close-mindedness). Ratings are on a six-point Likert scale (1 = strongly 
disagree) with low composite scores indicating a low NfCC.  
NfCC is related to a wide variety of social cognition concepts ranging from 
enhanced stereotypical judgments and impression primacy effects, to the correspondence 
bias and persuasion. For example, research attests to individuals high in NfCC becoming 
more stereotypical and simplified in their judgments (Ford & Kruglanski, 1995; Klein & 
Webster, 2000; Kruglanski, Pierro, Mannetti, & DeGrada, 2006). Motivated to achieve 
rapid closure, individuals seize on readily available information accessible in their memory 
and over-utilise pre-existing attitudes and prejudices. A study by Jamieson and Zanna 
(1989) used time pressure to enhance participants’ motivation for cognitive closure and 
found those who initially held negative attitudes towards women in management positions 
were more likely to devalue the CV’s of women compared to men (despite the information 
of both genders considered to be equivalent). This supports the theory that individuals high 
in NfCC (either situationally or inherently) are biased in their judgements, relying on pre-
existing knowledge structures to gauge their decisions, enabling a rapid decision to be 
made. Even if individuals do not inherently obtain judgmental cognitive structures, 
situationally manipulating such structures has been shown to have a similar effect. For 
example, when primed with a negatively and positively valenced adjective 
(reckless/ambitious), participants high in NfCC characterised an ambiguous target in 
relation to the prime presented (be it negative or positive) – once again supporting the 
notion of seizing upon readily available information (Ford & Kruglanski, 1995).  
 
2.3.2.1   Persuasion and NfCC. Dual process models accounting for persuasion in 
the literature (namely heuristic-systematic and elaboration-likelihood models: Chaiken, 
1987; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986b) suggest there are two routes to persuasion, influenced by 
cognitive and motivational aspects. High NfCC individuals rely on pre-existing schemas, 
pursuing readily available heuristic cues and ceasing in further information processing 
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when forming their judgments (Klein & Webster, 2000). This therefore makes them much 
more susceptible to persuasion attempts compared to low NfCC, who systematically 
process the incoming information and base their judgments on the scrutiny of the message 
arguments. Klein and Webster (2000) report that individuals low in their dispositional need 
for cognitive closure processed the persuasive message systematically, engaging in the 
central route of persuasion. However, those scoring high in NfCC processed the 
information heuristically and relied on peripheral cues to inform their judgments. 
Regarding the dual-process theories of persuasion, the HSM defence motivation (see 
section 1.4.1) claims that an individual motivated to defend their existing attitudinal beliefs 
(thought to occur in individuals high in need for specific closure), will be guided by the 
sufficiency principle; directly influencing epistemic motivation (Chaiken, et al., 1989; De 
Dreu et al., 2008). Thus, if an individual is satisfied with the quality and quantity of their 
current knowledge state, further information processing is nullified. However, if the 
sufficiency principle is not acquired, this will motivate individuals to seek out and process 
additional information, inducing a reduced need for closure and engaging the central route 
of processing.  
 Kruglanski et al. (1993) used the jury method paradigm (JM; London, 1973) to 
investigate the role of NfCC on persuasion, whereby dyads consisting of a high and low 
NfCC member were given information manipulated towards a certain viewpoint. When 
prior information is available, significantly more high NfCC individuals became the 
persuader whilst the low NfCC individuals became the persuadee. It supports the theory 
that high NfCC seize upon readily available information and freeze this viewpoint, 
defending their cognitive closure and are therefore becomes more resistant to persuasion 
from another individual. Pietrzak, Jochemczyk, Serbin, and Kuśka (2014) support this 
claim by suggesting high NfCC individuals are less likely to make concessions compared 
to low NfCC. This is due to the fact cognitive resources would have to be expanded to 
accept and rebuild knowledge structures, which is demanding on resource capacity.  
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      However, the converse appears to occur if prior information is absent. In their second 
study, Kruglanski and colleagues (1993) used a confederate in place of the manipulated 
legal analyses generally found in the Jury Method (JM: see Chapter 3). They found that 
without all the complete information, individuals high in NfCC became more susceptible 
to persuasion attempts and changed their verdict more often when compared to low NfCC, 
who were more resistant. Despite this result seemingly contradicting their first finding, it 
continues to support the notion that high NfCC individuals’ motivation is to achieve 
closure: If they cannot obtain reliable closure pre-persuasion, then they will become prone 
to early persuasion attempts in an attempt to rapidly achieve their desired cognitive state.  
This is due to high NfCC subject’s experiencing cognitive discomfort in ambiguous or 
uncertain tasks, and therefore becoming motivated to reduce the discomfort as quickly as 
they can. Thus, they peruse readily available heuristic cues and cease in further 
information processing when forming their judgments (Klein & Webster, 2000). However, 
when a task is seemingly clear-cut and individuals have a pre-made opinion, high NfCC 
subjects are motivated to protect this decision, portraying a higher degree of confidence 
(Federico, Golec, & Dial, 2005).  
 
2.4   Ethnicity 
The vast growth and development of online exchanges, blogging and social media 
highlights the extent to which persuasive messages can reach wider, more diverse 
audiences, becoming much more global in their reach. Research would therefore be remiss 
in overlooking the importance of how individuals from different ethnic backgrounds 
interact, process and respond to interactive persuasive exchanges across varying and far-
reaching modalities. For example, Garcia-Gavilanes, Quercia, and Jaimes (2013) found 
that country-level behavioural features examined using Twitter strongly correlate with 
cultural dimensions. It indicates that individuals from different ethnic-backgrounds use 
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social media to achieve alternate end-goals. Research is needed to expand this literature 
into persuasive exchanges both offline and online.     
Ethnicity references social groups and communities which share a common 
nationality, culture or language (Betancourt & López, 1992). Individuals from different 
ethnic backgrounds possess different attitudes, values and norms that reflects their cultural 
heritage (Cox, Lobel, & McLeod, 1991). On an individual level, ethnicity is claimed to be 
a social-psychological process whereby categorisation of a social group gives the 
individual a sense of belonging and identity, generating ties for reciprocity. Ethnicity is 
often associated with culture and is frequently used interchangeably. Hence, ethnicity 
refers to the ethnic quality or affiliation of a group, which is normally characterised by 
culture. Because ethnic groups typically interact with each other, ethnicity is a means by 
which culture is socially transmitted and reinforced, influencing language, behaviour, 
cognitive and social processing (Barth, 1998).  
For the purposes of the research reported within this thesis, the term ‘ethnic’ is used 
to refer to the groups of relevance to the research questions that have guided this thesis. 
One of the most extensively researched and arguably most obvious ethnic differences is the 
contrast between individualism and collectivism (Ind/Col: Hofstede, 1980). This broad 
categorisation classifies individualistic cultures as primarily Western societies (UK, USA, 
Australia and New Zealand) whereas collectivistic research has primarily focused on east 
Asian countries such as Japan and China. Individualistic cultures place emphasis on 
autonomy, internal attributes and self-reliance. There is a concern for oneself over others, 
with self-fulfilment arising from personal accomplishments. Reasoning and judgment are 
believed to be orientated towards the individual, often due to the assumption that the self is 
a stable construct (Oyserman, Coon, & Kemmelmeier, 2002). This is in direct contrast to 
collectivist cultures, which strive for group harmony and membership, placing importance 
on external events and influences (Triandis, 1989; 2001). Often thought to have common 
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goals and values, collectivist cultures restrain emotional expressions and put the group 
collective at the forefront.  
There is growing evidence to suggest that inferential and perceptual processes are 
influenced by one’s ethnic and cultural background. Individualistic cultures have an 
analytic reasoning style, using internal explanations for events and behaviour which are 
grounded in logical reasoning (Nisbett, Choi, Peng, & Norenzayan, 2001; Nisbett & 
Miyamoto, 2005). Western education often places emphasis on teaching critical thinking 
and debate, determining the validity of a statement and analysing key pieces of 
information. Yet collectivist countries (East and South Asia, for example) often place a 
high importance on the tradition of respectful learning; developing diligence and 
endurance (Kühnen et al., 2012). Likewise, there is a greater emphasis on holistic 
reasoning, explaining behaviour with reference to situational constraints and factors 
(Varnum, Grossmann, Kitayama, & Nisbett, 2008). This is evident through measurements 
of linguistic style, with collectivist dyadic interactions resulting in an increased use of ‘we’ 
pronouns, in direct comparison to individualistic dyadic conversations which have been 
found to prioritise personal pronouns (‘you’, ‘I’; Setlock, Quinones, & Fussell, 2007).  
The interdependence within collectivist groups, linked to a holistic reasoning style 
(Varnum, Grossmann, Katunar, Nisbett, & Kitavama, 2008) means collectivists are more 
likely than individualists to sacrifice personal interests for the attainment of group goals 
(Bond & Wang, 1983). Subsequently, heuristic cues such as consensus information 
influences persuasion within collectivist ethnicities (Markus & Kitayama, 1991) indicating 
higher persuasion outcomes due to differences in reasoning styles across ethnic pairings 
(Aaker & Maheswaran, 1997; Setlock, Fussell, & Neuwirth, 2004).  
Hall (1981) refers to the concept of high versus low context cultures which map 
onto the concept of Ind/Col. For example, low context cultures (individualistic cultures) 
focus on the explicit meaning and content of words, using linear and systematic reasoning, 
like to engage in debate, and focus on rational strategies. High context cultures on the other 
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hand (collectivist) interpret the meaning of messages and arguments using non-verbal 
entities such as the tone of voice, gestures and implied meaning. They incorporate the 
situation into their reasoning and wish to achieve harmony during exchanges.  
The body of research outlined in this section would suggest that collectivist cultures 
are more likely to take the peripheral/heuristic route to persuasion, whilst individualistic 
cultures prefer systematic and central route to processing information. Nevertheless, it 
should be noted that this dichotomous view of ethnicity and persuasion is simplistic, 
highlighting a narrow depiction of the cultural and ethnic complexity of behaviour and 
cognition. In addition, much of the work has looked at East Asian and American samples 
which fails to encompass alternative ethnic variations.  It is important to note that the key 
dimensions of ethnicity exist on a continuum (Hofstede, 2011) and therefore research 
dominating the extremes of this range is not representative of ethnic diversity; one of the 
key challenges in cross-cultural psychology being to identify structures and constructs at 
the individual and country level.  
 
2.5   Gender 
Social Roles Theory (SRT; Eagly, 1987) is the social psychological principle that 
men and women take on different roles due to societal expectations. For example, male 
stereotypical behaviour is considered agentic in nature: achieving independence, 
demonstrating assertiveness, competitiveness and becoming task-focussed.  They are less 
concerned with politeness and often engage in ‘flaming’ behaviour when conversing online 
(Herring, 1994; Herring & Stoerger, 2014). Women on the other hand, are thought to be 
more communal in nature, focussing on forming bonds during interactive exchanges 
(Eagly & Steffen, 1984).  This is reflected in interaction style, with women showing 
greater agreement and pro-social behaviour than their male counterparts (Carli, 1989; 
2001). Carli (1989) ran a study that investigated the role of gender on influence, whereby 
dyadic pairings would discuss a topic on which they initially disagreed. The results showed 
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that males gave significantly more opinions, suggestions and directions during group 
interactions, and disagreed on discussion points to a higher extent than female participants. 
There is the perception, in previous literature, that men have a higher social status to 
women, thus are assumed to be more competent and more likely to receive enhanced 
support for their contributions. However, the majority of such research was conducted over 
thirty years ago, and as such, societal expectations, gender stereotypes and social roles 
have changed and become much more fluid in nature.  
Gender interactions are thought to be dependent, in part, on the composition of the 
group. Piliavin and Martin (1978) found that men disagree more with men than women, 
and women become more dramatic when interacting with fellow women compared to men. 
Mixed-gender dyads show a convergence of speech towards their partner, thus neutralising 
and dampening gender stereotypical effects (Mulac, Wiemann, Widenmann, & Gibson, 
1988). Hence, the gender of the recipient plays an important and determining role on an 
individual’s behaviour. This was supported by Carli (1989), who found larger stereotypical 
gender differences in same-sex pairings: Male pairs displayed increased task behaviours 
and disagreements whereas female pairings displayed increased positive social behaviours 
and agreements during their interactions. Yet, during mixed-gender dyadic interactions, the 
only gender effect reported involved enhanced positive social behaviours by females.  
There is the perception that males become more engaged in a rational evaluation of 
a persuasive message than females (Guadagno & Cialdini, 2007) indicating a preference 
for the cognitively elaborate route to persuasion. Additionally, a meta-analytic review 
conducted by Eagly and Carli (1981) found that males were influenced less than females, 
despite the inclusion of non-significant persuasion studies. Women are easily influenced in 
comparison to males despite discussions on gender-neutral topics; however, this is 
mediated by the gender of the partner they interact with. Carli (1989) further found that 
when told they had to attempt to influence their partner, men and women reduced their use 
of stereotypically feminine behaviour. Yet in parallel, both genders increased their use of a 
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stereotypically-masculine linguistic style, evidenced by a decrease in agreements and an 
increase in direct and aggressive influence strategies. Conversely, this only occurred when 
attempting to persuade a male (Carli, 1990). It suggests there is the underlying perception 
that male-stereotypical behaviour is more influential during FtF interactions and that the 
gender of the subject has a direct influence over persuasion behaviour (see Eaton, Visser, 
& Burns, 2017).  
A meta-analytic review supported this view, showing that in mixed-sex groups, 
men exert more influence than women (Lockheed, 1985). Additionally, the effect of 
enhanced gender stereotypical behaviour during same-sex dyadic interactions assumes that, 
to some degree, individuals partake in social influence and exhibit behaviour assumed to 
be the gendered-norm. Carli expanded on these findings, reporting that both men and 
women dislike disagreement from a female conversational partner and are thus less likely 
to be persuaded by a woman during interactive FtF exchanges (Carli, 1990).  
 
2.5.1   Gender and linguistic style. Analysis of gender differences within speech 
styles and narratives has been investigated in terms of overall structure, as well as more in-
depth analysis of phrases and linguistic styles. Nonetheless, the nature of language is 
complex and thus requires varying degrees of research methodology and analyses, which 
in turn, makes generalisation of findings difficult within this area. Lakoff (1973) was one 
of the first researchers to investigate gender differences in linguistic style. This pioneering 
work identified key phrases used by women, which include (amongst others) enhanced 
hedges and tag questions; since supported by a number of other researchers (Mulac & 
Lundell, 1986; Newman, Groom, Handelman, & Pennebaker, 2008). For example, Herring 
(1993) found that women ask more questions and include more supportive statements than 
males, whose language holds strong assumptions, bold statements and increased rhetorical 
questions. This aspect of linguistic style, which Lakoff termed ‘women’s language’ is 
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thought to express tentativeness and uncertainty and has parallels to powerless speech 
styles.   
Powerless language refers to a linguistic style dictated by enhanced hesitations, 
hedges, intensifiers, disclaimers, polite forms and tag questions, and is often associated 
with a stereotypically feminine language style. As a result, women are often perceived as 
less authoritative, credible, favourable and competent (Holtgraves & Lasky 1999; Mulac, 
Bradac & Gibbons, 2001). For example, Bradley (1981) found that a powerless speech 
style containing qualifying phrases (disclaimers and tag questions) negatively affected 
women’s ability to exert influence and expertise during their arguments, despite powerless 
language used by men having no effect on the ability to assert the same arguments. Due to 
the perception that a powerless speech style is associated with feminine linguistic speech, it 
is assumed that females who deviate from this presumed style will be judged less likable 
and influential. Indeed, Carli, LaFleur, & Loeber (1995) found that women using tentative 
language were judged as friendlier by males compared to females who spoke assertively. 
However, other studies have reported no gender differences in the use of tentative language 
(Parton et al., 2002), reiterating the complexity of gender differences, often differing due to 
the methodology and analyses conducted.  
Furrow and Moore (1990) contradict the power/powerless linguistic style research, 
noting that it is not simply that women use aspects of powerless speech style or have a 
lower status in society. Instead, women use phrases such as “I know” and “I think” to 
express confidence and certainty rather than tentativeness. Additionally, Carli (1990) 
reports that the use of tentative language by females works to increase persuasion within 
male communication partners. Yet for men, there was no significant linguistic difference in 
terms of influence over male or female partners.   
Erickson et al. (1978) extended the literature and looked at the impact of powerful vs. 
powerless language in court room testimony using written and audio transcripts. They 
revealed that a powerful speech style resulted in higher ratings of attractiveness 
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irrespective of the gender of the speaker or subject. Additionally, greater perceived 
credibility was reported alongside greater acceptance of the position advocated during 
testimony, when compared to the powerless speech style; irrespective of gender of the 
subject and witness. Likewise, Holtgraves and Lasky (1999) reported that individuals who 
heard the powerful linguistic version of the same message were more likely to support and 
favour the recommendation proposed; irrespective of gender of either the speaker or 
participant. It implies that a powerless speech style does not represent female speech per se 
but rather individual differences and situational context (Blankenship & Holtgraves, 2005). 
More recently, research has moved away from the gender-stereotypical powerless 
speech styles, investigating speech content between the genders and the role this has on 
credibility, persuasion and influence. For example, Newman et al. (2008) examined the 
nature of differences between gender in speech style by utilising LIWC software to analyse 
linguistic style at the rudimentary level of speech. They found that female language had 
increased use of pronouns, social words, negations and psychological processes. 
Additionally, the authors concluded that women use language to discuss individuals and 
reveal their intentions, as well as to communicate their thoughts and internal processes – 
supporting the idea that the primary goal for women during interactions is communal and 
emotional. Likewise, Hancock and Rubin (2014) found that females tend to express their 
feelings more during discourse by employing enhanced personal pronouns, negations and 
references to emotion compared to their male counterparts. Given this difference in 
gendered linguistic style, female language is judged as indirect, affective and elaborate 
(Mulac et al., 2001). This is in direct comparison to male linguistic style. Newman et al. 
(2008) found that the male linguistic profile consisted of increased word length, articles, 
prepositions, swear words and emphasised current concerns. The primary function of 
language for males is technical and task focussed, discussing topics such as money and 
football (Basow & Rubenfeld, 2003). As a result, the male stylistic preference for language 
is judged as comparatively direct, succinct and influential (Mulac et al., 2001). Indeed, 
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male linguistic style echoes a powerful speech style and thus invokes the confidence 
heuristic in receivers. For example, a male who is deemed confident, assertive, 
domineering and succinct is likely to invoke heuristic processing of the persuasive message 
or indeed bias an opposing female’s systematic processing. Furthermore, if the male is the 
receiver, this would suggest reduced persuasive outcomes, with males invoking a defence-




2.6   Summary of Chapters 1 and 2 
 This thesis concerns context, gender, ethnicity, cognitive and linguistic 
style. These concepts have been briefly described, critiqued and referenced in relation to 
persuasion outcomes throughout the literature review. Considering each of these variables 
with reference to the predominant dual process theories of persuasion described above, 
Table 1.1 (below) provides some tentative predictions as to persuasion outcomes as a 
function of each levels of the factor. These predictions will in turn contribute to the 
forthcoming hypotheses contained within the relevant chapters of this thesis. 
To recap, the two persuasion models are very similar in the way they predict and 
outline the process of persuasive information (Two routes: One which requires greater 
cognitive thought, elaboration and critical thinking; One which is superficial, effortless and 
derived from previous experiences). The subtle differences between the two models lies in 
their processes and flexibility to which variables are incorporated. For instance, the HSM 
states that certain variables/ source cues are heuristic and thus specifically take the 
heuristic route, which even if motivated and able, can serve to bias or add to the ongoing 
systematic processing route. ELM on the other hand predicts that a cue can influence 
processing at any point along the continuum. For example, when elaboration likelihood is 
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high, the cue is elaborated upon and processed via the central route (which can serve to 
bias or validate).  
Below are four elements of the dual process models which highlight the key 
differences in the two models (please refer to Figures 1.1 and 1.2): 
 
1a. ELM hypothesise a continuum of elaboration that determines how persuasion 
unfolds. 
1b. HSM propose that persuasion depends on continuum of judgmental confidence (the 
sufficiency principle).  
 
2a. ELM states differences in motivation and ability influence elaboration and thus, the 
route of processing. 
2b. HSM assume individuals are cognitive misers and the least cognitive effort is the 
preferred and often default route. 
 
3a. ELM is only affected by accuracy whilst other motives serve to bias processing. 
3b. HSM note accuracy, defence and impression management as motives. 
 
4a. ELM highlight a trade-off is needed as one moves up or down the continuum.  
4b. HSM routes can co-occur. 
 
Table 1.1.  
Variables described in Chapters 1 and 2, and their likely impact for persuasion outcomes 
as a result of the dual process models. 
Gender • Women will be more susceptible to persuasion by a male 
confederate than vice versa. 






• SA participants will be more persuadable than British 
participants. 
• Collectivist group (SA) more likely to be persuaded via 
heuristic route (to maintain ingroup harmony, less exposed 
to/taught critical debate and thought to interpret messages 
using tone and pitch of voice, body language and implied 
meaning to a greater extent) 
• Individualistic group (British) more likely to be persuaded 







• High scores on the two measures will lead to greater 
persuasion, earlier on in the discussion. 
• Higher NfCC/PDI-R scores predict a reliance on pre-existing 
heuristic biases and schema. Individuals are still guided by 
sufficiency principle and thus motivated by accuracy despite a 
desire for quick closure – meaning that if the sufficiency 
principle is not achieved prior to discussion (lack of concrete 
evidence) – they are more likely to be biased by consensus and 
readily available persuasive messages. Alternatively, if they 
achieve subjective sufficiency, it is likely they will be 











• Richer mediums facilitate greater availability of 
cues/evidence/heuristics and thus greater persuasion and sense 
of presence/immersion.  
• The greater the ability for multi-channel processing, the 
greater the persuasion outcomes. FtF easier to persuade due to 
the richer availability of heuristic cues to compliment (additive 
or bias) systematic processing. CMC restricts heuristic cues 
and can serve to negatively bias processing as participant’s 
cognitive load increases (due to a lack of immediacy, 
clarification, and cognitive effort to transcribe and 
communicate persuasive thoughts).  
• Richer mediums (FtF) enable greater ability to elaborate and 
process multiple cues to inform decision. Longer discussion 
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times and greater ability to convey arguments rapidly and 
without confusion enables greater elaboration, motivation and 




• Greater LSM with successful persuasion outcomes (greater 
rapport, mental engagement, similar thinking styles, successful 
negotiations)   
• Those who resist changing their verdict will have higher 
linguistic confidence and self-validation. 





• SA females more likely to be persuaded than the opposing 
British males (who have higher power in language, dominance 
and less likely to be affected by restricted media due to their 
intentions and aims in conversations). 
• British will be less effected by restricted context (CMC) due to 
their focus on an argument’s explicit meaning. SA participants 
however, will notice these restrictions to a greater extent and 
react negatively (reduced persuasion outcomes) given their 
preference for non-verbal and paralinguistic cues to inform 
decision-making.  
• Females in restricted medium will be negatively affected and 
thus less likely to be persuaded than richer mediums, 
compared to male counterparts.  
• Male speech will display higher epistemic modality and have a 
higher degree of drives and analytical thinking in speech 
leading to reduced persuasion outcomes compared to females, 
who will show greater degree of social and informal language, 
and lower rates of epistemic modality.  
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Chapter Three: Materials, General Procedure and Analysis Approach 
 
3.1   Overview of Chapter Three 
This chapter provides a description of the paradigm, materials, general procedure 
and analysis approaches for experimental chapters four, five and six of this thesis. The 
paradigm employed is consistent throughout, differing only as a function of environmental 
modality. Likewise, the mixed methods analysis outlined in this chapter is constant across 
the studies, designed to investigate the effect of gender, ethnicity and cognitive style on 
persuasion outcomes as a function of context.    
 
3.2   Introduction 
As outlined in the preceding two literature review chapters, increasingly people are 
communicating in synthetic digital contexts, for example, using immersive virtual 
environments (VEs) and computer-mediated technologies - moving away from traditional 
face-to-face (FtF) interactions in a global economy. Yet, psychological understanding of 
the effect of context on cognition, in particular the effect of DMs within which people 
communicate has yet to be fully explored for persuasion and information gathering 
purposes. Equally, a literature review has revealed significant gaps in understanding of the 
impact, or otherwise, of gender, cognitive style and ethnicity across digital contexts.  
Accordingly, this thesis concerns itself with the main effect of context, and the interactions 
of gender (male; female), cognitive style (as measured by the need for cognitive closure 
scale, and delusional thinking inventory), and ethnicity (British: South Asian) on 
persuasion outcomes.  
The primary aims for this thesis are: 
1. To investigate the effect of communication modalities on the persuasion process; 
2. To investigate whether individual cognitive style mediates persuasion outcomes; 
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3. To understand whether gender and ethnicity affect persuasion when interacting in a 
dyadic conversation; 
4. To understand the impact, or otherwise, of language during persuasive 
communication across contexts. 
 
 
An overview of the three studies that make up this body of work, and how they interlink is 
illustrated in Figure 3.1 (overleaf). 
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3.3   The Jury Method Paradigm (JM) 
Traditional persuasion paradigms have generally manipulated persuasion using a 
one-way interaction process, typically in the format of an audio file, video file or a written 
statement (see Chaiken & Eagly, 1983). Participants are often seated and asked to listen or 
read a set persuasive message, with researchers measuring differences in attitudes before 
and after exposure to the message. It is through the presentation of structured arguments 
that researchers have been able to manipulate argument quality, likability of source, and 
context for example (e.g., Kelman, 2017; Petty, Briñol, Teeny, & Horcajo, 2018; Winter, 
Krämer, Rösner, & Neubaum, 2015). Direct observations of bilateral persuasion processes 
occurring in both the persuader and persuadee are rare, and so studies often lack the 
‘naturalistic’ aspect of free-flowing conversation during the persuasive process. As a 
result, previous research has typically focussed upon a very singular line of measuring 
persuasion, excluding the interaction and debate element of the persuasive process (see 
Martin & Yurukoglu, 2017; Stiff & Mongeau, 2016; Winter et al., 2015).  
The Jury Method (JM) is a long-standing and theoretically robust persuasion 
paradigm (London, Meldman, & Lanckton, 1970a & b; London, 1973) that allows free-
flowing communication to occur and facilitates a measure of persuasion from both the 
persuader and persuadee perspectives during a dyadic interaction.  Here, two individuals 
act as mock-jurors in a FtF context where they discuss the guilt or innocence of parties 
involved in a fictitious criminal event. Manipulation of opposing decisions (guilty vs. not 
guilty verdicts) are imposed prior to discussion (unbeknown to the mock-jurors) by 
manipulating the event information, which permits the observation of inevitable 
naturalistic persuasion in order to achieve a unanimous group verdict. In this situation, one 
individual typically becomes the persuader (maintaining their original verdict choice), 
whilst the other becomes the persuadee (changing their verdict post-discussion). 
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 The JM consists of 3 distinct aspects which participants receive separately in the 
form of a ‘jury booklet’ prior to discussing a legal case. These include: 
1. The Jury Summary. This 250-word summary outlined the key details of a fictional 
civil case of negligence. The authors reason this topic was chosen due to the 
majority of individuals not having a preconceived belief or opinion on the topic 
area. The case revolved around an airline company being sued for negligence by a 
lumber company. It states that faulty engineering resulted in a plane to crash, thus 
producing a fire which fuelled an existing fire to ultimately destroy the lumber 
company’s timber.   
2. The Judge’s Instructions. The 100-word text informs participants of a lack of 
precedent for the legal case. Additionally, it points out that they will have to base 
verdict decisions on a preponderance of evidence, and not a ‘beyond reasonable 
doubt’ assumption.    
3. The Legal Analysis. This section is manipulated to include arguments either for the 
plaintiff (the prosecution) or against (defence’s statement), unknowingly prompting 
an initial agreement in participants to support the presented opinion and ultimately 
providing a primary disagreement with their jury partner. It does not differ in terms 
of evidence provided, but simply in opinions stated.  
Once the jury booklet is administered, participants are given a verdict sheet, asking for 
their verdict choice (whether the airline company is or is not liable for the loss suffered by 
the plaintiff) and their confidence in this verdict, as a percentage. Upon subsequent 
completion, the participants are brought together and introduced. They are usually given 20 
minutes to discuss the details of the case, acting as a two-man jury in an attempt to reach a 
unanimous verdict upon which they both agree.   
Subsequent studies have used and adapted this paradigm, with larger sample sizes 
and confederates (Kruglanski et al., 1993; London et al., 1971; Webster & Kruglanski, 
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1994) and have repeated the findings of the initial research conducted by London et al. 
Furthermore, researchers (Kruglanski, Webster & Klem, 1993; Maslow et al., 1971; 
London et al., 1971) have extended this paradigm in an attempt to explain persuasion and 
persuadability using NfCC and confidence in communication; both of which will be 
discussed later on in this chapter. 
 
3.3.1   Adapting the jury method. The JM was adapted for this programme of 
research by altering the scenario presented to participants and focusing on a contemporary 
cybercrime occurrence (see Appendix A). This update reflects current events, helping to 
ensure the persuasion scenario was engaging for participants. Domain-relevant analogues 
were created for the jury booklet by first identifying the relation-attribute structure of the 
source domain using Gentner’s structure mapping theory of analogical problem-solving to 
guide the analysis (Gentner, 1983). This process ensured that the conceptual structure of 
the source domain used in previous research was retained in the new domain, so that 
complexity of the problem domains in terms of relational structure is maintained. This 
allowed for problem difficulty to be controlled for and the key concepts directly 
comparable to the original paradigm.  
 
3.3.1.1   JM adapted materials. The jury booklet comprised a series of distinct 
sections, which will now be described in detail. The jury booklet is consistent across 
contexts and is presented to participants in the same manner irrespective of modality.  
The case summary. The case summary outlines the details surrounding a fictitious 
criminal case briefly described here - a data storage company is charged with negligence 
because the company had not maintained a security firewall system thus allowing hackers 
to infiltrate the security network and steal a classified, highly-sensitive government 
document detailing key problems within the UK infrastructure. This document was 
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subsequently leaked to the press which caused public panic. The defence counsel claimed 
the hackers would have stolen the documents anyway, even if the correct firewall and 
protection were in place. The prosecution claimed the act of not maintaining the firewall 
lead to the illegal acquisition of the document, which was then leaked to the press.  
The judge’s instructions. The judge’s instructions informed the participant that 
there was no legal precedent and that the verdict had to be either guilty and pay 
compensation, or not guilty and therefore not pay compensation; the issue of unanimity 
was stressed. The burden of proof required a ‘preponderance of evidence’, rather than the 
traditional ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ assumption. This reflects and references the original 
paradigm’s instructions (London et al., 1970a). 
Pre-deliberation questionnaire. After examination of the case booklet, participants 
completed a set of questions outlined in the pre-deliberation booklet. These included an 
initial verdict choice of either ‘Guilty’ or ‘Not Guilty’ and an initial indication of their 
meta-cognitive confidence in this decision, on a scale of 1-100%. Participants were asked 
to write down the key points they used to base their decision on, why, and if they ignored 
any evidence, to state this and why they chose to ignore it. Finally, participants were asked 
how credible they found the case summary, registering their thoughts on a 4-point Likert 
scale from ‘not at all credible’ to ‘very credible’ (See Appendix B).  
Post-deliberation questionnaire. Following discussion of the case with a 
confederate, and once a decision had been reached, participants completed a post-
deliberation booklet, similar to the first, whereby they were asked for their verdict choice 
and key evidence and points they used to base their decision on, and why. This allowed a 
direct comparison to be made, measuring differences in verdict choices (persuaded or not) 
as well as an assessment of the extent of their persuasion post-jury discussion.   
In addition to the questions posed in the pre-questionnaire, the post-deliberation 
questionnaire asked how persuadable they thought the other juror member was, enquiring 
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if they said any persuasive and relevant points throughout the discussion. Likewise, an 
open-ended question asked how they found communicating with their jury partner (i.e., 
was it difficult or easy, and why). Finally, mock-jurors’ were asked to rate their jury 
partner on a 5-point Likert scale for friendliness (ranging from ‘very friendly’ to ‘very 
unfriendly’) and aggressiveness (‘very aggressive’ to ‘very passive’) to provide insight into 
possible factors that might contribute to persuasion. Previous research has suggested that 
subjective perceptions of personality/likability can influence compliance-gaining and 
persuasive processes (Rancer & Avtgis, 2006; Roskos-Ewoldsen, Bichsel, & Hoffman, 
2002) and therefore these questions were included in the post-questionnaire outcomes (see 
Appendix C).   
3.3.2   Piloting the adapted jury method materials. To understand whether this 
adapted version of the jury booklet was an unbiased and accurate adaption of the original 
paradigm, a pilot study was conducted. A within-subjects design was administered, 
whereby participants received both the original and the adapted jury booklets. These 
included both legal analyses so as to allow a single participant the full overview of the 
booklet’s content to make an informed decision without prior manipulation. It additionally 
allowed the investigation of potential bias towards a favourable viewpoint when all 
evidence was presented to the participants.  
 Thirty participants were recruited using opportunity sampling, resulting in 13 
males and 17 females, with a mean age of 31.80 years (SD = 13.81). The study was 
accessed online using SurveyMonkey, where individuals were provided with the 
participant information and asked for their informed consent. The first paradigm (original 
or adapted) was presented, followed by the second paradigm, which was counterbalanced. 
The booklet information was presented on screen, following which the survey asked 
individuals for their verdict choices and confidence in their decisions on a scale ranging 
from 1(not at all) to 10 (completely confident). Further questions were asked to probe an 
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understanding of participant’s decision-making when reading and deciding their verdicts. 
These included: 1) What are the three main points you used to base your decision on? 
Please explain in as much detail as possible; 2) What are the three main points you 
disagreed with or did not influence your decision? Please explain in as much detail as 
possible.   
Figure 3.2 (below) presents the key results from this pilot, indicating that the 
original JM booklet is heavily skewed towards a not-guilty verdict (80%) compared to the 
adapted version (58.6%). These results indicate that the adapted version is a more balanced 
summary of the evidence and does not directly influence participants to choose one 
particular verdict over another, based on strength or clarity of evidence. The adapted 
paradigm had a mean confidence score of 6.4 (out of 10) compared to 7 for the original. A 
dependent t-test revealed that participants were no more, or less confident in their verdict 
choices as a result of the jury booklet adaption, t(29) = 1.35, p = .188.  
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3.3.3   Confederates mock jurors. Two groups of participants were recruited for 
the programme of work presented in this thesis: confederates and mock jurors. 
Confederates were utilised for this research to experimentally manage the initial 
disagreement of verdict choices prior to the jury discussion. Using confederates negated 
the need for any pre-discussion manipulation of verdict choice and thus guaranteed an 
initial opposition of participant’s verdict choice. This approach has been employed in 
previous studies of the JM, to good effect (Kruglanski, Webster, & Klem, 1993; London, 
McSeveney, & Tropper, 1971). 
 
3.3.3.1   Confederate juror training. The pilot study had asked participants two 
open-ended questions to investigate their reasoning for choosing the verdicts (be it guilty 
or not guilty). The responses collected from this initial data collection was used to develop 
a script for the confederates that highlighted key points both for and against the legal 
scenario depicted in the jury booklet. The responses led to the development of alternative 
suggestions as to how to respond to participants during the jury discussion (see Appendix 
D).  
All confederates were instructed that this script was simply a list of key points and 
they could expand on these points during the jury discussions in response to the mock 
juror’s responses; the primary aim is to persuade the mock juror to the opposing viewpoint. 
Confederate jurors were also provided with a copy of the jury booklet and pre-discussion 
questionnaire, so any points brought up in jury discussions would be understood in context. 
All confederates were instructed to start the jury discussion by asking the participants for 
their verdict and thoughts on the case. This would then enable them to discuss the 
opposing, scripted points. All materials were made available to the confederates at least 
one week prior to the commencement of the study, along with the researcher’s contact 
information if they had any questions. All mock jurors read the booklet and made a 
guilt/innocence decision that was communicated (secretly) to the confederate prior to 
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discussions, enabling them to enter the discussion with an opposing viewpoint. The mock 
juror was unaware of the confederate’s status until the debrief was given.   
 
3.4   Demographic Questionnaire  
A demographic questionnaire was developed (see Appendix E1), comprising 11 
items to collect information relevant to this thesis; ethnicity/cultural group, age, sex, 
educational status, level of completed education, country of birth, parent’s country of birth, 
length of stay in the UK and first language. Here, ethnicity was defined as social traits 
within a population, such as nationality, religious faith and shared language, similar to 
culture but with an emphasis on racial roots (Betancourt, Green, Carrillo, & Ananeh-
Firempong II, 2003; Verkuyten, 2018). Participants were asked to self-identify using 
categories consistently employed by the UN, World Bank Group, SAARC (South Asian 
Association for Regional Cooperation), Foreign and Commonwealth Office, and CIA 
Factbook (see Appendix E2). Ethnic/cultural grouping is complex because of the 
multifaceted, subjective and changing nature of ethnic and cultural identification, but 
sources from a variety of internationally-renowned, well-established organisations provide 
a ‘gold standard’ approach to collecting and grouping data of this nature. The nature of this 
research looks at the importance of multi-cultural societies such as the UK, and one of the 
UK’s largest minority populations - the South-Asian community (Office for National 
Statistics, 2011). ‘South-Asian’ refers to individuals born, or first-generation migrants, 
from Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. 
Those whose ethnic group did not fit into the classifications being investigated within this 
body of research (British, South-Asian) were excluded.  
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3.5   Need for Cognitive Closure  
Need for Cognitive Closure (NfCC) scores were collected from all participants 
using the NfCC scale: a 42 item self-report measure designed to measure stable individual 
differences in NfCC (Kruglanski et al., 1993). NfCC uses a 6-point Likert scale (ranging 
from 1 strongly disagree to 6 strongly agree), with low composite scores indicating a low 
NfCC. The scale identifies five psychometric properties which include the desire for 
predictability, preference for order and structure, discomfort in ambiguity, decisiveness 
and close-mindedness. Previous research indicates these are reliable (Cronbach’s α = .84) 
in that they significantly discriminate groups high and low in NfCC. Additional high test-
retest reliability scores support the claim that the NfCC scale is stable construct (Webster 
& Kruglanski, 1994). A composite score is calculated by summing the responses across 
each item (after reverse scoring the appropriate items – see Appendix F) giving a possible 
range of 42-252. NfCC scores were neither manipulated nor controlled in the current 
research, rather they were used to investigate any potential relationship between persuasion 
outcomes, ethnicity, gender, and context. 
 
3.6   Delusional Thinking  
The Peter’s Delusional Inventory – revised (PDI-R) is a measure of delusional 
ideation in the general population, using 21 items to assess unusual and subjective 
experiences (Peters, Joseph, Day, & Garety, 2004; Peters, Joseph, & Garety, 1999). The 
schizotypal subtypes include distress, preoccupation and conviction, which have been 
shown to provide greater discrimination between ‘healthy’ and deluded populations; that is 
not what you think, it is how you think about it (Peters et al., 2004).  
Five separate scores are calculated, including the total across all dimensions. The 
first of these is the yes/no score (possible range of 0-21). For each of the 21 items, 
participants score either a 0 if the belief is not endorsed (‘no’) or a 1 if endorsed (‘yes’). An 
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answer of ‘no’ creates an automatic 0 for the following 3 subscales. However, a ‘yes’ 
answer requires participants to rate their levels of distress, preoccupation and conviction on 
a Likert scale from 1 (not at all) – 5 (very). Each dimension is calculated by summing the 
scores within this subscale, producing a possible range of 0-105 for each factor. A grand 
PDI-R total score is derived by summing all 4 subcategories, resulting in a range of 
potential scores of 0-336 for each mock-juror. This average is useful for comparing 
individuals grouped as high or low, and is a robust and reliable measure of delusional 
ideation in the general population (see Peters, Joseph, Day, & Garety, 2004; Appendix G).  
 
3.7   English Proficiency Measure  
Participants in the research presented in this thesis were ethnically distinct, and so 
the Expressive One-Word Picture Vocabulary Test-Fourth Edition (EOWPVT-4; Martin & 
Brownell, 2010) was administered to all participants to control for potential confounding 
variables associated with language comprehension. The EOWPVT-4 measures the use of 
expressive (verbal) proficiency for English thereby ensuring that all participants were able 
to fully comprehend the various materials and instructions given and converse in English. 
EOWPVT-4 employs a picture-naming paradigm and asks individuals to name (using one 
word) the various objects, actions and concepts represented in colour illustrations, taking 
no longer than 20 minutes to complete and score. Standardised scores were computed, and 
a baseline established, whereby standardised scores for 99.7% of cases in the normal 
distribution fall between 55-145, thus making a score of below 55 the exclusion criteria for 
participants in this study. All participants scored above this baseline score, across all three 
studies and is therefore not discussed or analysed further.  
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3.8   Methodological Triangulation  
‘An attempt to map out, or explain more fully, the richness and complexity of human 
behaviour by studying it from more than one standpoint’ (Cohen, Manion & Morrison 
2007, p.141). 
Methodological triangulation (sometimes referred to as mixed methods) involves 
collecting, analysing and integrating two or more research methods in order to study a 
single phenomenon or construct (Bekhet & Zauszniewski, 2012; Casey & Murphy, 2009). 
Combining multiple methods and empirical materials allows for a wider yet in-depth 
understanding of the research questions being asked (Foss & Ellefsen 2002; Olsen, 2004). 
This thesis focusses on concurrent triangulation, employing both qualitative and 
quantitative methods and analyses (Creswell, Plano Clark, Gutmann, & Hanson, 2003). 
This ‘across-method’ approach enables quantitative data collected to be complemented and 
clarified by qualitative findings; helping to identify key interests and concepts within the 
field of persuasion (Casey & Murhy, 2009).  
 
3.9   Qualitative Methodology 
The qualitative method employed for this research is self-reported, open-ended 
questions for mock-jurors prior to, and after the jury discussion (see the jury booklet). The 
rationale is to collect data on why/how individuals made their decisions, and how and 
whether this differs across persuaded groups, if at all. 
 
3.9.1   Qualitative content analysis (QCA). QCA was used to systematically 
describe and quantify written data from the pre- and post-questionnaires. It is a mixed-
methods approach: assigning categories and objective meaning to qualitative text to make 
valid inferences yet describing and analysing the frequencies of these categories using 
quantitative processes (Downe-Wamboldt, 1992; Mayring, 2014).  
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QCA involves understanding the surface structure of the materials selected and 
segmenting the transcriptions, allowing a clearer research focus and comparison of codes 
during analysis. In addition, QCA requires a coding frame for structuring material into 
thematic categories (dimensions) which specify relevant aspects, as well as subcategories, 
which specify relevant meanings concerning this aspect.  The development and 
construction of a coding frame is underpinned by four key processes, all of which feed into 
an open coding approach which was utilised in this thesis. Open coding is a strategy for 
discovering concepts within the data, conceptualising the material by reading the text line-
by-line.  
QCA is a systematic procedure. Material is read multiple times, and as many 
headings or paraphrases as required are deduced and constructed in order to describe all 
content. This progressive summarising then requires a streamlining of the paraphrases 
based on a discernment of the relevant material. This is an inductive data-driven process as 
categories and themes emerge from the data and so are freely generated. A feedback loop 
enables the main categories (known as dimensions) to be revised and subsumed into a 
codebook using a hierarchical structure (see Figure 3.3).  
A review of the literature reveals that thus far, there is no qualitative research for 
analysing persuasive interactive communications using QCA. As a result, this research 
aims to address this gap by complementing traditional quantitative methodology with 
inductive content analyses. The rationale for using QCA is to identify a broad yet 
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Figure 3.3. Diagrammatic overview of the content analysis procedural model (QCA) used 
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3.9.1.1   Data corpus. Data was collected using open-ended questions administered 
within the JM booklet, which investigated the subjective decision-making processes 
participants undertook when deciding on their verdict choices. Two primary questions 
were asked of mock-jurors’: a) ‘What were the main factors/evidence that you used to base 
your decision on – please list/describe them’. ‘Please explain why you deemed these 
factors to be important’; b) ‘What pieces of information/evidence did you not use to base 
your decision on? Please list them’. ‘Please explain why you ignored these factors’. 
Additional questions probed mock juror’s attitude to the communication and discussion 
with the confederate mock-juror. Participant’s perception of the persuasive discussion is 
important in understanding the impact the interactions had on persuasion. How these 
conversations are perceived, and how individuals react to the confederate juror as a result 
can serve as a guide to modify and develop interactive persuasive procedures.  
It is well documented that perceptions of others influences behaviour during 
interactions in a top-down fashion (Campbell & Cunnington, 2017; Firestone & Scholl, 
2016). For example, Kahle and Berman (1979) found that attitudes have an important 
degree of predictive utility, whilst Chaiken and Eagly (1983) concluded that communicator 
salience influences the processing of persuasive messages, dependent on communication 
modality. Understanding how the participants felt immediately after the jury discussion is 
important when measuring and quantifying persuasive message exchanges across varying 
communication modalities. As a result, two open-ended questions were administered in the 
post-questionnaire; a) ‘Do you feel your jury partner said some relevant and persuasive 
points? Please explain’; b) ‘How did you find the discussion in general? For example, was 
it hard to communicate to your jury partner etc? Please explain’.  
Finally, participants were given the chance to comment on the research as a whole, 
having the opportunity to add anything they deemed to be important that was not covered 
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in the set questions (‘Is there anything else about this research, or your participation in it 
that you would like to discuss or comment on?’). All answers to these open-ended 
questions were transcribed across the three studies. In total, five detailed responses per 
participant were collected and analysed using QCA.   
3.9.1.2   Coding and development of codebook. QCA has a number of 
requirements when establishing and refining a coding frame which needs to be taken into 
account when designing and analysing qualitative data. These include: 1) 
Unidimensionality, which requires that each dimension captures one aspect of the data 
corpus; 2) Mutual exclusiveness, which means that only one unit of coding can be assigned 
to just one of the subcategories within a dimension; 3) Exhaustiveness, referring to the 
requirement that all data should be assigned to one unit of coding within a subset of the 
coding frame; 4) and Saturation, meaning that all categories should be utilised at least once 
in the dataset, thus no categories are left empty.  
To this end, a codebook for the current research was established (see Appendix H).  
Seven primary themes were identified from the data spanning two dimensions (pre- and 
post-discussion). These included: 
1) Facts taken from the case file used to inform decision-making. This theme consists 
of 11 sub-categories  
2) Reasoning for the verdict choice, containing 13 sub-categories.  
3) Placement of responsibility for the crime depicted, containing 5 sub-categories.  
4) References used to reason their verdict choice, constraining 4 sub-categories.  
5) Persuasiveness of the confederate mock-juror, which was sub-divided into 
persuasive, not persuasive and neutral, containing 15 sub-categories.  
6) Communication of the jury discussion. This was further sub-divided into 
communication with the confederate mock-juror, and perception of communication 
as a function of the communication modality covering 15 sub-categories.  
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7) Additional thoughts and details on the research study, covering 12 sub-categories. 
 
For the first question on the pre-questionnaire (‘What were the main factors/evidence that 
you used to base your decision on? Please explain why you deemed these factors to be 
important’), four codes are elicited per participant. These comprise a single code from 
themes 1, 2, 3 and 4. For the second question (‘What pieces of information/evidence did 
you not use to base your decision on? Please explain why you ignored these factors’), two 
codes are elicited per participant from themes 1 and 3. Therefore, the pre-questionnaire 
prior to the discussion phase produces six codes for each participant, elicited from four 
themed headings. 
For the first question on the post-questionnaire (‘Explain why you think that the 
defendant is guilty/not guilty in as much detail as possible. Explain the main 
factors/evidence that you used to make your decision’), four codes are elicited per 
participant which is exactly the same as the four codes produced for the first question in 
the pre-questionnaire (comprising themes 1, 2, 3 and 4). The second question (‘Do you feel 
your jury partner said some relevant and persuasive points?’) elicits one code from theme 
5. The third question (‘How did you find the discussion in general?’) elicits two codes 
from theme 6 which covers communication from the discussion as well as the modality. 
Finally, the fourth question covers theme 7 (‘Is there anything else about this research, or 
your participation in it that you would like to discuss or comment on?’) but can be 
extracted from any section of the questionnaire if relevant. In summary, the post-
questionnaire produces eight codes. These are elicited from the above seven themed 
headings and apply to all participants. The points made for each participant were coded 
separately at both the pre- and post- questionnaire stages so a comparison of the changes in 
views could be analysed with regards to persuasion, cognitive style, ethnicity and gender.   
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3.9.1.3   Inter-coder reliability. Two independent raters, blind to the research 
design and hypotheses underwent training sessions. This involved understanding the JM 
paradigm, the definitions of the codebook, and how the coding scheme is applied to the 
qualitative transcripts. Following this, each coder completed practice transcripts which 
were then compared sentence by sentence to the researcher’s codes, and feedback was 
given where needed. Interrater reliability, measured through Cohen’s κ, was calculated 
from a random sub-sample of 21 participants spanning all three communication modalities 
and independent variables. Results indicated that all themes were rated in the highest band 
of agreement (M = 0.929, SD = 0.69; see Table 3.1), indicating that the coding scheme was 
reliable and consistently applied.  
 
Table 3.1 
QCA reliability testing from two independent raters (N = 21) 
 
Note. All p’s < .001 
Theme No Pre Deliberation Themes κ
1 Facts used to inform decision-making 0.819
2 References 1.000
3 Reasoning for verdict choice 0.866
4 Attribution of responsibility 1.000
5 Facts not used in decision-making 0.869
6 Reasoning for not using evidence 1.000
Post Deliberation Themes
7 Facts used to inform decision-making 0.888
8 References 1.000
9 Reasoning for verdict choice 0.940
10 Attribution of responsibility 0.924
11 Persuasiveness of the confederate 0.825
12 Communication of jury discussion 0.943
13 Additional comments 1.000
Pre Deliberation Themes
Post Deliberation Themes
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3.10   Overview of Quantitative Analyses  
A primarily quantitative approach is used throughout this thesis, allowing decisions 
and behaviours to be systematically quantified and measured. Prior to reporting the results 
in full, the following provides a brief overview of the analysis approaches employed on the 
research data throughout this thesis, and how the methods used support an in-depth 
analysis of persuasion. 
 
3.11   The Jury Method Analyses 
First, persuasion outcomes were considered using the pre- and post-discussion self-
reported questionnaires, whereby participants indicated their verdict choice of either 
‘Guilty’ or ‘Not Guilty’. A change in verdict post-discussion indicated persuasion had 
occurred. This categorical data was analysed using non-parametric Chi-Square statistical 
tests, permitting a comparison of proportional indicators of persuasion as a function of the 
sample as a whole, and across experimental manipulations.  
 Analyses of variance (ANOVA) were used to investigate differences in confidence 
of verdict choice, both before and after the jury discussion as a function of Persuasion, 
Ethnicity and Gender. Confidence in verdict choice was gleaned from the pre- and post-
questionnaires given to mock-jurors’, using a percentage scale of 0 (not at all) - 100% 
(very).  
 Percentage change in confidence was calculated to determine the degree of 
confidence change as a result of the jury discussion. This was calculated using London et 
al.’s (1970b) computations, taking the confidence indicators from the pre- and post-mock-
juror questionnaires and calculating a single change score, to allow a direct comparison 
across groups, irrespective of changes in verdict (see Section 3.11.1). The confidence 
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percentage change scores are analysed using relevant inferential statistical analyses across 
Persuasion, Ethnicity, Gender and Cognitive Style. Chi-Square Goodness of Fit tests 
determine the direction of confidence change scores for significant ANOVA results.  
         Two cognitive style measures were calculated and analysed (PDI-R & NfCC). 
Descriptive statistics are reported, following which analysis of variance tests were used to 
analyse the distributions of scores collected, and to investigate whether the distributions 
differ significantly across the unrelated conditions of Gender, Ethnicity and Persuasion.  
Both cognitive measures were also used to categorise mock-jurors as either high or low in 
their cognitive style if they fell within the first or final quartile emerging from the range of 
scores collected. The resultant dichotomous data was analysed across a range of dependent 
variables (DVs) including confidence in verdict choices pre- and post-discussion, the 
change in percentage confidence and the duration length of the jury discussion. To 
investigate whether there was a relationship between the two cognitive style measures, a 
correlation was additionally computed.  
To determine whether the length of the jury discussion between mock-jurors and 
confederate mock-jurors impacted on persuasion outcomes, and whether the experimental 
variables influenced discussion length, the duration of the jury discussion was calculated 
by the number of seconds from the experimenter leaving the testing lab, to a verdict being 
agreed upon (whether that verdict be unanimous or disputed). Analysis of the means across 
the experimental variables including Persuasion and Cognitive Style was also analysed.  
The language of verbal speech during the dyadic jury deliberation was analysed. 
Transcripts were transformed into files suitable for linguistic style analysis using 
Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count software (LIWC: Pennebaker, Booth, Boyd & Francis, 
2015). This is a text-based analysis system that allows speech to be broken down into 
psychologically meaningful categories. It provides some insight into the cognitive and 
perceptual processes of the mock-jurors during the dyadic jury discussion (see Section 
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3.12). From this database, Linguistic Style Matching (LSM) is calculated allowing insight 
into the synchronicity of mock-jurors linguistic style when interacting with the confederate 
mock-juror (see Section 3.13).  
      Qualitative data is collected from pre- and post-discussion questionnaires, whereby 
participants were given a series of open-ended questions regarding why they chose the 
verdict they did, evidence they decided to focus on/ignore, any relationship between those 
persuaded vs. not, and changes in participant’s focus of key data, along with responses to 
open-ended questions. This allowed consideration of persuasive comments and 
communication ease to give some insight into subjective opinions of the confederate 
persuasiveness compared to those who were not persuaded.  
Finally, the influence of the confederate on the dyadic discussion was investigated 
using a series of non-parametric Mann-Whitney U tests using the mock-juror’s rankings of 
confederate’s friendliness and aggressiveness. These data emanated from 5-point Likert 
scales as a function of Gender, Ethnicity and Persuasion. Finally, the confederate’s speech 
when discussing the case with the mock-juror participants is transcribed and analysed 
using LIWC and LSM analyses to compare linguistic style across the various variables to 
mock-jurors.  
 
3.11.1   Percentage change in confidence and persuasion. Every mock-juror 
participant was asked to give his opinion twice (pre- and post-discussion). From this 
comparison, two principal measures of persuasion were collected and analysed: opinion 
change (persuasion) and the degree to which opinion differed post-exposure to persuasive 
messages (percentage confidence change). Persuasion, whereby an individual changes their 
opinion following the jury discussion or sustains their initial decision, consists of a binary 
assignment of either yes or no (coded as ‘1’ for persuaded or ‘0’ as not persuaded).  
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 The change in confidence from pre- to post-discussion verdict was analysed to 
investigate any differences in subjective confidence ratings when persuasion had occurred. 
This is simple to calculate for an individual who was not persuaded and therefore did not 
change their verdict. The pre-confidence rating is subtracted from the post-confidence 
rating, as illustrated below. In this example (Figure 3.4), the participant’s initial pre-
decision verdict was not guilty, indicating a 60% confidence in that decision. Post-
discussion shows the individual was not persuaded, but confidence of their original verdict 
increased, stating 80% for not guilty post-discussion. This results in a percentage 
confidence change score of 20%: an increase in confidence of verdict choice post-jury 
discussion. 
Figure 3.4. Illustration to show the percentage change score calculation for an individual 
who was not persuaded. 
 
However, a problem arises when comparing confidence in verdicts for those who 
were not persuaded and did not change their verdict decision, and those who were 
persuaded and therefore rejected their previous verdict. In such instances percentage 
change scores cannot be effectively compared as one group changed their verdict choice 
and one group did not. To allow a reliable and absolute measure for comparing percentage 
change in confidence for mock-jurors who were persuaded versus those not persuaded, the 
following calculation was used (see London et al., 1970b): 
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PostC – X = Percentage Change Score  
(X = 100 – PreC) 
where PreC is the pre-verdict confidence and PostC is the post-verdict confidence. 
 
In this example, (as Figure 3.5 illustrates) the participant was initially 60% confident in 
their pre-verdict choice of not guilty. However, after the discussion, they changed their 
verdict to guilty and this resulted in a confidence in the new verdict of 30%. By calculating 
100 minus the pre-discussion confidence in the ultimately rejected verdict, this allows an 
absolute score to be derived. Stating a confidence of 60% is the reverse of stating you are 
40% confident in the opposing verdict. Consequently, this results in having a percentage 
change score of -10%: a reduction in absolute confidence by 10%. Using this calculation 
allows the two confidence change scores across persuasion groups to be directly compared. 
 
Figure 3.5. Illustration to show the percentage change score calculation for an individual 
who was persuaded. 
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3.12   Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC) 
LIWC, developed by Pennebaker and colleagues (Pennebaker, Booth, & Francis, 
2007; Pennebaker, Boyd, Jordan, & Blackburn, 2015; Pennebaker, Francis, & Booth, 
2001), is a computerised text-analysis program which enables word-by-word analysis of 
multiple linguistic files to efficiently quantify language (Boyd & Pennebaker, 2015; 
Newman, Groom, Handelman, & Pennebaker, 2008; Pennebaker, Chung, Ireland, 
Gonzales, & Booth, 2007). LIWC consists of both content and style words. Content words 
include nouns, regular verbs, adjectives and adverbs which convey the content of 
information in speech. Function words on the other hand, are what binds speech together 
and consist of pronouns, prepositions, articles, auxiliary verbs and conjunctions. LIWC has 
been found to be reliable and used effectively across a number of psychological studies 
(Tausczik & Pennebaker, 2010).  
3.12.1   Linguistic style during jury discussion. To calculate the linguistic content 
for each individual, discussion transcripts were separated into utterances for mock- and 
confederate mock-jurors’, creating two separate files for each jury discussion (394 files in 
total). Each transcript was checked for spelling errors and adapted to accommodate for 
spoken language, in line with the LIWC2015 manual. For example, starting words with 
‘rr’ if it is to be classed as a non-fluency, or contracting words such as ‘youknow’ to ensure 
categorisation as a filler item. Transcripts were scanned for target words using the LIWC 
software system, and compared to each word in the default LIWC dictionary. Appropriate 
word categories and subcategories are then incremented, meaning that one word can create 
more than one LIWC output. For example, the word ‘cried’ would be categorised under 
‘sadness’, ‘negative emotion’, ‘overall affect’, ‘verb’ and ‘past tense verb’.  
Paralinguistic dimensions allow for conversational analyses within studies, 
including ‘netspeak’ which comprises shortened text-phrases and basic emoji’s (‘b4’, 
which is coded as a preposition; ‘J’, which is coded as a positive emotion subcategory). 
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This supports a crude measurement of text-speak (relevant for Study 2). LIWC output is 
expressed as the percentage of total words in the text sample submitted per individual, with 
five exceptions in the summary categories: word count (WC), analytical thinking, clout, 
authentic and emotional tone. The resulting percentage score thus permits a profile of the 
individual’s linguistic style.  
Four summary variables were included in the analyses for linguistic style in the 
current body of research. These included analytical thinking, clout, authenticity and 
emotional tone. Six linguistic themes of interest were also included, which comprised of 
total function words (including pronouns, articles, prepositions, auxiliary verbs, adverbs, 
conjunctions and negations), affective processes (positive and negative emotions, anxiety, 
anger and sadness), social processes (family, friends, female and male references), 
cognitive processes (insight, causation, discrepancy, tentative, certainty and 
differentiation), drives (affiliation, achievement, power, reward and risk) and informal 
language (swear words, netspeak, assent, nonfluencies and fillers).  
3.12.2   Epistemic modality: A new LIWC dictionary. Epistemic modality 
influences the perception of confidence within speech, and so can influence the degree of 
persuasion across varying communication modalities. In order to analyse epistemic 
modality within participant’s linguistic style, a new dictionary was created to be subsumed 
into the LIWC software. The word stems were directly derived from past studies 
(Kärkkäinen, 2003; Leech & Svartvik, 1975; Maslow et al.,1971; Quirk, Greenbaum, 
Leech, & Svartvik, 1985; Wesson, 2005), combining research across language power, 
dogmatic style, expressed confidence and meta-cognition to form a comprehensible and 
logical measure for assessing epistemic modality both within speech and text formats. 
Tentative language was compiled using a number of unique language features that indicate 
uncertainty and low confidence. Examples include hedges (e.g., might, sort of, maybe, 
probably; Wesson, 2005), epistemic stance verbs, adverbs and modal verbs (e.g., ‘should’ 
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is a weaker equivalent of ‘must’ highlighting the non-committed tendency of the speaker 
or a tentative inference: Leech & Svartvik, 1975; Quirk et al., 1985). A confident linguistic 
style, on the other hand, includes expressions of certainty and expressed confidence 
derived from the same studies but appearing at the other end of the continuum (e.g., 
‘certainly’, ‘will’, ‘need’, ‘believe’, ‘definitely’). Furthermore, coding of jury discussion 
transcripts facilitated additional inclusion of epistemic modality word stems which could 
be considered specific to the JM context, such as ‘I am leaning both ways’, and ‘but then’ 
which highlights indecisiveness, changing of opinions and thus doubt in self (see Appendix 
I). 
 
3.13   Linguistic Style Matching (LSM)  
To examine the synchronicity of linguistic styles between the mock- and 
confederate jurors’ during the persuasive dyadic interaction, linguistic style matching 
(LSM; Ireland & Pennebaker, 2010; Niederhoffer & Pennebaker, 2002) was employed. 
LSM utilises LIWC outputs to examine the data corpus for each individual’s utterances 
within the JM discussion, specifically calculating the amount of words that fall into nine 
specified categories (auxiliary verbs, articles, common adverbs, personal pronouns, 
indefinite pronouns, prepositions, negations, conjunctions and quantifiers) for each 
individual (see Table 3.2). These categories measure the synchronicity of function words to 
the other conversational partner throughout the course of the recorded conversation. 
Function words reliably reflect a speaker’s psychological state and tend to be processed 
rapidly and largely subconsciously (Ireland & Henderson, 2014). This indicates that LSM 
scores reflect unconscious synchronicity between conversational partners, rather than 
deliberate intention. Previous studies have utilised LSM as an analysis method for dyadic 
interactions and across communication modalities. For example, examining romantic 
interest and stability between couples (Ireland et al., 2011), and investigating whether LSM 
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is a predictor of cohesiveness within asynchronous CMC and FtF environments (Gonzales, 
Hancock, & Pennebaker, 2010).  
 
Table 3.2  
The 9 function categories collated from LIWC2015 and used in the calculation of the LSM 
score, along with definitions and exemplars 
Function Category  Definition  Linguistic example  
Adverbs 
Describes or gives 
additional information 
about a verb, adjective or 
phrase 
Very, well, gently  
Articles References a noun The, a, an  
Auxiliary verbs 
Adds functional or 
grammatical meaning to a 
clause  
Shall, have, do  
Conjunctions Connects clauses or sentences And, but, therefore 
Indefinite pronouns 
Pronoun which does not 
refer to a specific being, 
object etc. 
Something, anything, it,  
Negations  Contradiction or denial No, not, nobody 
Personal Pronouns Reference to a specific 
person  
I, me, we 
Prepositions 
Show a relationship in 
space or time or between a 
person, object or place 
Down, opposite, around  
Quantifiers  Denote size, scale or amount Many, few, much 
 
The following formula is taken to calculate an individual’s LSM score across each of the 9 
categories: 
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LSMf  =  1 – [(|fm   – fc|) / (fm + fc + .0001)] 
where ‘f’ is the function category, ‘m’ is the individual’s LIWC score for that particular 
function category, and ‘c’ is the opposing discussion partner’s LIWC score for the same 
function category (in this case, it would be the confederate-mock-juror). The denominator 
of .0001 is used to prevent division by zero (see Ireland & Pennebaker, 2010). The 
resulting 9 scores for each jury discussion are averaged to provide a total LSM score for 
each discussion between mock-juror and confederate mock-juror. LSM scores vary 
between .00 and 1.00 whereby the higher the score, the greater the LSM between the two 
speakers. Analysis of function words in this way can determine the level of linguistic style 
matching which occurs at a subconscious level, whereby the function categorised denote 
how communication is occurring, rather than what is being said (content words) and have 
been found to correlate with behaviours such as social bonding and dominance (Tausczik 
& Pennebaker, 2010).  
3.13.1   LSM over time. To investigate whether persuasion outcome was 
systematically related to changes in LSM over the course of each interaction, the length of 
the dyadic discussions were divided into quarters, based on the word count within each 
dataset. Word count was used as a basis for comparison as it allowed automatic delineation 
within statistical and LIWC software systems. In addition, it allowed for direct 
comparisons to be made between dyadic discussions regardless of discussion length. Four 
time periods were chosen as previous research indicated further division of utterances may 
reduce the ability of the analysis to identify meaningful patterns of change in an 
individual’s word use (London et al. 1970a; Taylor & Thomas, 2008).  
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3.14   Ethics 
All of the research presented in this thesis was the subject of ethical scrutiny by the 
Ministry of Defence Research Ethics Committee (MoDREC), the University of 
Wolverhampton Ethics Committee and the University of Westminster Ethics Committee. 
The research was ethically cleared by all of the above committees and was run in 
accordance with the British Psychological Society ethical code of conduct. Accordingly, 
participation was entirely voluntary, and participants could withdraw at any time. All 
information was anonymous, and contact details were kept confidential. All participants 
(including confederates) were first provided with an information sheet (Appendix J) and 
consent form (Appendix K) which they read and signed, having had the opportunity to ask 
questions. Information about the research project and what would be required was 
provided, but all participants were naïve to the experimental aims and hypotheses.  
Questionnaires presented online (in studies 2 and 3) via Survey Monkey gave the 
information sheet on the first page. Before completing the questionnaire, participants were 
required to read and consent to the research and the survey did not allow those who did not 
consent to further view or compete the questionnaires. There was no risk to participant’s 
health or psychological well-being regarding stress, worry or embarrassment. All FtF and 
VR discussions were video and audio-recorded, whilst the online CMC study was text-
copied and monitored in real-time; the researcher being on hand and available throughout 
all three studies. All participants were referred to using their unique participant number, 
with all recordings kept on a password-protected hard-drive which only the experimenters’ 
had access to. All hard-copy data used participant numbers and were stored in locked 
cabinets in a secure office at the University of Westminster/Wolverhampton whereas 
identifiable information obtained through consent forms and demographic questionnaires 
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were either stored on a separate password protected hard-drive, or in a separate, securely-
locked cabinet.  
Upon completing the research, participants were given a debrief sheet which 
highlighted the use of a confederate, and asked for their informed consent, again 
highlighting their ability to withdraw and ask the researcher any questions (Appendix L). 
The experimenters’ email addresses were also provided if the participants had any 
questions once the study had finished.  
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Chapter Four: The Dyadic Face-to-Face Modality (Study 1) 
 
4.1   Overview of Chapter 
This chapter reports the first of three empirical studies. Here culture, gender, 
cognitive style and persuasion are investigated in a traditional face-to-face context (FtF) 
thereby providing a baseline for understanding persuasion across novel contexts (Chapters 
5 and 6) and the relative impact, or otherwise, of culture, gender and cognitive style. This 
chapter expands on previous research by investigating persuadability in mixed-gender, 
same-ethnic dyads, as well as measuring cognitive and linguistic style through a variety of 
methods and analyses, mentioned in the previous chapter. 
 
4.2   The Jury Method (JM) paradigm  
The cognitive approach to persuasion (Greenwald, 1968) claims that when 
individuals perceive and respond to persuasive communication they will attempt to relate 
the new information to existing topic knowledge and schemas. Cognitive processes refer to 
the processing of information via perceiving, judging, elaborating and recalling from 
memory (Posner, 1973). The receiver is not passive, but instead uses information to 
construct opinions and anticipate communication (Brock, 1967). Lewin (1947) found that 
when individuals were given a persuasive communication in a passive style (lecture), only 
3% were persuaded. However, when the same message was presented in an active group 
discussion, persuasion jumped to 32%. Interacting and engaging with the persuasive 
message has a more positive outcome on changing a person’s decision than a passive style 
of reading or watching (also see Hiraoka, Neubig, Satki, Toda, & Nakamura, 2016). 
Referring to the working definition of persuasion outlined in Chapter 1, persuasion is an 
interactive communicative process, social in nature. Individuals look to others for advice 
and elaboration before a final decision and attitude is formed (Dainton, 2005; Perloff, 
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2003). And yet research often relies upon video or written messages to deliver persuasive 
unilateral arguments (see Petty & Cacioppo, 2012 for an overview of persuasive 
methodology and its recent development). The JM paradigm allows for a bilateral 
exchange between conversational partners, infrequently seen within the persuasion 
literature.  
 
4.3   Ethnicity  
Differences in cognitive style and decision-making across cultural groups has been 
demonstrated (albeit sparsely) within the persuasion literature. For example, Nisbett et al. 
(2001) found that East Asians were more holistic in their reasoning, attending to the 
‘bigger picture’ compared to Westerners, who were more analytical and preferred to 
include formal logic in their reasoning. Nisbett argued that these are differences in the 
nature of Asian and European thought processes. However, research has typically focussed 
on the extreme ends of Hofstede’s cultural dimensions (East Asian v. Caucasian American, 
Hofstede, 1980; 2011) which are being revised in light of emerging cultural data emanating 
from a more contemporary multicultural society (see Minkov, 2018). 
The study reported in this Chapter (in addition to Chapters 6 and 7) will extend the 
current literature by focussing on two ethnic groups - South Asian and British - selected to 
convey new differences in the spectrum of Ind/Col to understand whether such dimension 
scores still hold in a society which is increasingly multi-cultural. Interestingly, there is still 
a consensus that individualistic cultures tend to place a greater emphasis on autonomy, 
compared to collectivist cultures who aim for group harmony and connectedness, and so it 
was hypothesised that the South-Asian group will show greater levels of persuasion post-
jury discussion compared to the British sample.  
 
4.4   Language  
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Cohesiveness of language has been linked to successful negotiation outcomes 
where an agreement has been achieved (Ireland & Henderson, 2014). Research has 
suggested that participants who have a high level of rapport mimic one another’s linguistic 
style (Tickle-Degnen & Rosenthal, 1987; 1990) increasing liking and positive perceptions. 
For example, successful hostage negotiations have greater coordination of linguistic style 
compared to unsuccessful ones (Taylor & Thomas, 2008). In turn, this implies that higher 
aggregate LSM scores could feasibly be associated with successful persuasion outcomes.  
 Epistemic modality refers to the evaluation of chances. Individuals often qualify 
statements on an epistemic continuum, ranging from absolute, high, moderate, low 
certainty and uncertainty (Rubin, 2010). Once again, the literature lacks consistency in 
manually annotating and automating the identification of statements which explicitly 
express certainty and doubt. This is perhaps due, in part, to the wide variety of ways to 
measure confidence in speech. Confidence can cover a wide variety of linguistic styles, 
each of which have been separately investigated and manipulated in past research. This 
includes language power, dogmatic style, expressed confidence and meta-cognition. 
Expressed confidence, for example was researched using a unilateral version of the JM 
paradigm. Maslow et al. (1971) found that expressed confidence increased persuasion 
leading to participants changing their verdict choice, compared to transcripts which 
enhanced doubt. The current thesis combines these areas of epistemic modality to measure 
post-hoc the relationship between persuasion and confidence. It is predicted that 
participants not persuaded will express higher linguistic confidence in the jury discussions.  
 The nature of language is complex, and this thesis simply aims to lead discussion. 
One specific area which it aims to highlight is gender and linguistic style. There are 
differences in the use of linguistic styles across genders - men use a more direct, succinct 
and influential style compared to women, who prefer to elaborate and support their 
communal goals (Mulac et al., 2001). As a result, it is possible that linguistic style (both in 
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terms of LSM and LIWC outcomes) and thus persuasion outcomes will differ in relation to 




4.5   Gender 
As outlined in Chapter 2, past research has suggested that males and females 
portray differences in interactive styles and behaviours during communication. A male-
dominated style of interaction (considered to be more dominant, rational and aggressive) is 
utilised when attempting to overtly influence a partner (despite that individual being male 
or female; Carli, 1989). Carli (1990) expanded on this research, finding that women are 
less likely to persuade a conversational partner due to a dislike for female disagreement. 
However, a lot of the gender research is decades old and is therefore not an accurate 
reflection of current society changes. Nevertheless, given the available literature, it is 
sensible to expect that males will be less persuaded by a female confederate than vice 
versa. 
 Furthermore, language is a medium in which findings have shown gender 
differences in linguistic styles. For example, women are thought to be sensitive to 
overconfidence but likewise show a dislike to men who displayed low confidence during 
speech (Wesson & Pullford, 2009). In other words, men and women who express the same 
level of confidence can be perceived differently (e.g., assertive, knowledgeable, overly-
confident, unlikeable) which as a result, influences reasoning and persuasion outcomes. It 
is therefore prudent to investigate gender on linguistic style and persuasion outcomes. 
Linguistically, it is likely that male speech will display higher confidence and an 
individualistic style (swear words, increased word length) compared to females, who are 
believed to prefer to form a communal bond and thus display less overt confidence and a 
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more holistic style of speech (increased pronouns, negations and reference to psychological 
processes).  
 
4.6   Cognitive Style 
Jumping to conclusions and becoming ‘closed off’ to further discussion once an 
opinion has been formed is the hallmark of scoring highly in cognitive style measures of 
delusional thinking (PDI-R) and the need for cognitive closure (NfCC). Given the relevant 
literature introduced in Chapter 2, it could reasonably be argued that scoring highly on 
these measures would lead to reduced persuasion in the JM paradigm because participants 
will have stated their initial verdict prior to the persuasive discussion, thus achieving their 
NfCC. Alternatively, a high score in these measures could also indicate a propensity to be 
more persuadable early on the jury discussion. The JM paradigm is deliberately written to 
be indefinite and allow for alternative verdicts to be reached. As a result, some participants 
may feel that they have failed to reach adequate, systematic closure due to a lack of 
concrete evidence. Thus, exposure to persuasive arguments during the jury discussion 
might lead to a jumping to conclusions bias, thus achieving cognitive closure by changing 
their verdict choice once alternate views are aired. Accordingly, scoring highly in NfCC 
will correlate to scoring highly in delusional thinking, demonstrating the relationship 
between these two elements of cognitive style.  
 
4.7   Qualitative Content Analysis (QCA) 
Finally, content analysis is employed to explore the reasoning behind the decisions 
made, and the influence this might have on persuasion. Additionally, if gender, ethnicity 
and cognitive style interplay with reasoning and post-discussion reflection. For example, 
whether females focus more on the individual being prosecuted (rather than the company) 
compared to males; whether males have an increased focus on the facts and evidence 
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disclosed; or whether individuals high in the NfCC stick to the evidence initially provided, 
or use the discussion to expand their reasoning?  
 
4.8   Study One Hypotheses 
Given the available literature previously introduced, a series of tentative hypotheses 
were formulated: 
 
1. South-Asian participants will show greater persuasion post-jury discussion compared 
to British participants; 
2. Females will be more persuadable when interacting FtF with a male confederate; 
3. South-Asian females are more likely to be persuaded than British males given 
predictable differences in language, power and confidence.  
4. There will be a relationship between cognitive style and persuasion outcomes; 
5. Male speech will display higher confidence and an individualistic style (e.g., swear 
words, increased word length) compared to females which will lead to reduced 
persuasion outcomes; 
6. Participants expressing higher confidence (expressed linguistically and through 
measurements of meta-cognitive percentage confidence via pre-and post-
questionnaires) will be less persuadable; 
7. Linguistic style (both in terms of LSM and LIWC outcomes) will differ as a function of 
gender and persuasion outcomes. 
 
4.9   Method 
 
4.9.1   Participants.  Sixty-six mock-juror participants took part in this study, 
comprising 17 British males, 16 British females, 16 South-Asian males and 17 South-
Asian females. Of the British sample, 32 self-reported their ethnicity as English (97%), 
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whilst 1 participant stated they were Scottish (3%). Of the South-Asian sample, 23 
reported their ethnicity as Pakistani (69.7%), 9 as Indian, (27.3%), and 1 as Bangladeshi 
(3%). All South-Asian participants reported being either foreign-born or first-generation 
immigrants to the UK. Mock-jurors’ ages ranged from 18 to 52, with a mean of 24.00 
years (SD = 7.86). Four students from the University of Wolverhampton (1 male and 1 
female from each cultural group) were recruited as confederate mock-jurors with a mean 
age of 21.0 years (SD = 0.82), ranging from 20 to 22 years.  Mock juror participants were 
recruited via the University of Wolverhampton’s SONA system and opportunity sampling 
in the local community. Psychology students were given course credits for their 
participation. Mock jury participants from the local community were paid £10.00 for their 
time. The confederate juror participants were paid £5 per mock juror for participating in 
the research.  
 
         4.9.2   Design. A between-subjects’ experimental design was employed with two 
independent variables, i) Ethnic group with two levels (South-Asian; British), and ii) 
Gender with 2 levels (male; female). All dyadic discussions occurred in mixed-gender 
dyads: male confederate juror & female mock juror, or vice versa. The dependent variable 
was persuasion, measured by each mock juror completing a pre-and post-dyadic discussion 
self-report questionnaire for verdict choice and percentage confidence change (Appendices 
B & C, also see materials below). Linguistic and cognitive style were not manipulated, 
rather these measures were collected from participants to investigate their 
effects/relationship with persuasion outcomes. Cognitive Style consisted of two measures 
(PDI-R and NfCC) with 2 between-factor levels: high (scoring within the top 25% quartile) 
or low (bottom 25% quartile), taken across all FtF data. Linguistic style was measured 
using LIWC software outputs, consisting of both confederate and participant contributions 
to the jury discussion, in addition to using this data to ascertain LSM and epistemic 
modality (which has two levels: doubt and confidence). 
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4.9.3    Procedure. Mock Juror participation for this study comprised of two 
sessions (session 1 and session 2), whereas confederate juror participation necessitated 
attendance at just one experimental session (session 2).  
 
4.9.3.1   Mock-juror session 1. Session 1 comprised an online survey conducted 
via SurveyMonkey, containing an information sheet (see Appendix J), and participants 
were given the opportunity to ask questions prior to agreeing to participate in the study 
(delivered via email) after which they were asked to confirm their consent (see Appendix 
K. Having given consent, all mock jurors then completed the Demographic Questionnaire 
(see Appendix E1) the Need for Cognitive Closure scale (see Appendix F) and the 
Delusional Thinking Inventory (see Appendix G), which took approximately 20 minutes to 
complete. Participants made arrangements to attend session 2 in a comments box.  
 
4.9.3.2   Mock-juror session 2. Upon arrival at session 2, participants were once 
again given the information sheet to remind them of the aims of the research, and what 
would be required of them in session 2. Participants were asked to complete a second 
consent form for session 2 and were offered the opportunity to ask any additional questions 
before beginning. Session 2 commenced with the English Proficiency Measure (see Martin 
& Brownell, 2010) to establish English ability and ensure parity across groups before the 
Jury Method (JM) paradigm was administered. 
The JM consists of two members of a dyad, each given the essentials of a legal case 
(London, Meldman & Lanckton, 1970a). This includes a summary of the case, the judge’s 
instructions on how to convict, and a legal analysis. Pairs also fill out pre- and post-
discussion verdict sheets, asking for their verdicts (pre and post) and confidence in these 
verdict choices. Each mock juror read the booklet alone, following which he/she completed 
the pre-discussion sheet, which recorded their initial verdict and thoughts concerning the 
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case to be used as a baseline measure. Once complete, the mock-juror was escorted into the 
same room as the confederate, and the two individuals were seated opposite each other (the 
mock-juror was ignorant of the fact the other participant was a confederate). The 
researcher then instructed both to deliberate the case they had just been presented with and 
emphasised the need to reach a unanimous decision. The discussion was limited to 20 
minutes (which the researcher made clear to the participants would be enough time). Jurors 
were informed that the researcher would leave the room whilst they discussed the case so 
as to reduce unwanted interference and resemble a realistic jury discussion. At this point, 
the researcher switched two video cameras on (recording both the confederate and mock-
juror) to evidence their discussions.  
     When the deliberations had finished, the confederate mock-juror was led out and 
the mock-juror was asked to complete the post-discussion sheet on the pretence that the 
confederate was doing the same in the room next door (See Appendix C). Completion of 
the questionnaire marked the end of the research, at which point participants were offered 
the opportunity to ask the researcher any further questions. A debrief sheet was provided, 
explaining the use of a confederate and the aims behind the research. They additionally 
signed the debrief, acknowledging the use of a confederate, and to express their continued 
and informed consent (Appendix L). 
 
4.9.3.3   Confederate mock-jurors. Confederates attended session 2 at the same 
time as the mock-juror so as to create the illusion of an ordinary participant. At this point, 
the confederate juror was separated and placed in another room whilst the mock-juror 
completed the pre-questionnaire and measures (described in Chapter 3). Once the mock-
juror had read the jury booklet and was ready for the discussion, they were led into the 
adjacent room and placed opposite the confederate mock-juror where it was explained to 
both individuals the purpose of the cameras and the 20-minute time limit. It was stressed 
there should be a unanimous decision and the opportunity to ask any questions was given. 
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Once the researcher had left the room, the confederate was instructed to begin the 
discussion with the question ‘What do you think; do you think the defendant is guilty or 
not guilty?’ and from there, he/she attempted to persuade the participant to the opposing 
viewpoint. Once a decision had been made and the cameras were turned off, the researcher 
led the confederate back into a separate room under the pretence of completing the post-
discussion questionnaire. At this point, the confederate juror’s role was complete.  
 
4.10   Results 
 
4.10.1   Mock-juror persuasion. Descriptive statistics show that more mock-jurors 
changed their verdict (70%) compared to those who were not persuaded (30%), after 
having discussed the case with the confederate mock-juror (n [persuaded] = 46; n [not-
persuaded] = 20). 
 
4.10.1.1   Ethnicity and persuasion. South-Asian mock-jurors had similar results 
for persuasion (n = 24) as British mock-jurors (n = 22). To understand whether the two 
ethnic sub-groups differed, a between-groups chi-square test for independence was run. 
This revealed that South-Asian and British samples do not significantly differ on 
persuasion, !"(1) = .287, p = .592, φ = .07 (See Figure 4.1).  
 









Figure 4.1. Bar graph showing British (n=33), South-Asian (n=33) and the overall sample 
(n=66) for persuasion groups.   
 
4.10.1.2   Gender and persuasion. A chi-square test for independence revealed a 
non-significant association for gender and persuasion, !"(1) = 2.58, p =.108, φ = .20. 
Nevertheless, Figure 4.2 (below) illustrates the almost 20% difference in the number of 
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Figure 4.2. Bar graph showing Males (n=33), Females (n=33) and the overall sample 
(n=66) across persuasion groups.   
 
4.10.1.3   Gender, ethnicity and persuasion. Two chi-square tests were conducted 
for the persuaded groups to investigate gender and ethnicity. This allows for a comparison 
to be made for British females, British males, South-Asian females, and South-Asian males 
across both persuaded and non-persuaded groups (see Figure 4.3). This revealed non-
significant results for persuaded (!"(1) = .07, p = .796, φ = .04) and non-persuaded groups 
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Figure 4.3. Bar graph showing Persuasion as a function of Ethnicity and Gender. 
 
 
4.10.2   Confidence in verdict choice. To investigate whether persuasion 
influenced subjective confidence ratings in verdict decisions, a series of univariate 
ANOVAs were conducted for gender, ethnicity and persuasion to investigate the 
differences within pre-, as well as post-discussion confidence ratings. This allowed for a 
direct comparison of confidence means (represented on a percentage scale of 0 [no 
confidence) -100% [extremely confident/certain]) to be obtained across the two separate 
time points (pre- and post-discussion). Both pre- and post-discussion confidence revealed 
non-significant effects for all three variables (p’s >.05), with the means showing 
persuasion, gender and ethnic groups had similar ratings of confidence in their decisions at 
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Table 4.1  
Descriptive statistics, F and p values for pre- and post-discussion confidence ratings in 
verdict choice across Gender, Ethnicity, and Persuasion  
Factor Levels 
Pre-Discussion (%) Post-Discussion (%) 
M SD F p M SD F p 
Persuasion 
Persuaded 67.51 21.05 
1.92 .17 
69.77 19.68 
.12 .29 Not 
Persuaded 74.21 16.09 75.3 18.57 
Gender 
Male 72.19 21.06 
1.18 .28 
71.72 22.45 
.01  .93 
Female 66.81 18.4 71.28 16.05 
Ethnicity 





Asian 73.22 17.01 73.23 19.73 
 Note. M = mean; SD = standard deviation; F = univariate ANOVA statistic; p = significance value. 
 
4.10.2.1   Percentage change in confidence of verdict choice. A series of 
univariate ANOVAs were conducted to investigate percentage confidence change as a 
function of ethnicity, gender and cognitive style. There were non-significant differences 
for gender, F (1, 61) = .17, p = .680, ethnicity, F (1, 61) = 1.63, p = .207, PDI-R (mock-
jurors high and low), F (1, 29) = .78, p = .383, and NfCC (mock-jurors high and low), F (1, 
31) = 3.45, p = .073. This shows that groups did not significantly differ in their percentage 
change of confidence.  
A univariate ANOVA for persuasion was conducted. Levene’s statistic revealed 
that the assumption of homogeneity had been violated (p < .05). Therefore, the Welch’s 
adjusted F ratio was used, which revealed a significant effect, Welch’s F (1, 60.29) = 
98.38, p < .001, ηp2 = .49, 95% CI [25.38, 38.33]. Those who were persuaded had a mean 
confidence change score of 43.59 (SD = 21.06, 95% CI [37.19, 49.99]), whereas those not 
persuaded had a mean confidence change score of 4.68 (SD = 10.04, 95% CI [-.15, 9.52]).  
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 A chi-square test was conducted to understand if this significant difference in 
percentage confidence change was positive or negative. Direction of change was 
categorically coded as either positive (increasing in absolute confidence), negative 
(decreasing in absolute confidence) or no change. This resulted in a significant association 
for persuasion and direction of absolute confidence change, !" (2) = 43.19, p < .001, 
Cramer’s V = .83. In order to break this down further and identify the level at which the 
significant association exists, standardised residuals were calculated and analysed (see 
Table 4.2). These revealed significant effects for absolute confidence in verdict choice for 
persuasion - that is, those who were persuaded were significantly more confident in their 
verdict choices. Those that were not persuaded showed no significant change in 
confidence. 
 
Table 4.2  
A 3x2 contingency table containing frequency data (n) and standardised residuals (z) for 
persuasion and direction of confidence  
    Direction of absolute confidence in verdict choice  
    Increased Decreased No Change 
Persuaded 
n 39 4 1 
z 1.9* -0.1 -3.0** 
Not Persuaded 
n 2 2 15 
z -2.9** .1 4.6*** 
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001.  
 
Table 4.2 also shows the descriptive statistics of the direction of confidence change, 
highlighting that the majority of the persuaded group (88.64%) increased their confidence 
post-discussion, despite changing their verdict. This is compared to just 10.53% of those 
not persuaded. The majority of those not persuaded had no change in their confidence of 
verdict choice post-discussion (78.95%, compared to 2.27% for those persuaded).  
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4.10.3   Mock-juror cognitive style. Cognitive Style consisting of the Delusional 
Thinking Inventory (PDI-R) and the Need for Cognitive Closure Scale (NfCC) were 
analysed for the three primary IVs (persuasion, gender and ethnicity). No significant 
differences emerged (all p’s > .05, see Table 4.3).  
 
Table 4.3 
Summary descriptives, F and p values for the total PDI-R and NfCC scores, as a function 
of Gender, Ethnicity and Persuasion 
 
 
To investigate whether the two measures of cognitive style were correlated, a 
Spearman’s rho correlational analysis was conducted on the total scores for each scale. 
This was due to the parametric assumptions being violated for normality whereby 
skewness (.900) was two times the standard error (.297. - for non-normal correlation 
    NfCC PDI-R 
Factor Level M SD F p M SD F p 
Gender 




Female 158.15 18.02 49.18 35.79 
Ethnicity 





Asian 159.03 17.35 54.7 28.82 
Persuasion 





Persuaded 159.05 14.57 52.00 37.56 
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corrections, see Bishara & Hittner, 2012). The correlational analysis revealed no 
significant relationship between PDI-R and NfCC, r = .034, p = .786.  
 
4.10.3.1   High and low in cognitive style. The distribution of PDI-R scores for 
mock-jurors ranged from 0 to 159, with an overall mean score of 51.75 (SD = 32.72), 
consistent with prior research in the normal population (Peters et al., 2004; Ross et al., 
2016). To enable analysis on mock-jurors who are considered high or low in the measures 
of cognitive style, total scores for both PDI-R and NfCC were computed and the first and 
last quartiles within each measure’s scores were taken to represent the extremities. 
Seventeen mock-jurors scored in the lowest quartile of this distribution and were therefore 
classified as low on delusional thinking (M = 15.53, SD= 10.58). Sixteen mock-jurors 
scored in the highest quartile of this distribution and were thus classified as high in their 
delusional thinking (M = 96.94, SD = 24.96). The distribution of NfCC scores for mock-
jurors ranged from 111 to 192, with an overall mean NfCC score of 158.34 (SD = 16.87). 
Seventeen mock-jurors scored in the lowest quartile of this distribution and were therefore 
classified as low on the NfCC (M =136.76, SD = 10.88). Sixteen mock-jurors scored in the 
highest quartile of this distribution and were thus classified as high in their NfCC (M = 
178.81, SD = 5.98).  
Univariate ANOVAs revealed no differences between mock-jurors scoring high 
and low on cognitive style based on duration of jury discussion, or pre-, and post-
confidence (p’s > .05). Likewise, chi-square analyses revealed non-significant differences 
for persuasion (p’s > .05), indicating that being classified as high or low in cognitive style 









Table 4.4  
Descriptive and follow-up inferential statistics for high and low groups on cognitive style 
measures, across Duration, Pre- and Post-confidence ratings and Persuasion variables  
Source   
       Group Comparison 
Statistic p 
     High      Low 
PDI-R      
 Duration 
M = 591.69 M = 648.18 
F = .13 .72 
SD = 370.31 SD = 504.16 
 Pre-
Confidence 
M = 71.00 M = 71.12 
F < .01     .99 
SD = 25.86 SD = 8.77 
 Post-
Confidence 
M = 75.94 M = 75.37 
F = .01 .91 
SD = 13.44 SD = 13.67 
 Persuasion 
N P = 11   N P = 11 
χ2 = .06 .81 
N NP = 5  N NP = 6 
NfCC      
 Duration 
M = 613.94 M = 872.88 
F = 1.96 .17 
SD = 534.63 SD = 526.27 
 Pre-
Confidence 
M = 73.31 M = 67.65 
F = 1.00 .32 
SD = 17.74 SD = 14.70 
 Post-
Confidence 
M = 78.44 M = 69.71 
F = 1.95 .17 
SD = 19.81 SD = 16.05 
 Persuasion 
N P = 11 N P = 10 
χ2 = .35 .55 
N NP = 5  N NP = 7 
Note. P = persuaded. NP = not-persuaded.  
 
4.10.4   Duration of jury discussion. For the purposes of this research, duration 
was defined as the total amount of time (in seconds) that the dyadic pairings discussed the 
case summary. This was measured from when the confederate mock-juror asked what the 
mock-juror’s verdict was (as instructed in the confederate mock-juror training), to when a 
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decision had been decided upon and the discussion came to an end (be it a unanimous 
agreement, or disagreement). The average length of the jury discussions as a function of 
persuasion were analysed using a univariate ANOVA. This revealed a significant 
persuasion effect, Welch’s F (1, 26.71) = 39.34, p < .001, ηp2 = .67, 95% CI [532.29, 
760.19)]. Duration of discussion where persuasion occurred was significantly shorter (M = 
441.56, SD = 295.13, 95% CI [353.92, 529.21]) compared in the non-persuaded group (M 
= 1117.00, SD = 440.51, 95% CI [910.83, 1323.16]).  No significant differences for 
gender, F (1, 64) = .07, p = .788, ethnicity, Welch’s F (1, 58.28) = 1.01, p = .319, or 
cognitive style (high or low) for PDI-R, F (1, 31) = .13, p = .718, and NfCC, F (1, 31)= 
1.96, p = .171, as a function of duration emerged.  
 
4.10.5   Mock-juror linguistic analysis. 
4.10.5.1   Word count. To investigate whether the number of words spoken differed 
as a function of persuasion, a univariate ANOVA was conducted, revealing a significant 
difference, Welch’s F (1, 20.96) = 30.07, p < .001, ηp2 = .69, 95% CI [785.66, 1234.49]. 
Mock-jurors who were persuaded spoke an average of 598.02 words (SD = 370.01, 95% CI 
[488.14, 707.90]) throughout the discussion whereas those who were not persuaded spoke, 
on average, 1957.80 words (SD = 1081.77, 95% CI [1451.52, 2464.08]). No significant 
main effects of ethnicity, F (1, 64) < .01, p = .959, or gender, Welch’s F (1, 47.90) = 2.75, 
p = .102 emerged.  
 
4.10.5.2   LIWC categories. To investigate language as a function of gender, 
ethnicity and persuasion, three between-factor MANOVAs were performed on the primary 
LIWC categories within our inclusion criteria. There were no multivariate main effects for 
gender, Wilks’s Λ =.77, F (10, 55) = 1.62, p = .125. However, ethnicity revealed a 
significant multivariate effect, Wilks’s Λ = .44, F (10, 55) = 6.93, p < .001, ηp2 = .56. A 
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series of univariate ANOVAs (applying Bonferroni’s correction - see Table 4.5) revealed 
significant main effects for Clout, Authentic and Social processes. In particular, South-
Asian mock-jurors had a higher degree of Clout and Social processing in their linguistic 
style, whereas the British mock-jurors had an increased Authentic language style. 
 
Table 4.5 




Ethnicity Inferential statistic 
Significance 
value Effect size 
British South-Asian F p ηp2 
Analytical 
Thinking 
M = 7.78 M = 5.81 
2.06 .156 .03 
SD = 6.62 SD = 4.25 
Clout 
M = 36.76 M = 55.92 
21.53 <.001 .25 
SD = 15.63 SD = 17.83 
Authentic 
M = 37.11 M =22.34 
10.07 .002 .14 
SD = 18.75 SD = 19.05 
Tone 
M = 37.41 M =41.99 
.78 .381 .01 




M =65.44 M = 63.48 
7.59 .008 .11 
SD = 2.58 SD = 3.17 
Affective 
processes 
M = 4.86 M = 5.43 
2.54 .116 .04 
SD = 1.39 SD = 1.47 
Social 
processes 
M = 9.49 M = 13.04 
36.33 <.001 .36 
SD = 2.11 SD = 2.65 
Cognitive 
Processes 
M = 19.15 M = 18.74 
.41 .526 .01 
SD = 2.68 SD = 2.54 
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Drives 
M = 5.18 M = 5.77 
1.87 .176 .03 
SD = 1.42 SD = 2.00 
Informal 
Language 
M = 6.68 M = 8.26 
3.04 .086 .04 
SD = 3.37 SD = 4.02 
Note. df = 1,64.  
 
A one-way, between-factor MANOVA for persuasion also revealed a significant 
and large multivariate effect across the LIWC categories, Wilks’s Λ = .57, F (10, 55) = 
4.12, p < .001, ηp2 = .43. Examination of the univariate ANOVAs (applying Bonferroni’s 
correction) revealed significant main effects for Drives and Informal language (see Table 
4.6). Observation of the means show that non-persuaded mock-jurors had a higher degree 
of drives in their linguistic style, compared to the persuaded group, who had a higher rate 
of informal language.  
 
Table 4.6 
Descriptive statistics and follow-up ANOVAs for main effects of linguistic categories for 













M = 5.74 
SD = 4.76 
M = 9.22 
SD = 6.70 
5.78 .019 .08 
Clout  
M = 43.41 
SD = 19.09 
M = 53.08 
SD = 18.27 
3.66 .060 .05 
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Authentic  
M = 31.08 
SD = 22.10 
M =26.62 
SD = 14.91 
0.67 .414 .01 
Tone 
M = 38.86 
SD = 22.37 
M = 41.62 
SD = 18.01 




M = 64.17 
SD = 3.33 
M = 65.14 
SD = 2.14 1.44 .234 .02 
Affective 
processes 
M = 5.41 
SD = 1.48 
M = 4.55 
SD = 1.19 
5.17 .026 .07 
Social 
processes 
M = 10.90 
SD = 2.82 
M = 12.12 
SD = 3.22 
2.41 .126 .04 
Cognitive 
Processes 
M = 19.26 
SD = 2.89 
M = 18.22 
SD = 1.59 
2.24 .139 .03 
Drives 
M = 4.94 
SD = 1.51 
M = 6.70 
SD = 1.65 
17.90 <.001 .22 
Informal 
Language  
M = 8.61 
SD = 3.61 
M = 4.82 
SD = 2.67 
17.82 <.001 .22 
Note. df = 1, 64.  
 
Due to WC showing a significant difference for persuasion groups (above), a 
MANCOVA was run to understand whether controlling for this DV would directly affect 
the results observed for linguistic style. This revealed no significant differences in the 
primary LIWC categories for mock-jurors who were persuaded vs. mock-jurors who were 
not persuaded when WC is controlled, Wilks’s Λ = .80, F (10, 54) = 1.34, p = .236. 
4.10.5.3   Confidence in linguistic style (epistemic modality). Confidence was 
measured using the epistemic modality dictionary uploaded to LIWC2015 software. This 
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allowed simultaneous measurement of linguistic confidence for mock-juror and 
confederate mock-jurors’ as a function of gender, ethnicity, and persuasion. As such, the 
outputs for confidence relate to outputs from LIWC itself, expressed as a percentage of the 
total words within each discussion.   
 A 2 (gender: male v female) x 2 (ethnicity: british v south-asian) x 2 (persuasion: 
persuaded v not persuaded) MANOVA was conducted for mock-jurors on the two DVs for 
confidence (epistemic modality: high [confidence] and low [doubt]). No significant main 
effects or interactions emerged, all F’s < 2.96, all p’s > .06. 
To understand the interaction between the dyadic parings and persuasion outcomes 
for epistemic modality, a further 2 (dyadic pairing: mock-juror v confederate mock-juror) x 
2 (persuasion: persuaded v not persuaded) MANOVA on epistemic modality (high or low) 
was conducted. The Box’s M test of equality of covariances was significant, Box’s M = 
38.58, F (9, 40716.24) = 4.14, p < 0.01, indicating heterogeneity of covariances. Pillai’s 
trace was subsequently used to assess significance given previous research showing its 
robustness to statistical violations of covariance homogeneity (Field, 2013; Tang & Algina, 
1993). The dyadic pairings revealed no significant differences in epistemic modality, 
Pillai’s trace = .01, F (2, 127) = .60, p = .552, or persuasion, Pillai’s trace = .01, F (2, 127) 
= .47, p = .625. The multivariate interaction was non-significant, Pillai’s trace = .04, F (2, 
127) = 2.63, p = .076, indicating that confidence does not differ for mock- and confederate 
mock-jurors, in either persuaded or non-persuaded interactions.  
 
4.10.5.4   Linguistic style matching (LSM). To investigate whether LSM was 
higher in interactions that result in a mock-juror changing their verdict, a comparison of 
the mean total LSM scores across persuaded and non-persuaded mock-juror groups was 
conducted. The mean LSM score for those who were persuaded was lower (M = .87, SD = 
.05, 95% CI [.85, .88]), than the scores for those who not persuaded (M = .90, SD = .03, 
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95% CI [.88, .92]). Levene's Test of Equality of Variances indicated that the homogeneity 
of variances had been violated and so the Welch-Satterthwaite independent t-test was used 
to control for Type 1 error (Delacre, Lakens & Leys, 2017). This produced a significant 
difference in the LSM total score for persuasion groups, t (59.91) = -3.18, p = .002, d = 
.73, 95% CI [-.05, -.01]. Non-persuaded interactions had higher levels of linguistic 
synchronicity despite coming to opposing conclusions and resisting the persuasive 
messaging.  
4.10.5.4.1   LSM over time. To understand the role LSM plays in persuasion 
processes over time, the jury interactions were split into quartiles and total LSM was 
calculated as a function of each time slot. A 2 (Persuasion: persuaded v not persuaded) x 4 
(Time: 1 v 2 v 3 v 4) mixed-factor ANOVA revealed a non-significant result for time, F (3, 
192) = .47, p = .701. However, there was a significant main effect for persuasion, F (1, 64) 
= 24.00, p < .001, ηp2 = .27, 95% CI [.73, .95], whereby those who were not persuaded had 
significantly higher LSM (M = .85, SD = .03, 95% CI [.82, .87]) than those who were 
persuaded (M = .78, SD = .05, 95% CI [.76, .79]), corroborating the previous findings 
reported above. Further, there was a non-significant interaction, F (3, 192) = .46, p = .711, 
indicating that LSM did not differ across the time phases of the jury discussion for 
persuaded and non-persuaded groups (see Figure 4.4).  




4.10.6   Mock-juror qualitative content analysis (QCA). Qualitative content 
analysis (QCA) was conducted on the pre- and post-questionnaire’s, as described in detail 
in Chapter 3. Seven unique themes emerged. A complete table of the QCA descriptive 
statistics within each theme are reported in full in Appendix M1, showing the coding 
frequencies and percentages of responses to the pre-set questions. 
 
4.10.6.1   Descriptive group comparisons for the pre-questionnaire. 
Theme 1: Facts used to inform decision-making. Concerning question 1, 
participants chose to expand upon the arguments presented in the case file summary, 
focusing primarily on the prosecution’s argument (42.4% of respondents compared to the 
defence’s argument at 18.2%). This pattern followed across persuasion, ethnicity, gender 
and cognitive style groups. It indicates that participants were fully engaged with the 
Figure 4.4. Mean LSM score across jury discussion quartiles as a function of 
Persuasion. Error bars denote ± 2 SE (standard error of the mean).  
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material presented to them, elaborating and further developing the arguments given prior to 
the jury-discussions, albeit biased towards the prosecution’s argument.  
Theme 2: References to accused. The majority of participants (65%) who were not 
persuaded referred solely to ‘the company’ or ‘Datastore’ as a generalised entity when 
reporting their reasoning for their verdict choice prior to the discussion. This is in contrast 
to 43.5% of those in the persuaded category. Very few (5% not persuaded; 13% persuaded) 
referred only to the individual (the managing director/ accused) solely within answers to 
the pre-questionnaire, indicating a lack of cognitive apprehension towards the individual 
on trial.  
Theme 3: Reasoning for verdict choice. Across all groups and on average across 
all participants, the primary reason for choosing a verdict choice focussed on category code 
9. This encompasses negligence of the company, focussing on a rationale that they failed to 
provide a service and thus failed in their duties. This fits with Theme 1, whereby the 
majority of participants used the prosecution’s argument to inform their verdict choice.  
 Category code 10 focusses on the managing director (MD) specifically, their 
reasoning being that the MD is responsible due to his position and responsibility. 
Interestingly, no British participants fell into this category. However, 15.2% of South-
Asian participants reported this code within the reasoning for their verdict. Some mock-
jurors mentioned that they chose their verdict choice as they felt there was a lack of 
certainty and evidence around the facts, thus indicting a sense of hesitancy in their initial 
choices. However, there were no differences for the cognitive style categories (high or low 
in NfCC and PDI-R) regarding the ‘lack of certainty or evidence’ reasoning (QCA code 
12).  
 Participants falling into category code 141 do not expand on their reasoning other 
than to use vague rationale pertaining to the facts contained within the summary. Of those 
who were persuaded, 15.2% focussed primarily on this reasoning in comparison to 5% in 
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the not-persuaded group. This perhaps indicates that expansion of cognitive reasoning 
outside of the evidence provided strengthens resistance to persuasive attempts. As such, 
4.3% of the persuaded group fell into category 13 (analytical reasoning focussing on the 
judge’s instructions and duty as a jury member) compared to 10% of participants who were 
not-persuaded.  
Theme 4: Attribution of responsibility. Following from the theme that the majority 
of participants (60.6%) expanded on the prosecution’s argument and reasoned that the 
company failed to provide a service and was thus negligent, participants largely attributed 
responsibility to the MD and company. Individuals who did not fall into this category 
largely referred to the hackers being responsible (15.2%) or failed to attribute 
responsibility to anyone when answering the pre-set questions (19.7%). This pattern 
followed across all sub-group IVs (consisting of cognitive style, gender, ethnicity and 
persuasion).  
Theme 1: Facts ignored in the decision-making process. The information 
predominantly ignored and not taken into account during the decision-making consisted of 
the background information contained within paragraphs 1 to 4 of the file summary, 
comprising QCA code 4 at 43.9%: ‘The potential consequences [FB8]; ‘Info about what 
the newspapers reported and the disruption caused to the country’ [FB6]; ‘The press, the 
consequences of the document being published, the consequences of such actions like wide 
spread panic. It doesn’t explain or justify if the MD is guilty or not’ [MA10]. This was 
closely followed by discounting the defence’s argument, at 33.3% (QCA code 1). Once 
again, this pattern did not differ across the sub-groups of the IVs. In sum, the majority of 
mock-jurors ignored the background information which sets the picture, instead focussing 
on the evidence contained within the case summary, despite some mock-jurors being 
persuaded and others not.   
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Theme 3: Reasoning for ignoring these facts. This theme produced an array of 
category codes and no primary pattern across the IV groups. The highest percentage of 
participants (22.7%) ignored the information they did because it was irrelevant to the case 
of negligence: ‘Not relevant to the topic where the hacking is concerned’ [MB5] whilst 
18.2% ignored evidence that suggested that the company failed to provide an adequate 
service (QCA code 9).  
4.10.6.2   Descriptive group comparisons for the post-questionnaire. 
Theme 1: Facts used to inform decision-making. After the discussion with the 
confederate juror, the facts upon which the participants used to inform their decision-
making became much more varied than the pre-questionnaire results to this same question. 
The highest scoring category (28.8%) continued to focus on expanding the prosecution’s 
argument whilst 18.2% of mock-jurors in the pre-questionnaire question expanded on the 
defence’s argument when explaining their decision-making on the post-questionnaire. 
15.2% focussed on the fact that the MD as an individual was being charged, whilst the 
same number (15.2%) used the fact that there was little information and evidence 
contained in the case file to inform their verdict choice. Those who were persuaded 
expanded on the prosecution’s argument (26.1%), whilst a similar number also expanded 
on the defence’s argument (23.9%) indicating that those who changed their opinion used 
the persuasive messages presented in the discussion to expand on the chosen verdict and 
explore this outside of the evidence presented in the case summary.  In addition, 21.7% of 
those who were persuaded (be it guilty or not guilty) used the fact that an individual (the 
MD) was being charged, whereas no-one in the non-persuaded group used this fact to 
inform their decision.  
Theme 2: References to accused. More than half of the South-Asian participants 
(51.5%) referred only to the defendant. The British group primarily focussed on the 
company as an entirety (39.4%) rather than singling out the accused (15.2%). This 
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seemingly mirrors findings from Theme 3 of the Pre-Questionnaire, whereby 15.2% of 
South-Asian participants focussed on the MD being charged as a reason for their verdict 
choice; in comparison to no-one in the British sample.  
Similar to the South-Asian group, individuals high in NfCC predominantly 
referenced the accused individual (63.6%), with no individuals high in NfCC falling into 
QCA codes 502 (referencing only the company as an entity) or 503 (reporting no 
references to accused). In contrast, low NfCC was much more evenly spread throughout 
theme 2, with 35.3% falling into QCA code 501 (referencing only the defendant).  
Theme 3: Reasoning for verdict choice. Overall, the highest proportion of 
participants fell within QCA code 142 which focusses on a not-guilty verdict using real-
world evidence and examples (30.3%), followed closely by the reasoning of negligence 
due to the company not providing an adequate service (21.2%; QCA code 9).  
The majority of the persuaded participants reasoned by expanding on the defence’s 
argument and utilising the background information (39.1%. For example, ‘It is the 
government’s fault for not ensuring that the security was at a higher level sufficient enough 
for this data’ [MB6]). No individuals who were within the not-persuaded sub-group used 
moral reasoning to explain and justify their verdict choice (QCA code 8), whereas 13% of 
persuaded individuals did fall into this category. It is also interesting to note that 30% of 
non-persuaded individuals cited a lack of certainty and/or evidence in their decision-
making processing. For example, ‘They are not guilty as there isn’t enough to say they 
were negligent’ [MA14]; ‘Difficult to remember some of the info that the other jury 
member said she had seen and would be wrong to convict on that’ [MB14], compared to 
6.5% of the persuaded individuals who fell within the category. Likewise, those high in 
delusional thinking fell largely within the ‘lack of certainty’ category (25%; QCA code 12) 
unlike individuals low in delusional thinking (5.9%). However, this was not the case for 
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the NfCC, whereby only one individual from the high and low sub-groups fell within QCA 
code 12.  
Theme 4: Attribution of responsibility. This theme produced similar findings to the 
pre-discussion questions, whereby the highest scoring category meant that 39.4% of 
participants attributed guilt to the accused (be that the company or the defendant) which 
followed across sub-groups. However, this excludes individuals high in delusional 
thinking, who primarily accused others of being guilty, reasoning that they did not have the 
full picture and that others may be at fault (43.8%). For example, ‘The government should 
not have outsourced such documents’ [MA12]; ‘I think there must be someone else 
beneath the MD to blame more’ [FA15].  
Theme 5: Persuasiveness of the confederate. From the 46 participants who were 
persuaded within this study, over half (58.7%) cited that they changed their verdict due to 
the confederate mock-juror challenging the evidence presented and highlighting missing 
information (QCA code 163).  This was the prevalent response to theme 5 across all IV’s 
(gender, ethnicity, cognitive style) but one: the non-persuaded participants. 55% of not-
persuaded individuals largely fell into QCA category 156, conceding that the confederate 
mock-juror did say some persuasive points despite this not influencing their verdict choice 
(‘sure she made points that were relevant but I don’t believe they would make the 
defendant not guilty’ [MB2]).  
Theme 6: Communication during the discussion. The majority of participants 
(33.3%) commented that the communication during the jury discussion was friendly and 
pleasant. This occurred across most of the IV’s including the persuasion groups, 
irrespective of the individual being persuaded or not (35% not-persuaded falling into QCA 
code 21; 32.6% persuaded within this category). 27.3% of the British sub-group 
commented that the discussion was balanced and fair (‘It was quite balanced, so it was not 
hard to come to an agreement’ [FA6]). Very few individuals from the entire sample 
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(10.6%) fell into QCA codes 23 and 24, which depicts the discussion as being awkward, 
argumentative or rigid.  
Theme 7: Additional comments. More than half of the sample did not provide 
additional comments (53%). However, of those that did comment, they did so on the fact 
that the research seemed realistic and proceeded to mention additional points in this section 
which related to the case and jury discussion (‘With a not guilty verdict, I would feel 
happier purely on the basis that I wouldn’t be responsible for the conviction of an innocent 
person’ [FB17]).  
 
4.10.7   Confederate mock-jurors. 
4.10.7.1   Social ratings. Mann Whitney U tests were conducted to examine juror’s ratings 
of friendliness and aggressiveness of the mock jurors as function of gender, ethnicity, and 
persuasion groups. Mock-jurors rated the confederate mock-jurors’ communication style 
for Friendliness and Aggressiveness following the jury discussion on a Likert scale ranging 
from 1-5 (Friendliness: 1 = very unfriendly, 3 = neutral, 5 = very friendly; Aggressiveness: 
1 = very aggressive, 3 = neutral, 5 = very passive). As seen in Table 4.7, gender and ratings 
of friendliness of the confederate-mock-juror were significant (p < .05). The mean ranks 
show that male mock-jurors rated the female confederate higher in friendliness (Mrank = 
38.83) compared to female mock-jurors (Mrank = 28.17) rating the male confederate. 
Persuasion and ratings of aggressiveness also revealed a significant result (p < .01). 
Persuaded mock-jurors rated their confederate mock-juror significantly higher (Mrank = 
38.28) and thus more passive than the non-persuaded mock-jurors (Mrank = 22.50), who 
perceived the confederate as being more aggressive during the jury discussion. All other 
comparisons across the IV’s revealed non-significant results (p > .05). 
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4.10.7.2   Word count (WC). To understand flow and dominance of the discussion, 
word count was compared across mock-jurors and confederate mock-jurors. A one-way 
ANOVA revealed no significant effect, F (1, 130) = 1.10, p = .296, indicating that both 
mock-jurors and confederate mock-jurors spoke and participated equally within the 
discussions. However, when word count was separated by Persuasion, a different result 
emerged. Across the persuaded discussions, confederate mock-jurors had a significantly 
higher word count (M = 906.17, SD = 838.80, 95% CI [657.08, 1155.27]) than mock-jurors 
(M = 598.02, SD = 370.01, 95% CI [488.14, 707.90]): Welch’s F (1, 61.87) = 5.20, p = 
.026, ηp2= .23, 95% CI (614.78, 889.41). Discussions whereby no persuasion occurred 
resulted in no significant difference in the average word count for mock- jurors (M = 
1957.80, SD = 1081.77) and confederate mock-jurors (M = 1823.15, SD = 1038.97), F (1, 
38) = .16, p = .690. This shows that confederate mock-juror’s use more words during the 
jury discussion than the mock-juror when persuasion was successful.  
 134 
 
Table 4.7  
Descriptive statistics and Mann Whitney U results for mock-jurors’ ratings of the confederate mock-juror, for ethnicity, gender and persuasion groups 
 
 Friendliness Aggressiveness 
 Median U z p r Median U z p r 
Ethnicity South-Asian = 4.0 
British = 4.0 
521.50 -.32 .748 -.04 South-Asian = 3.0 
British = 3.0 
447.00 -1.36 .175 -.17 
Gender Male = 5.0 
Female = 4.0 
368.50 -2.45 .014 -.30 Male = 3.0 
Female = 3.0 
529.50 -.21 .835 -.03 
Persuasion Persuaded = 4.5 
Not persuaded = 4.0 
343.00 -1.77 .076 -.22 Persuaded = 3.0 
Not persuaded = 3.0 




4.10.8   Overview of results. The results show that overall, mock-jurors are more 
persuaded than not as a result of the jury discussion with a mixed-gender confederate. 
Gender revealed non-significant differences for persuasion outcomes. However, females 
were more likely to be persuaded than not, compared to men, who did not differ in their 
likelihood of persuasion.  
Subjective ratings of confidence in verdict choice, both before and after the jury 
discussion did not influence persuasion outcomes when analysed across the sample data. 
However, the mock-jurors’ percentage change in confidence for their verdicts produced a 
significant result. Individuals who were persuaded had on average, a 44% increase in their 
confidence rating for their final verdict choice, which is a larger and increased confidence 
percentage change compared to non-persuaded interactions - scoring on average, a 5% 
change in confidence across the two time points. The results showed that non-persuaded 
mock-jurors neither increased nor decreased in their confidence for their verdict choice as 
a result of the jury discussion.  
The two measures of cognitive style (NfCC and delusional thinking) were found 
not to correlate, illustrating that the two measures were unrelated. Comparing participants 
who scored high or low in the two measures produced non-significant results when 
analysed against persuasion, duration of discussion and confidence in verdict, both pre- 
and post-discussion. 
The duration of the jury discussion was calculated and compared against persuasion 
outcomes, which resulted in a finding that discussions leading to the mock-juror changing 
their initial verdict (ie, being persuaded) had shorter interactions (measured in seconds) 
compared to those who were not persuaded, who talked, on average almost 3 times as long. 
This is additionally reflected in the word count data, which highlights that more words 
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were uttered in the non-persuaded interactions compared to the persuaded discussions. 
Furthermore, the data revealed that when the interaction resulted in no change in the 
verdict by the mock-juror, word count did not significantly differ – here, the mock-juror 
and confederate mock-juror were both contributing equally to the conversation resulting in 
similar word counts. However, when individuals were persuaded, the confederate mock-
jurors had a significantly higher word count than the mock-jurors, indicating that 
participants were listening more and talking less.   
Linguistic analyses revealed differences in ethnic and persuasion groups across 
various linguistic categories. For example, persuaded individuals had a higher degree of 
informal language in their speech compared to non-persuaded mock-jurors, and South-
Asian mock-jurors used more clout and social processing during their discussions whereas 
British mock-jurors used more authentic language. Confidence in linguistic style, as 
measured using the epistemic modality dictionary revealed non-significant results across 
all IVs. 
Linguistic style matching (LSM) measured the linguistic similarity between the two 
communicators. Findings revealed that non-persuaded interactions produced LSM to a 
greater extent than persuaded interactions. These findings did not change when word count 
(WC) was controlled. Cognitive style, gender and ethnicity produced similar LSM scores 
and thus did not significantly differ on synchronicity of linguistic style. When LSM was 
investigated throughout 4 time segments, again this revealed no significant differences in 
LSM as the interaction progressed.  
Qualitative analyses (QCA) revealed that the majority of participants expanded on 
the arguments presented to them and used general reasoning of negligence to inform their 
decision-making. Post-discussion, the reasoning for verdict choices become much more 
varied, yet the majority of reasoning depicted did not differ across the IVs. Interestingly 
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however, more than half of the South-Asian participants referred only to the defendant in 
their post-discussion reasoning compared to the British participants, who tended to report 
on the company rather than singling out the individual defendant. Additionally, more than 
half of mock-jurors claimed to have been persuaded due to the challenging of the evidence 
they presented during the interactive discussion. Overall, most participants recorded that 
the interaction was friendly, balanced and fair.  
When analysing the impact of confederate mock-jurors, it was found that mock-
jurors perceived interactions to be less aggressive when they were persuaded by said 
confederate. This is in direct contrast to those who were not persuaded, who, on average 
rated the confederate as significantly more aggressive. Subjective ratings of the 
confederate also produced a significant result for friendliness as a function of gender. The 
data revealed that females rated the male confederates as less friendly when compared to 
males rating the female confederates.  
 
4.11   Discussion 
This first experimental chapter reports the investigation of persuasion in a 
traditional face-to-face context, alongside the impact of gender, ethnicity, cognitive and 
linguistic style. This research is novel in that the original jury method materials has been 
updated to reflect more contemporary criminal events, and this is the first time the impact 
of gender, ethnicity, cognitive and linguistic style have been investigated in unison. Thus, 
this study will serve as a baseline for further studies of persuasion in contemporary 
contexts, presented in the following chapters.  
Despite the novelty of this research, the available literature relevant to this 
programme of PhD research supported the tentative formulation of a series of hypotheses 
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and as such, the results of this chapter will be discussed with reference to the hypotheses 
below.   
1. South Asian participants will show greater persuasion post-jury discussion compared to 
British participants; 
2. Females will be more persuadable by a male confederate; 
3. There will be a relationship between cognitive style and persuasion outcomes; 
4. Male speech will display higher confidence and an individualistic style (e.g., swear 
words, increased word length) compared to females; 
5. Participants expressing higher confidence (expressed linguistically and through 
measurements of meta-cognition via pre-and post-questionnaires) will be less likely to 
be persuaded to change their verdict choice; 
6. Linguistic style (both in terms of LSM and LIWC outcomes) will differ as a function of 
gender and persuasion outcomes.  
 
Overall in FtF dyads, more mock-jurors were persuaded to change their decision 
following the jury discussion than those who retained their initial pre-discussion stance. 
This is in line with the media richness theory (MRT), which posits that modalities which 
enable immediacy of feedback, natural language exchanges and support numerous cue 
systems lead to increased intentions to alter behaviour (Daft & Lengel, 1986; Hammick & 
Lee, 2014). It also lends credence to the assumption made by the HSM that the heuristic 
route is the default route to persuasion where there is an abundance of heuristic cues to add 
to, or bias persuasive processing. 
Contrary to predicted ethnic differences in persuasion, participants from two 
diverse ethnic backgrounds did not differ in their propensity for persuadability, thus 
hypothesis one was not supported. This lack of differentiation between the two ethnic 
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groups is considered to be inconsistent with Hofstede’s (1980) cultural dimensions, 
predicting differences in reasoning and judgement across diverse ethnic groups. However, 
such dimensions exist on a continuum, with most previous research recruiting participants 
at the extremes of such a continuum (e.g., East Asian and American cultures; Setlock et al., 
2007; Taylor, Larner, Conchie & Menacere, 2017). These findings suggest the notion that 
Ind/Col cultural norms may be diluted for first-generation migrants, and supports the need 
for further contemporary research concerning the multi-level nature of ethnicity (e.g., 
Minkov, 2018).   
That females were more susceptible to persuasive attempts than their male 
counterparts when interacting in cross gender dyads is entirely consistent with enduring 
gender-stereotypical assertions that women are more agreeable and more easily influenced 
(Eagly, 1978; Eagly & Carli, 1981; Ellemers, 2018) and is supportive of hypothesis two. 
The primary focus of this thesis is on the persuadee and their influenceability, thus the 
paradigm remains constant across the discussions. Nevertheless, it would be interesting to 
note whether this gender effect is indeed due to females having an increased propensity to 
be persuaded versus the ability of the opposing gender to persuade. For example, it has 
previously been argued that individuals are more influenced by males than females (Carli, 
2017), and this holds in experiments where behaviour has been kept constant whilst gender 
has been manipulated (Carli, 2001; Elias & Cropanzano, 2006). Indeed, Propp (1995) 
found groups were six times more likely to use an idea to inform their decision when it was 
presented by a male, rather than a female.  
Turning to hypothesis three, the current findings are counter to those of previous 
studies investigating cognitive style, such as need for cognitive closure on persuasion 
(NfCC - where individuals jump to conclusions and freeze their decision-making in the 
presence of prior information). For example, Kruglanski, Webster and Klem (1993) 
manipulated NfCC situationally and individually within the jury method paradigm and 
  
140 
found that participants high on NfCC were more resistant to persuasion. Koot, ter Mors, 
Ellemers, and Daamen, (2016) and Viola and colleagues (2015) report finding NfCC 
moderates decision-making whereby persons high on NfCC appear more influenced by 
outcome relevance and so invest more cognitive effort into maintaining their position; the 
suggestion being that individuals high in NfCC process information in a more elaborate 
and effortful manner (Viola et al., 2015) and thus can cognitively justify a chosen position.  
Here, cognitive style (delusional thinking and the NfCC) were not related, 
correlated, nor did they significantly differ as a function of persuasion outcome, gender, 
ethnicity, or linguistic style. One key difference between previous research and the current 
study was that NfCC and delusional thinking were not systematically manipulated. Rather, 
the scores were collected and analysed post-hoc. Experimental manipulation of individuals 
scoring high and low in the two measures may provide alternate findings more in line with 
the theoretical literature in this field. However, from an applied perspective where these 
measures can neither be measured nor manipulated this research suggests their utility is 
limited. 
The current findings do not support a gender differences model for language, which 
has been cited in most research regarding linguistic style and gender, and so was used to 
inform both hypotheses four and six. Hypothesis four predicted that male speech would 
display higher confidence and a more dominant linguistic style (e.g., swear words, 
increased word length). Conversely, these predicted gender differences were not found 
despite a significant amount of research indicating the differentiations in linguistic style for 
gender (e.g., Pennebaker et al., 2015). More recently however, researchers have begun to 
question the notion of gender differences in naturalistic conversations, arguing that it is the 
manner in which the conversation progresses that may be gender specific rather than the 
linguistic content – females being interrupted more that male speakers, for example 
(Hancock & Rubin, 2014). This aspect of language/linguistic style nor the conversational 
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process was considered here, but for persuasion this may be relevant and so is a potential 
for future research (also see Coates & Cameron, 2014).  
In the more naturalistic conversational setting employed for this research, gender 
similarities across the ten linguistic themes measured by LIWC emerged. One possible 
explanation for this outcome comes from the gender similarities hypothesis (Hyde, 2005). 
Based on a review of 46 meta-analyses, Hyde argues that males and females are similar on 
most psychological variables, with gender differences in language being moderated by 
contextual variables such as partner familiarity, gender composition, status, and nature of 
the topic (Leaper, 2014; Pillon, Degauquier, & Duquesne, 1992). Interestingly, one piece 
of research which has reported similar findings to those reported here comes from an 
experimental study with similar situational factors to that of the current paradigm (Pillon et 
al., 1992). For example, participants interacted in mixed-sex dyads, with individuals they 
were not familiar with (strangers), and the authors measured linguistic style through 
conversational behaviour. It should also be noted that the study by Pillon and colleagues 
was one of the few which used participants that were not American. It may be that 
differential cultural identities interplay with gender norms.   
Confidence in post-discussion verdicts run counter to those of London et al. 
(1970b), who found that persuadees had lower certainty in their final opinion than 
persuaders. Here, confidence levels remained consistent with no difference in post-
discussion verdict confidence across the persuasion groups. This result casts doubt on the 
concept of the sufficiency principle, outlined in the HSM (see Figure 1.1), stating that 
one’s difference in actual and desired confidence serves to guide the route of persuasive 
processing. The findings here show that different persuasive outcomes occurred despite 
their subjective confidence remaining consistent across pre- and post- measurements. For 
example, if one is motivated to achieve an accurate and confident decision, their threshold 
is likely to be high, and thus if persuaded, this would be expected to close given that they 
  
142 
have changed their verdict in order to achieve a higher degree of accuracy and/or 
confidence.  
In addition to a lack of differences for meta-cognitive confidence in decisions, 
findings revealed similarities for epistemic modality, indicating that expressed confidence 
and doubt is not indicative of persuasion outcomes, contradicting hypothesis five. 
However, a comparison of confidence changes from pre- to post-discussion did show a 
significant increase in confidence for persuaded mock-jurors. Not only were mock jurors 
more likely to change their verdict following the jury discussion for this study, but those 
who were persuaded increased their confidence, despite the final decision being 
completely different to their initial conclusion. This indicates that persuasion wasn’t 
arbitrary, due to conformity or any sort of peer pressure. Indeed, outcomes from the 
qualitative content analysis show that mock-jurors were primarily persuaded from 
evidence-based challenges. Thus, this highlights that persuaded mock-jurors were 
motivated by accuracy and engaged in processing which served to increase their subjective 
confidence following high elaboration and rational arguments.  
Of note here is the confidence of participants who were not persuaded. Indeed, 
these individuals remained consistent in their self-rated confidence, contradicting theories 
on resistance to persuasion which would predict an increase in confidence post-resistance, 
and thus does not support hypothesis five. For example, McGuire’s inoculation hypothesis 
argues that exposure to an initial persuasive communication can strength one’s resistance 
to further persuasion on the topic area (McGuire, 1964; McGuire & Papageorgis, 1961). 
Furthermore, resistance to persuasion and exposure to persuasive arguments has been 
found to bring about crystallization of an individual’s viewpoints, with that individual 
being increasingly unlikely to be persuaded (Clarkson, Tormala, & Rucker, 2008; 2011). 
Given the positive responses to the QCA analysis for non-persuaded mock-jurors (55% 
conceding that the confederate said some persuasive points), it is clear that mock-jurors did 
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not have a negative response to the persuasive attempts; a negative effect being where the 
receiver deliberately, and as a direct consequence of the arguments, strengthens and 
increases confidence in their initial viewpoint, or even adopts an opposing attitude at the 
most extreme. This did not happen. Rather, they engaged in interactive discourse in which 
they debated and were exposed to counter-arguments. This exposure was not enough to 
convince them to change their mind, nor was it enough for them to foster a negative 
resistance effect to the alternate opinion.  
There is very little research investigating the expansion of synchronicity of 
language into bilateral persuasive interactions, which may be one explanation as to the lack 
of findings within the current persuasive paradigm. Research has consistently reported a 
higher degree of LSM in successful negotiations and thus it was hypothesised (hypothesis 
six) this would extend into the persuasive space, leading to enhanced rapport, trust and 
thus persuasion. However, the reverse has emerged, with higher synchronicity of linguistic 
style for non-persuaded interactions. Niederhoffer and Pennebaker state there has been 
conflicting research in this area, with the authors finding high levels of LSM for both 
positive and negative outcomes. Indeed, they proposed that it is engagement in the 
conversation that influences synchronicity of language (Niederhoffer & Pennebaker, 
2002). The coordination-engagement hypothesis posits that when two individuals are 
actively engaged in conversation (be that in a positive or negative manner), the more 
verbal and non-verbal coordination is proposed. Thus, it is engagement in the conversation 
rather than rapport or ‘liking’ that influences synchronicity of language. This indicates that 
non-persuaded mock-jurors were more engaged in the discussion than persuaded mock-
jurors, which is evidenced in that non-persuaded interactions lasted, on average 18 minutes 
compared to persuaded discussions (lasting a mere 7 minutes on average).  It implies that 
successfully persuaded outcomes originated from a central route of processing: elaborating 
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on and engaging with the arguments presented, motivated to achieve an accurate and 
confident answer.  
To conclude, the findings from this first study reveal new insights regarding the 
interplay of bilateral persuasion on gender, ethnicity, cognitive style, and language. In 
order to investigate naturalistic persuasion further and to understand persuasion in more 
contemporary contexts, the next study in this thesis will investigate persuadability using 





Chapter Five:  The Synchronous, Computer-Mediated Communication Modality 
(Study 2) 
 
5.1   Introduction 
Communication is no longer restrictive to face-to-face encounters (FtF), with 
technology becoming increasingly integrated into our everyday lives. Computer-mediated 
communication (CMC) allows interaction whereby traditional barriers of distance and time 
no longer hinder remote communication. For example, in December 2017, internet usage 
was estimated at 54.4% of the world’s population, a 1052% increase since 2000 (Internet 
World Stats, 2018). This substantial growth opens up new opportunities for researchers to 
investigate aspects of social cognition such as persuasion in novel contexts.  
Despite most technology now equipped with audio and video enabled features, text-
based CMC remains a popular form of online communication, with the majority of 
communication occurring via instant messengers online and via mobile phones (Statista, 
2018b). Additionally, it has recently been reported that 90% of young adults use social 
media. Furthermore, this increase is not solely restricted to the younger generation, with 
usage tripling over the last decade in adults over 65 years of age (Pew Research Center, 
2015). However, this modality is limited in terms of relaying paralinguistic cues and body 
language, which are taken into account (whether consciously or unconsciously) when 
interacting and conversing with others FtF (Guerrero & Floyd, 2006; Hargie, 2016). 
Media-rich modalities which allow for unconstrained transmission of non-verbal and 
paralinguistic cues enable rapid communication and allow ambiguous messages to be 
clarified immediately, often leading to better performance on decision-making tasks (Daft 
& Lengel 1986; DiBlasio & Milani, 2008; McGrath & Hollingshead, 1993).  This implies 
that a more constrained communication modality will hinder decision-making processes 
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and change social cognition when interacting in a synthetic environment. A primary 
component of this change is owed to the anonymity that text-based CMC affords.  
Individuals often have the ability to withhold or even create new information about 
themselves. For example, portraying alternative gender, ethnicity and ages when online. 
This concept is becoming increasingly prevalent in the mainstream media, with popular 
reality shows even dedicated to the public interest of anonymity online as a social 
experiment (‘The Circle’, Channel 4). Some individuals have expressed that anonymity 
enables them to talk freely, allowing open and honest communication (Suler, 2004). 
However, there is a darker site to anonymity online, with research suggesting it can 
normalise and encourage uninhibited behaviour such as flaming, trolling and bullying 
(Moore, Nakano, Enomoto, & Suda, 2012; Siegel, Dubrovsky, Kiesler, & McGuire, 1986), 
decreased group consensus (Daly, 1993) and lower satisfaction in final decisions and 
outcomes (Baltes, Dickson, Sherman, Bauer, & LaGanke, 2002). In addition, the 
restriction of non-verbal and paralinguistic cues which is often used to discern attitudes 
and attributes can lead to enhanced negative perceptions of the conversation partner 
(Siegel et al., 1986). Researchers confirm that the lack of feedback (which arises naturally 
during FtF exchanges) leads to social norms of politeness being violated online (Kiesler, 
Siegal, & McGuire, 1984), and likability of conversational partners decreasing (Weisband 
& Atwater, 1999). 
Furthermore, the synchronicity of the medium has been suggested to impact on the 
levels of media richness in communication. Synchronous CMC is considered more 
interactive than asynchronous exchanges and is therefore perceived to be higher in media 
richness; promoting higher degrees of involvement and engagement by facilitating instant 
communication and real-time feedback of the individuals writing or read status, as well as 
the option of emoticons to express feelings and emotions (Fullwood & Martino, 2007). The 
majority of research which has investigated differences in social cognition in online 
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settings has primarily focussed upon asynchronous CMC such as email, perhaps due to the 
relatively novel proliferation of instant messaging systems. It is therefore beneficial to 
investigate text-based CMC using instant messaging modalities.  
 
5.2   Resistance to Persuasion  
Persuasive messages do not always result in a change of decision: indeed, 
persuasion attempts can go in the opposite direction and produce a negative persuasion 
effect. In other words, resistance to persuasion can occur as a direct result of the message 
or modality (Pfau, Holbert, Zubric, Pasha, & Lin, 2000). One fundamental resistance 
theory is known as inoculation (McGuire, 1964), considered an active process whereby 
counter-arguing featuring critical reasoning, elaboration and verifiable evidence leads to 
resistance of the counter-message arguments over time. McGuire and Papagorgis (1961) 
first reported this effect when participants seemed to become impervious to subsequent 
stronger persuasive attacks after they had initially been exposed to a mild persuasion 
attempt. It is thought to occur in two ways. Firstly, initial persuasion increases awareness 
of the perceived vulnerability of the attitude or belief and thus motivates defence building. 
Secondly, the initial persuasive message allows participants to create counter-arguments, 
strengthening the attitude against future attacks and increasing their confidence in the 
initial attitude. A meta-analysis of 54 research papers revealed that inoculation was 
effective in conferring resistance to persuasion even when novel attacks were used in the 
second persuasive attempt, concluding that inoculation fosters resistance to attitude change 
(Banas & Rains, 2010). 
Research suggests that the persuasive impact of a message, and subsequently the 
route in which it is taken, is influenced by the modality in which the message is displayed 
(Muscanell, 2009). It is the communication modality that influences the effectiveness and 
hence the interpretation of the persuasive messages. Text-based CMC (where the modality 
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restricts richness of non-verbal cues, and thus leaves individuals focussing heavily on the 
written content and arguments presented) often engages the cognitively-demanding central 
route of the persuasion process. The medium automatically restricts social and source cues, 
thus constraining opportunities to assess quality and intended meaning of the persuasive 
message in order to make their decision. Subsequently, this restricting of non-verbal 
nuances is thought to lead to the message being centrally processed and enhancing 
systematic consideration than if it were presented FtF (Guadagno & Cialdini, 2002; 2007).  
As a result of the active process of inoculation, resistance requires systematic 
processing and engagement of the messages being exchanged, thus suggesting persuasion 
via the central route of processing (text-based CMC) will be more likely to inoculate and 
resist persuasive attacks if compared to FtF exchanges (thought to be processed in a 
primarily heuristic manner).  
 
5.3   Ethnicity  
According to Hall (1981), collectivist countries rely primarily on situational 
information and non-verbal cues to inform their interactions. As such, communicating 
online through CMC could negatively impact such individuals. Setlock, Fussell, and 
Neuwirth (2004) found collectivist dyadic pairs took longer in their online exchanges to 
reach a consensus. This appeared to be an attempt to create a deeper cognitive agreement 
between the collectivist individuals. On the other hand, Setlock, Quinones, and Fussell 
(2007) found cultural differences were reduced but not eliminated when the persuasive 
message was presented using instant messaging software compared to FtF. The 
equalisation hypothesis (Dubrovsky et al., 1991) would suggest that any differences 
attributable to surface-level group membership such as ethnicity will be reduced or even 
eliminated when interacting anonymously, and thus any differences in ethnic persuasion 
outcomes will produce null results in this modality. Given that figures suggest that Asian 
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countries contribute to over half of all internet users (Internet World Stats, 2018), it would 
be remiss to exclude the impact of ethnicity on DMs, given its access to enhanced 
collaboration and communication across vast distances. 
 
5.4   Gender 
The majority of research investigating gender could be considered outdated, with 
gender roles within society changing vastly since the inception of such studies and the 
increasing role that technology and social media plays within everyday communication. 
For example, it has been reported that women actually outnumber men in terms of their 
social media usage (Kimbrough et al., 2013; Pew Research Center, 2015), which is a vast 
increase from reports of female internet users at 5% in 1992 (Sproull, 1992, cited in Ebben 
& Kramarae, 1993). Kimbrough et al. (2013) investigated gender differences within CMC, 
with the aim of understanding the motivations behind male and female use of technology 
for communicating. Kimbrough and her colleagues found that males and females use 
technology to a similar extent, but the purposes behind this use differed between the sexes. 
Females use the technology to maintain relationships and social interactions, whereas the 
males are noted to use the internet as a source for facts and information, focussing on task 
activities such as reading the news. It strengthens the Social Roles Theory and supports the 
view that men aim to achieve agentic goals compared to females’ communal objective 
when communicating. This is despite the fact that technology provides freedom in terms of 
behaviour and interactions during online communications. It is therefore predicted that 
anonymity within this DM will hinder the female goal to achieve and maintain a 
relationship, whereas men will not be as affected by this restriction in media cues, thus not 





5.5   Linguistic Style 
McLeod and Elston (1995) noted differences in the use of persuasive linguistic 
devices between anonymous and identified individuals conversing online during a jury 
discussion. For example, anonymous individuals being much more direct in their style. 
Herring (1996) found that males were more likely to assert opinions as facts and use crude 
language in the online space. However, this study only looked at Caucasian individuals 
using self-report questionnaires and so a direct observation of language in DM is 
necessary. Nevertheless, Fullwood, Melrose, Morris, and Floyd (2012) support Herring’s 
claims, finding that males were more likely to swear in online blogs.  
 
5.6   The Present Study 
This research utilises synchronous instant messaging software, enabling interaction to 
occur in real-time. The aim being to investigate CMC latency on persuasion outcomes, 
enabling a comparison with previous research, which has typically utilised asynchronous 
email conditions. Given that CMC interferes with the social motivations of females by 
restricting non-verbal cues and diminishing the establishment of social intimacy and 
relationships, it is hypothesised that: 
1. Female persuasion will be negatively affected when interacting in CMC, 
leading to reduced persuasive outcomes compared to males.  
2. Given the anonymity that the instant messenger software will afford, it is 
hypothesised that persuasion outcomes as a function of surface-level ethnicity 
will not differ. 
Regarding the other variables of interest (cognitive and linguistic style), no specific 
hypotheses are made here due to limited research on these areas within a synchronous 






5.7   Method 
5.7.1   Participants. Sixty-four mock-juror participants took part in the current 
study. Participants self-identified their ethnic background as either British (16 British 
males, 16 British females) or South-Asian (16 Asian males and 16 Asian females). The 
South-Asian self-reported sample consisted of 20 Indian, 7 Pakistani, 2 Bangladeshi, 2 
Nepalese, and 1 Sri Lankan participants. The British self-reported sample consisted of 30 
English and 2 Scottish participants. Ages ranged from 20 to 63, with a mean of 26.92 years 
(SD = 10.10). This study consisted of nine mock-juror confederates (3 British females, 1 
British male, 3 South-Asian males and 2 South-Asian females), who had a mean age of 
21.55 years (SD = 2.45). Participants and confederates were recruited using opportunity 
and snowball sampling in the West Midland, North-West and London areas. Participants 
were given the choice between receiving course credits (if they were studying psychology 
at either the University of Wolverhampton or Westminster) or being paid £10.00 for their 
time. The confederate mock-jurors were paid £5 per mock juror for participating in the 
research.  
 
5.7.2   Materials.  Google Hangouts was used as the synchronous computer-
mediated modality, which provides an instant messaging service through the Gmail 
website or mobile app for two or more users. This can be accessed online via a number of 
platforms including mobile, tablet and computers thus allowing ease of access to multiple 
participants. Whilst participants converse and type, speech bubbles appear on screen to 
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represent the conversational partner responding and these conversations can be saved and 
synced across devices, with the timing of previous messages also being visible on the 
screen (see figures 5.1-2). This particular platform was chosen as it facilitated instant 
messaging akin to social media and being free to access on multiple, wifi-enabled devices. 
Further features include the ability to converse using three-way interactions, use emoji’s 
and avatar’s, monitor and record conversations, and allow the exchange of files through the 
email facility. Additionally, it facilitated the creation of new, anonymous accounts for each 
participant for added security. 
 
5.7.3   Procedure. Participants were sent an email once they had completed 
Session 1 (see Chapter 4 procedure), containing key information about a new Gmail 
account to which they were instructed to log into at a scheduled time. This allowed 
anonymity for the participants, meaning they were only identifiable by a participant 
number. Additional questions were added to Session 1 which included a subjective 
measure of how confident participants were in using a computer (from 1 completely 
confident, to 5 not at all confident) and how often participants used a computer, on 
average, per week (from 0-10 hours per week, to > 50 hours per week). The information 
sheet was provided in the email inbox 24 hours prior to the study.  
At the scheduled time, the researcher opened a new chat window using the Google 
Hangout feature, supported by Gmail, and explained how the study would be run, 
reiterating the format of the research and asking for consent. The same procedure used in 
the FtF study was employed here, whereby the jury booklet was provided to participants. 
This was accessed using an online link to the information as well as an online link to the 
pre-deliberation questionnaire. Once the participant had acknowledged that they had 
completed these tasks, a second chat window was opened, enabling a three-way 
conversation: containing the researcher, confederate and participant. The same instructions 
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were given as in Study 1 (see Appendix N), and it was emphasised that the researcher was 
available throughout for any questions. Both the confederate and participant were only 
identifiable by a participant number and thus the conversation remained anonymous 
throughout. Once the discussion had been completed, the confederate was let go on the 
pretence of completing the same post-deliberation questionnaire as the participant, to 
which a link was again provided within the chat window. Once completed, the researcher 
sent the debrief via email and there was an opportunity for the participant to ask any 
further questions. Finally, the participant was thanked for their time and dismissed, and the 


































5.8   Results 
 
5.8.1   Mock-juror persuasion. Descriptive statistics show how significantly more 
mock-jurors resisted persuasion (n = 43; 67%) as a result of the jury discussion than mock-
jurors who were persuaded (n = 21; 33%).  
 
5.8.1.1   Ethnicity and persuasion. Overall, a test for independence chi-square 
showed no significant difference for persuasion outcomes, !"(1) = 1.77, p = .183, φ = .17 
(see Figure 5.3). South-Asian mock-jurors showed a similar breakdown of persuaded (n = 
10) v. not persuaded (n = 22) as the British mock-jurors (n = 11; n = 21).  
 
Figure 5.3. British (n =32) and South-Asian (n =32) groups, compared to the overall 

























5.8.1.2   Gender and persuasion. Descriptive statistics revealed 41% of females 
were persuaded, double the rates for male persuasion, at just 25%. A test for independence 
revealed a non-significant result for gender and persuasion, !"(1) = 1.77, p = .183, φ = .17 
(see Figure 5.4).  
 
 Figure 5.4. Male (n =32) and Female (n =32) groups, compared to the overall sample  
(n =64) for persuasion outcomes.   
 
5.8.1.3   Ethnicity, gender, and persuasion. A Fisher’s Exact test revealed non-
significant results for the persuaded outcome when broken down by gender and ethnicity, !"(1) = 1.15, p = .387, φ = .23. Likewise, a chi-square test for independence revealed a 
non-significant result for the not-persuaded outcomes, !"(1) = .68, p = .432, φ = .12 (see 



























Figure 5.5. Persuasion as a function of Ethnicity and Gender (n =64).  
 
 
5.8.2   Confidence in verdict choice. To analyse whether subjective confidence 
influenced persuasion, univariate ANOVAs were conducted on the pre- and post-
discussion confidence ratings. Confidence was analysed separately for the two different 
time points (before and after the jury discussion) to enable a comparison for persuasion 
within the separate time entities (see Table 5.1). The only significant result was in the post-
discussion confidence ratings, with persuaded mock-jurors scoring significantly lower on 































Table 5.1  
Descriptive and inferential statistics for pre- and post-discussion confidence ratings in 
verdict choice across Gender, Ethnicity and Persuasion  
Factor Levels 
Pre-Discussion (%) Post-Discussion (%) 
M SD F p M SD F p 
Persuasion 





Persuaded 73.26 22.75 81.98 20.65 
Gender 




Female 65.62 25.2 67.19 24.13 
Ethnicity 




Asian 65.62 24.39 71.87 23.55 
 Note. M = mean; SD = standard deviation; F = univariate ANOVA statistic; p = 
significance value. 
 
5.8.2.1   Percentage change in confidence of verdict choice. Univariate ANOVAs 
were computed for the absolute change score conversions (see Chapter 3). There were non-
significant effects for gender, F (1,62) = .71, p = .403, ethnicity, F (1,62) = .25, p = .616, 
and cognitive style, PDI-R: F (1,62) = .17, p = .680, NfCC: F (1,62) < .01, p = 1.00. 
However, the ANOVA for persuasion revealed a significant main effect, F (1,62) = 6.05, p 
= .017, ηp2 = .30, 95% CI [13.91, 22.81]. Analysis of the means revealed that those who 
were persuaded had a mean confidence change score of 26.19 (SD = 21.62, 95% CI [16.35, 
36.03]) whereas those who were not persuaded had a mean confidence change score of 
14.53 (SD = 15.65, 95% CI [9.72, 19.35]).  
  To understand the direction of confidence change and whether this differed across 




Table 5.2  
A 3x2 contingency table for the frequency data (n) and standardised residuals (z) for 
persuasion and direction of confidence  
    Direction of absolute confidence in verdict choice  
    Increased Decreased No Change 
Persuaded 
N 13 2 6 
z 6.0* -5.0* -1 
Not Persuaded 
N 18 4 21 
z 3.7* -10.3* 6.7* 
Note. *p < .001.  
 
Table 5.2 also shows the descriptive statistics of the direction of confidence change, 
highlighting that the majority of the persuaded group (61.9%) increased their confidence 
post-discussion, despite changing their verdict. 41.9% of the not-persuaded sample 
increased in their confidence, whilst 48.8% showed no change in confidence (compared to 
22.2% for those persuaded).  
To understand whether the direction of confidence change significantly differed 
across persuasion, a Fisher-Freeman-Halton test for independence was conducted. This 
revealed a non-significant effect, !"(1) = 2.54, p = .280, showing that direction of 
confidence change did not differ when comparing across persuasion groups.   
 
5.8.3   Mock-juror cognitive style. Table 5.3 shows the summary and inferential 
statistics for cognitive style measures across persuasion, gender and ethnicity. The table 
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reveals one significant result - South-Asian mock-jurors scored higher in delusional 
thinking on average, when compared to British mock-jurors. 
 
Table 5.3  
Summary descriptives of the total PDI-R and NfCC total scores as a function of Gender, 
Ethnicity and Persuasion  
  NfCC PDI-R 
Factor Level M SD F p M SD F p 




 Female 160.69 18.50 42.44 24.62 







158.37 20.14 57.16 29.49 







156.53 21.04 45.95 34.00 
 
To investigate whether the two measures are correlated, a Spearman’s Rho 
correlation was analysed on the total scores across the two scales. This was chosen due to 
the parametric assumptions of normality being violated (skewness = .922, standard error = 
.302) but revealed a non-significant relationship between the two measures, r = .10, p = 
.442.  
 
5.8.3.1   High and low in cognitive style.  The distribution of the NfCC scores 
ranged from 107 to 207. Mock-jurors who scored in the highest or lowest quartiles for 
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cognitive style were categories as high or low in each measure. Sixteen participants were 
considered ‘high’ in their NfCC (M = 180.69, SD = 10.14) and 16 were classed as low in 
the NfCC (M = 132.56, SD = 9.89). The distribution of PDI-R scores ranged from 0 to 146. 
As above, those scoring in the top and bottom quartiles were classified as high or low in 
their delusional thinking (high: M = 90.07, SD = 25.02; low: M = 12.47, SD = 7.06). 
Univariate ANOVAs were conducted to investigate any differences in those high or low in 
their cognitive style for duration, and pre- and post-confidence. Chi-square analyses were 
conducted on the high and low categories to understand and analyse any differences in 
persuasion outcomes (see Table 5.4). These all revealed non-significant effects.  
 
Table 5.4  
Descriptives and inferential analyses of high and low cognitive styles, as a function of 
duration, pre- and post-confidence, and persuasion 
Source   
Group Comparison       
High Low Statistic p Effect Size 
PDI-R       
 Duration 
M = 1863.75 M = 1522.50 
F = 2.08 .159 ηp2 = .25 SD = 768.21 SD = 552.03 
 Pre-
Confidence 
M = 64.06 M = 71.87 
F = 1.08 .307 ηp2 = .19 SD = 22.30 SD = 20.16 
 Post-
Confidence 
M = 67.19 M = 75.00 
F = 1.00 .325 ηp2 = .18 SD = 25.36 SD = 18.26 
 Persuasion 
N P =   6 N P = 4 
χ2 = .58 .704 φ = .13 
N NP = 10  N NP = 12 
NfCC       
 Duration 
M = 1547.14 M = 1817.65 
F = 1.00 .326 ηp2 = .18 SD = 513.07 SD = 897.44 
 Pre-
Confidence 
M = 66.07 M = 67.65 
F = .03 .862 ηp2 = .03 SD = 28.77 SD = 21.22 
 Post-
Confidence 
M = 69.64 M = 79.41 
F = 1.27 .27 ηp2 = .20 SD = 28.04 SD = 20.22 
 Persuasion 
N P = 5 N P = 4 
χ2 = .55 .693 φ = .13 




5.8.4   Duration of jury discussion. The duration of the jury discussion was 
measured in seconds, from the moment the researcher stated the mock-jurors could begin 
the discussion, until the moment a decision was unanimously reached (be that an 
agreement, or termination of the chat). The average length of the jury discussion by 
ethnicity was analysed and found that the assumption of homogeneity of variances had 
been violated (Levene’s < .05). Therefore, the Welch’s F test was utilised. This revealed a 
significant main effect for duration, Welch’s F (1, 62) = 14.79, p <.001, ηp2 = .44, 95% CI 
[1445.02, 1826.85] whereby British mock-jurors spoke for longer on average (M = 1968.75 
seconds, SD = 861.76, 95% CI [1658.05, 2279.45]), than the South-Asian mock-jurors (M 
= 1303.12 seconds, SD = 464.57, 95% CI [1135.63, 1470.62]). Persuasion also revealed a 
significant main effect for duration, F (1, 62) = 7.21, p = .009, ηp2 = .32, 95% CI [1445.02, 
1826.85]. Further analysis of the means revealed that those who were not persuaded talked 
for longer (M = 1806.98 seconds, SD = 739.06, 95% CI [1579.53, 2034.42]) than those 
who were persuaded (M = 1285.71seconds, SD = 708.04, 95% CI [963.42, 1608.01]). No 
significant main effects for gender, F (1, 62) = .06, p = .808, or cognitive style (high or 
low) for PDI-R, F (1, 29) = 1.00, p = .326, or NfCC, F (1, 62) = 2.08, p = .159, as a 
function of duration emerged.  
 
5.8.5   Mock-juror linguistic analysis. 
5.8.5.1   Word count. To investigate whether word count (WC) differed as a 
function of persuasion, cognitive style, ethnicity and gender, and whether this differed to 
results reported under ‘Duration’, a series of univariate ANOVAs were conducted. 
Analysis of the means showed that British mock-jurors said, on average, 423 words (SD = 
259.63, 95% CI [329.39, 516.61]) compared to the South-Asian participants, who spoke 
almost half this number throughout the jury discussion (M = 277.75, SD = 151.65, 95% CI 
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[223.07, 332.42]). This resulted in a significant inferential finding for ethnicity, F (1, 62) = 
7.47, p = .008, ηp2 = .33, 95% CI [294.61, 406.14].  
Similar to the duration of the jury discussion, persuasion also revealed a significant 
difference in WC. Persuaded participants spoke approximately 50% fewer words (M = 
241.00, SD = 145.66, 95% CI [174.69, 307.30) than participants who resisted the 
persuasive messages from the confederate mock-juror (M = 403.79, SD = 236.13, 95% CI 
[331.12, 476.46]), F (1, 62) = 8.38, p = .005, ηp2 = .34, 95% CI [294.61, 406.14]. Gender, 
F (1, 62) = 3.02, p = .087, and cognitive style (high or low) in PDI-R, F (1, 29) = 1.45, p = 
.239, and NfCC, F (1, 30) = .61, p = .440, did not significantly differ.  
 
5.8.5.2   LIWC categories. A series of between-factor MANOVAs were performed 
on the LIWC categories as a function of ethnicity, gender, persuasion and cognitive style. 
Non-significant interactions were found for Gender, Wilks’s Λ = .92, F (10, 53) = .44, p = 
.921, and cognitive style: NfCC (high or low) Wilks’s Λ = .75, F (10, 21) = .69, p = .72, 
and PDI-R (high or low, where Box’s M implied that the assumption of equal covariances 
were not met, and thus the more conservative Pillai’s trace was utilised: see Tang & 
Algina, 1993; Field, 2013) Box’s M = 125.66, F (55, 2495.47) = 1.40, p = .03, Pillai’s trace 
= .35, F (10, 20) = 1.08, p = .42.   
 A significant interaction emerged for Ethnicity, Wilks’s Λ = .64, F (10, 53) = 2.94, 
p = .005, ηp2 = .36. Subsequent univariate ANOVAs and their descriptive statistics are 
presented in Table 5.5.  Significant main effects (adjusting for Bonferroni’s correction) 
were found for affective and informal language. The South-Asian sample used more 
informal language during the jury discussion and had greater frequency of affective 








Table 5.5  
Descriptive statistics and follow-up ANOVAs showing the main effects of linguistic style 












F p ηp2 
Analytical Thinking 
M = 29.96 
SD = 14.55 
M = 31.02 
SD = 18.20 
.07 .796 .07 
Clout  
M = 45.53 
SD = 16.06 
M = 51.16 
SD = 19.35 
1.59 .212 .02 
Authentic  
M = 29.15 
SD = 19.35 
M = 27.11 
SD = 21.27 
.16 .689 <.01 
Tone 
M = 36.46 
SD = 25.82 
M = 36.61 
SD = 26.08 
<.01 .965 <.01 
Total Function words 
M = 61.56 
SD = 3.35 
M = 59.42 
SD = 3.09 
7.05 .010 .10 
Affective processes 
M = 6.33 
SD = 2.01 
M = 8.21 
SD =2.30 
12.09 .001 .16 
Social processes 
M = 9.79 
SD = 2.18 
M = 10.53 
SD = 2.79 
1.40 .242 .02 
Cognitive Processes 
M = 19.30 
SD = 3.65 
M = 18.53 
SD = 3.16 




M = 7.71 
SD = 1.88 
M = 8.75 
SD = 2.52 
3.46 .068 .05 
Informal Language  
M = 1.64 
SD = 1.38 
M = 2.99 
SD = 2.03 
9.74 .003 .14 
 
Additionally, the between-factor MANOVA revealed a significant interaction for 
Persuasion across the themed categories analysed using LIWC, Box’s M < .05, Pillai’s 
trace = .35, F (10, 53) = 2.87, p = .006, ηp2 = .35. Subsequent univariate ANOVAs 
(adjusting for Bonferroni’s correction) revealed significant main effects for affect, 
cognitive processing and informal language (see Table 5.6). As highlighted below, this 
shows that the persuaded group had a larger frequency of cognitive processing and 
informal language when compared directly to the non-persuaded groups.  
 
Table 5.6  











F p ηp2 
Analytical Thinking 
M = 29.87 
SD = 19.86 
M = 30.80 
SD = 14.60 
.04 .834 <.01 
Clout  
M = 49.67 
SD = 18.18 
M = 47.70 
SD = 18.17 
.17 .684 <.01 
Authentic  
M = 29.72 
SD = 21.17 
M = 27.35 
SD = 19.91 




M = 43.76 
SD = 28.56 
M = 33.12 
SD = 23.82 
2.47 .121 .04 
Total Function 
words 
M = 59.80 
SD = 4.26 
M = 60.83 
SD = 2.84 
1.31 .257 .02 
Affective processes 
M = 8.15 
SD = 2.02 
M = 6.83 
SD = 2.39 
4.73 .034 .07 
Social processes 
M = 10.16 
SD = 2.40 
M = 10.16 
SD = 2.59 
<.01 .991 <.01 
Cognitive Processes 
M = 20.66 
SD = 2.79 
M = 18.07 
SD = 3.40 
9.19 .004 .13 
Drives 
M = 8.01 
SD = 2.07 
M = 8.34 
SD = 2.37 
.293 .590 <.01 
Informal Language  
M = 3.52 
SD = 2.25 
M = 1.17 
SD = 1.29 
16.59 <.001 .21 
 
 Given the significant findings reported for WC, ethnicity, and persuasion (above), 
two between-factor MANCOVAs were run to understand whether controlling for WC 
would alter the findings reported. The between-factor MANCOVA for ethnicity revealed a 
significant interaction with the LIWC themes, Wilks’s Λ = .69, F (10, 52) = 2.29, p = .026, 
ηp2 = .31. Similarly, the MANCOVA for persuasion also remained constant, revealing a 
significant effect across the LIWC themes, Wilks’s Λ = .70, F (10, 52) = 2.17, p = .034, ηp2 
= .29.  This indicates that despite WC differing across ethnicity and persuasion groups, this 
did not significantly alter findings when analysing LIWC categories, when controlling WC 




5.8.5.3   Confidence in linguistic style. As mentioned previously, the confidence 
epistemic dictionary was used in LIWC to analyse confidence in speech, expressed as a 
percentage of the total words within each discussion.  A 2 (Gender: male v female) x 2 
(Ethnicity: south-asian v british) x 2 (Persuasion: persuaded v not-persuaded) MANOVA 
was conducted for mock-jurors on the two DVs (high and low in linguistic confidence). 
The assumption of equal covariances was not met (Box’s M = 56.52, F (21, 1391.96) = 
2.22, p = .001) for this test. The subsequent findings revealed non-significant multivariate 
effects for gender, Pillai’s trace = .01, F (2, 55) = .19, p = .826, and ethnicity, Pillai’s trace 
= .01, F (2, 55) = .29, p = .747. However, persuasion revealed a significant multivariate 
effect, Pillai’s trace = .23, F (2, 55) = 8.19, p = .001, ηp2 = .23. Subsequent between-factor 
ANOVAs revealed a significant main effect for low confidence, F (1, 56) = 9.80, p = .003, 
ηp2 = .15, 95% CI [1.76, 2.36]. Descriptive statistics show that the persuaded mock-jurors 
had a higher frequency of low confidence words in their speech writing (M = 2.71, SD = 
.27, 95% CI [2.18, 3.25]) compared to mock-jurors who were not persuaded (M = 1.71, SD 
= .18, 95% CI [1.36, 2.07]). There were no significant interactions for gender x ethnicity, 
Pillai’s trace = .01, F (2, 55) = .14, p = .87, gender x persuasion, Pillai’s trace = .01, F (2, 
55) = .34, p = .71, ethnicity x persuasion, Pillai’s trace = .01, F (2, 55) = .23, p = .79, or 
gender x ethnicity x persuasion, Pillai’s trace < .01, F (2, 55) = .06, p = .94.  
To analyse the interaction between dyadic pairings and persuasion, a 2 (Dyadic 
pairing: mock-juror v confederate mock-juror) x 2 (Persuasion: persuaded v not-persuaded) 
MANOVA on confidence in speech (high and low) was conducted. Findings showed a 
non-significant main effect for dyadic paring, Wilks’s Λ =.98, F (2, 123) = .97, p = .381. 
However, persuasion was significant, Wilks’s Λ = .80, F (2, 123) = 14.90, p < .001, ηp2 = 
.19, mirroring the findings above. The dyadic pairing x persuasion interaction was non-
significant, Wilks’s Λ = .97, F (2, 123) = 1.55, p = .216. These results indicate that 
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confidence does not significantly differ for mock- and confederate mock-jurors for 
persuaded or non-persuaded interactions.  
 
5.8.5.4   Linguistic style matching. To investigate the hypothesis that LSM would 
be higher in persuaded interactions, a comparison of the mean total LSM scores was 
conducted. The independent t-test revealed no differences in mean total LSM scores for 
persuasion, t (62) = -1.68, p = .098. 
5.8.5.4.1   LSM over time. The jury interactions were split into even quartiles to 
observe any differences in LSM over the course of the jury discussion. A 2 (Persuasion: 
persuaded v not-persuaded) x 4 (Time 1 v 2 v 3 v 4) mixed-factor ANOVA revealed non-
significant main effects for time, F (3, 186) = .41, p = .689, and persuasion, F (1, 62) = 
2.24, p = .140. Additionally, there was a non-significant time x persuasion interaction, F 
(3, 186) = 1.76, p = .156, indicating that LSM did not significantly differ across the 

























Figure 5.6. Mean LSM scores per quartile of the jury discussion by Persuasion. 






5.8.6   Mock-juror qualitative content analysis (QCA). The exploration of the 
content analysis codes is presented below. A complete summary table of the breakdown of 
each code, and the IVs (ethnicity: South-Asian v British; persuasion: persuaded v not 
persuaded; gender: male v female; and cognitive style: NfCC high v NfCC low; PDI-R 
high v PDI-R low) are reported in full in Appendix M2, highlighting the coding 
frequencies and percentage responses across each category.  
 
5.8.6.1   Descriptive group comparisons for the pre-questionnaire.  
Theme 1: Facts used to inform decision-making. When looking at the overall data 
sample, more mock-jurors used the prosecution’s arguments and expanded on this 
evidence (QCA codes 2 [18.8%]; 202 [21.9%]) compared to those who relied on the 
defence’s argument (QCA code 1 [10.9%]; 101 [15.6%]). Interestingly, the highest scoring 
category for mock-jurors who were persuaded was the use of background information 
(QCA code 4; 23.8%), followed closely by individual interpretation of the case file 
summary (QCA code 3). This suggests that mock-jurors who were persuaded to change 
their decisions initially used information that is considered much broader in scope, rather 
than focussing and expanding on the specific arguments for and against the defendant’s 
stated crime. In support of this, the majority of those who were not persuaded were more 
likely to fall within QCA codes 1, 101, 2, and 202. 
Theme 2: References to the accused. Across all the IVs of interest depicted in 
Appendix table M2, mock-jurors tended to fall within the category where references are 
made only to the company as a collective (‘the company’, ’they’). The exception being 
37.5% of mock-jurors scoring low in NfCC, who mention both the company and the 
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individual/defendant within their written reasoning, perhaps in an attempt to cover all 
possible reasoning and thus fulfilling their desire to suspend judgmental commitment. 
Theme 3: Reasoning for verdict choice. Not many mock-jurors mentioned moral 
reasoning for their choice in verdict (QCA code 8). However, there was a difference in the 
distribution of those falling within this category when broken down by gender, with 12.5% 
(n =4) of females referencing fairness and ethics when justifying their decisions (‘I believe 
it is worse to sentence an innocent man than to let a guilty man go free’ [FB12]). This is 
compared to just 1 male (3.1%) who similarly justified his verdict choice of not guilty 
using the reasoning depicted in QCA code 8 [MA8]. Also, of interest here was the lack of 
mock-jurors either high or low in cognitive style giving reference to a lack of evidence 
when qualifying their decisions pre-discussion (QCA code 12).  On average, most mock-
jurors, despite being persuaded or not, reasoned that either the company was negligent due 
to them simply not fulfilling the contract/providing a service (for the guilty verdicts: QCA 
code 9) or went beyond the case file and used real-world knowledge/scenarios to explain 
how the company/defendant was not at fault for the events that took place (QCA code 142; 
not-guilty verdicts). Thus, with regards to persuasion, there were no particular differences 
in reasoning styles pre-discussion, and the codes that mock-jurors fell into imply a focused 
thought process (with no-one in the current study commenting that they went for the easier 
option to ease cognition (QCA code 11).  
Theme 4: Attribution of responsibility. Overall, there is an even spread when it 
comes to participants attribution of blame. No-one who scored highly on the NfCC scale 
attributed responsibility to ‘others’ (QCA code 701: examples include the Government and 
media). In contrast, 25% of mock-jurors who were low on this measure fell into this 
category. This pattern is reversed when the comparison is made for delusional thinking, 
with no one low in the measure falling into code 701, but 14.3% of mock-jurors high in 
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PDI-R did. This seemingly reiterates the findings above showing that the two cognitive 
style measures do not have a relationship (are not correlated).  
Theme 1: Facts ignored in the decision-making process. This sub-category shows 
a similar spread of results, with a high proportion of the participants ignoring the 
background information when it comes to the decision-making process. This holds across 
all IVs. It should be noted however, that the non-persuaded mock-jurors had a higher 
degree of spread across the QCA sub-categories, seemingly ignoring more information 
compared to persuaded individuals, who primarily disregarded the background summary 
information (61.9%).  
Theme 3: Reasoning for ignoring these facts. Irrespective of gender, ethnicity, 
cognitive style and persuasion, most individuals state they ignored the evidence they did 
due to it being unimportant and irrelevant to the decision being made. Seven non-
persuaded mock-jurors (16.3%) claimed they ignored the evidence they did because it was 
weak and lacked certainty (‘No evidence of credibility’ [FB10]). However, no individual 
who was persuaded fell within this category (QCA code 12) potentially indicting that 
persuaded mock-jurors took on board most information presented to them, despite the case 
summary being overall neutral in its delivery. The non-persuaded individuals, on the other 
hand, stated that they discounted information if they deemed it to lack certainty.  
 
5.8.6.2   Descriptive group comparisons for the post-questionnaire.  
Theme 1: Facts used to inform decision-making. Similar to Theme 1 in the pre-
questionnaire, a high percentage of mock-jurors continued to expand on the prosecution’s 
argument. However, unlike the pre-questionnaire, 25% of mock-jurors made their 
decisions based on the lack of facts and evidence presented in the case summary file and 
used this lack of information to form their final verdict decision, ‘On the basis of these 
facts, we agreed that more information was needed’ [MA17]; ‘Based on lack of important 
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information, it is very hard to say whether or not the managing director is guilty’ [FB12]. 
Furthermore, groups low in cognitive style (both NfCC and delusional thinking) had a 
higher percentage of individuals falling into this category (31.3%, and 35.3% respectively) 
compared to mock-jurors high on these measures (25% high in NfCC; 21.4% high in PDI-
R). It suggests that individuals with a propensity to jump to conclusions and need to shut 
down their cognitive decision-making as soon as possible are less likely to focus on the 
lack of evidence when informing their final verdict choice.  
Another interesting observation came from the persuasion sub-groups. QCA code 
401 depicts that the crux of the mock-juror’s verdict being based on the fact that the 
defendant as an individual is being charged, be it placing blame on him specifically 
(‘Because as managing director, he gets paid to take on the responsibility’ [MB1]) or 
using the fact that he is being indicted as an argument against prosecuting. For example, 
‘Even in the highest levels of management, a person does not necessarily make decisions 
on the day to day minute.  The 'leaker' of the delicate information is someone who had no 
previous record, criminal or otherwise, so how could the managing director predict what 
may or may not happen’ [FB6]. More than double the number of individuals fell within 
this category when there were not-persuaded (n = 7; 16.3%), compared to 9.5% (n = 2) 
persuaded mock-jurors. It seems that when mock-jurors develop their argument around 
their person at the heart of the prosecution case, it becomes harder to change their mind.  
Theme 2: References to the accused. 44.2% of those not-persuaded focused solely 
on the managing director as an individual when referencing their decision, with less than 
half of this number (20.9%) falling into the opposing category whereby they only reference 
the company as an entity. Interestingly, these results are almost flipped for the persuaded 
group: 23.8% falling into QCA code 501 whilst 42.9% fall into 502. This infers that 
persuaded individuals have a holistic overview of the case, referencing the company as an 
entity compared to non-persuaded individuals who perhaps have a more directed focus, 
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which corroborates the findings in Theme 1 post-questionnaire, whereby non-persuaded 
individuals were more likely to fall into QCA code 401.  
Theme 3: Reasoning for verdict choice. Ethnicity have similar patterns of 
distribution within this category. For example, exactly 25% of the South-Asian sample 
stated that a lack of evidence contributed to their decisions. Likewise, 25% of the British 
sample indicated the same reasoning. However, when gender was broken down, this 
showed a difference for QCA code 12. 40.6% of the male sample reasoned that a lack of 
evidence led to their decision, ‘I would say it is, more specifically, lack of evidence. It 
seems unwise to assume guilty when there isn't enough evidence to say to the contrary’ 
[MB3]. However, only 9.4% of the female sample (n = 3) used this argument. Compared to 
the pre-questionnaire question which asks the same thing, males increased their argument 
for this QCA code, indicating that the jury discussion with a female confederate (whether 
persuaded or not) led to men relying further on the lack of evidence presented, in 
comparison to the females interacting with a male confederate, despite the same arguments 
being presented by all confederate mock-jurors.  
Theme 4: Attribution of responsibility. More than half of the mock-jurors high in 
the NfCC and delusional thinking attributed blame on the managing director or company. 
However, mock-jurors who did not have the same urge to reach a conclusion had a higher 
percentage of individuals attributing blame to others. For example, ‘Not all the defendant’s 
fault, their experts said they couldn’t have done anymore, the third party are all at fault’ 
[FB10]. It seems that mock-jurors who wish to reach a conclusion fast and achieve 
cognitive closure attribute blame to the ‘obvious’ candidate (i.e., the managing director 
being put on trial), whereas mock-jurors who score low on these measures instead put 
greater stock in discerning alternate blame.  
Theme 5: Persuasiveness of the confederate. 20.9% of mock-jurors who were not 
persuaded claimed the arguments presented (both during the jury discussion and the case 
  
174 
summary) were not directly relevant or were not strong enough to change their mind. 
18.6% of the not-persuaded mock-jurors conceded however that the confederate did say 
some persuasive points, but this was not enough to change their mind, ‘I do think that he 
made some good points, and used metaphor to good effect, but the persuasiveness was 
lessened by my impression that he hadn't distinguished between the facts of the case and 
what each of the defence and prosecution were arguing’ [MA16]. 57.1% of mock-jurors 
state that they were persuaded to change their decision as the confederate highlighted 
evidence that they had missed or challenged their viewpoint. For example, ‘They made 
some persuasive points in that they were looking at the case from a different perspective 
than I was, and so brought some things I hadn't thought about to the table. These things 
were enough to make me think the defendant was guilty’ [MB12].  
Theme 6: Communication during the discussion. Overall, the highest scoring 
categories for mock-jurors within this theme comprised of finding the CMC 
communication friendly and pleasant (26.6%) or failing to comment on the communication 
at all (26.6%). Intriguingly, a higher percentage of individuals not persuaded specified that 
they found the communication awkward (11.6%) or rigid and argumentative (18.6%): ‘It is 
a tough dialogue as we both had our points of view and were not willing to budge on those 
points of view’ [MB11]. This is in direct comparison to no-one in the persuaded mock-
juror group mentioning that the discussion was difficult, and only 14.3% claiming the 
communication was, at times, rigid. This mirrors the comments relating directly to the 
CMC modality, with more non-persuaded individuals commenting on the synthetic 
modality than those who were persuaded. Interestingly, there was an even split for the non-
persuaded mock-jurors between finding the communication easy and the environment 
positive (18.6%): ‘It wasn't hard at all. The chat is a very easy way to communicate. The 
discussion was dynamic. Plus, the Gmail chat was very similar to the Facebook one so I 
found myself in a "usual" environment’ [FA10] to mock-jurors commenting on how 
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difficult and frustrating they felt the medium was to discuss the case (18.6%) ‘The 
communication was generally slow, which made it kind of tedious’ [FB12]. This seems to 
appear across the IVs, with a fairly even split between positive and negative comments 
regarding the facilitation of a discussion using Google Hangouts.  
Theme 7: Additional comments. More than half of the participants did not provide 
any additionally comments (65.6%). Of those that did, 13.6% commented that they found 
the scenario realistic, and all of these were not persuaded to change their verdict. 13.6% 
commented that they wanted more time, whilst the same number commented that the study 
was too long and believed it was time-consuming.  
 
5.8.7   Computer confidence and average usage. To understand the baseline 
competency and confidence of the participant sample in their computer usage, and thus 
whether this might affect the results, a series of Mann-Whitney U tests were carried out on 
the subjective data concerning confidence self-ratings (measured on a Likert scale from 1 
completely, to 5 not at all), and how often the mock-jurors used a computer, on average per 
week (from 1: <10 hours, to 6:  >50 hours).  
The majority of mock-jurors were completely confident in their computer abilities 
(48.44%), with a mean rating of 1.92, whilst 11.1% of the sample rated their confidence in 
using computers as ‘lacking’, or ‘not at all’. The subjective ratings of confidence in 
computer abilities did not significantly differ for males and females; Gender U = 426.50, z 
= -1.03, p = .302, r = -.13, British and South-Asian; Ethnicity U = 427.00, z = -1.02, p = 
.305, r = -.13, and persuaded and non-persuaded groups, Persuasion U = 424.00, z = -.27, 
p = .789, r = -.03.     
The majority of mock-jurors indicated that they use a computer for at least 2 hours 
a day (with 79.4% of the sample stating they use a computer for more than 20 hours per 
week), with a mean rating of 4.12 (out of 6).  The subjective ratings for average weekly 
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computer usage did not significantly differ across Gender, U = 447.00, z = -.89, p = .373, r 
= -.11, Ethnicity, U = 450.00, z = -.85, p = .395, r = -.11, or Persuasion, U = 448.00, z = -
.05, p = .959, r <.01.  
 
5.8.8   Confederate mock-jurors. This section of results covers the confederate 
mock-juror analysis. Firstly, between-factor ANOVAs are used to analyse word count to 
examine any differences across the persuasion groups, as well as the confederates 
themselves. Secondly, ratings of the confederate mock-juror (made by the mock-jurors 
post-discussion) are analysed using non-parametric Mann Whitney U tests to help 
understand participant’s perception of the anonymous interaction.  
 
5.8.8.1   Word count (WC). To understand whether status (confederate or mock-
juror) varied in their contribution to the discussion and thus wrote more/less as a function 
of persuasion outcome, a 2 x 2 between-factor ANOVA was conducted. This revealed a 
non-significant effect for status, F (1, 124) = .20, p = .654. Persuasion was significant, 
confirming the differences in WC for the two outcomes for mock-jurors above, but is not 
of relevance here (p > .05). Furthermore, the persuasion x status interaction was non-
significant, F (1, 124) = .73, p = .40, indicating that neither the confederate nor the 
participant dominated the interactions and as a result, did not influence the persuasive 
outcomes. 
 
5.8.8.2   Social ratings of the confederate mock juror. Mock-jurors were asked to 
rate their jury partner on a Likert scale from 1-5 concerning how friendly, aggressive and 
sociable they perceived their interaction. Mann Whitney U tests were carried out for 
ethnicity, persuasion, and gender but all revealed non-significant results indicating no 




Table 5.7 (continued overleaf)  
Descriptive statistics and Mann Whitney U results for mock-jurors’ ratings of the 
confederate mock-juror, for ethnicity, gender and persuasion groups 
 
 Sociable 
 Median U z p r 
Ethnicity South-Asian = 2.0 
British = 3.0 
393.00 -1.69 .090 -.21 
Gender Male = 2.5 
Female = 3.0 
499.00 -.18 .853 -.02 
Persuasion Persuaded = 3.0 
Not persuaded = 3.0 
445.00 -.10 .922 -.01 
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Table 5.7 (continued)  
Descriptive statistics and Mann Whitney U results for mock-jurors’ ratings of the confederate mock-juror, for ethnicity, gender and persuasion groups 
  
 Friendliness Aggressiveness 




British = 3.0 
505.50 -.09 .927 -.01 
South-Asian = 
3.0 
British = 3.0 
487.00 -.39 .697 -.05 
Gender Male = 3.5 
Female = 3.0 
448.00 -.90 .368 -.11 Male = 3.0 
Female = 3.0 
509.00 -.05 .963 <.01 
Persuasion 
Persuaded = 3.0 
Not persuaded = 
3.0 
436.00 -.23 .816 -.03 
Persuaded = 3.0 
Not persuaded = 
3.0 





5.8.8.3   Physical perceptions of the confederate mock-juror. Given the anonymity 
of the jury interactions in this study, analysis of mock-jurors perceptions of their jury 
partner were obtained and evaluated. Across the entire sample contained within this study, 
64.06% of mock-jurors (n =41) perceived that the individual they were taking to was 
‘British’, as opposed to ‘Asian’ (17.19%), or ‘other’ ethnicity (18.75%). However, 
perception of gender was more evenly dispersed: ‘male’ (42.19%), ‘female’ (32.81%) and 
‘unsure’ (25%) categories of choice.   
  
5.8.9   Summary of results. The CMC modality found that more mock-jurors 
resisted persuasion compared to mock-jurors who were persuaded to change their verdict 
decision. Ethnic groups did not differ in persuasion outcomes, reflecting the overall sample 
distribution for persuasion. Furthermore, results show that males had a high degree of 
resistance (75%) whereas females had a much more even distribution regarding persuasion 
outcomes, albeit they too were marginally in favour of resistance at 59%. This disconnect 
between the genders was further highlighted when gender and ethnicity was broken down. 
Despite there being no significant differences in persuaded and non-persuaded outcomes 
across gender and ethnicity, figure 5.5 highlights that British females were 50:50 regarding 
their propensity to be persuaded but British males were at less than 20% for persuaded 
outcomes. South-Asian males and females on the other hand, had very similar 
distributions.  
Taken at face value, confidence in verdict choices illustrate how those who were 
persuaded had lower confidence in their initial verdict choice (the inferential test almost 
reaching significance). At post-discussion, the non-persuaded mock-jurors increase their 
confidence further still, with there being a significant difference of over 20% between both 
persuaded and non-persuaded groups. However, when absolute confidence change was 
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calculated, the change in mock-jurors’ confidence was found to be lower for non-
persuaded mock-jurors, with persuaded participants having an average of 26% change in 
confidence rating despite changing their verdict, and this was generally in an upward 
direction. 
Interestingly, the only significant finding regarding cognitive style came from 
comparisons across the ethnic groups, revealing a significant difference in delusional 
thinking scores. Here, South-Asian mock-jurors were higher in delusional thinking 
compared to the British sample. In addition, ethnic groups differed on duration of 
discussion, with South-Asian mock-jurors making their decisions faster, and speaking 
almost half the number of words compared to British mock-jurors. Ethnicity was not the 
only significant finding however, as non-persuaded individuals spoke for longer and used 
more words during the discussion when compared against successfully persuaded 
interactions.  
Gender and cognitive style produced similarities relating to linguistic style, 
measured through the ten themes in LIWC. Ethnicity highlighted differences however, 
with South-Asian mock-jurors having a higher degree of affective language in their speech, 
which was more informal than the British sample. Furthermore, analysis on persuasion 
revealed greater use of cognitive processing and informal exchanges for persuaded 
individuals. These linguistic style results were not affected when word count was 
controlled.  
Confidence in speech, measured using the epistemic modality dictionary in LIWC, 
revealed a small effect for persuasion: persuaded mock-jurors used more low confidence 
words in their verbal output compared to non-persuaded mock-jurors. Linguistic style 
matching (LSM) showed no differences in the synchronicity of speech across persuaded 
groups, nor did LSM differ over the duration of the jury discussion. 
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Qualitative analysis of mock-juror responses both before and after the jury 
discussion were taken and interpreted in line with the codebook covering the entirety of 
this thesis. Pre-questionnaire analysis revealed that non-persuaded individuals tended to 
use the prosecution and defence’s arguments, whereas persuaded mock-jurors utilised the 
background information which lacked clear evidence or arguments which could reliably 
contribute towards an informed opinion. There were no differences regarding reasoning of 
verdict choice across the persuaded groups. Interestingly however, non-persuaded 
individuals were more likely to ignore evidence due to a perceived lack of credibility, 
indicating a systematic route to processing whereas persuaded individuals failed to 
acknowledge reference to the strength of evidence, rather choosing to ignore certain facts 
because they were ‘irrelevant’.  
Post-discussion, non-persuaded mock-jurors were twice as likely to rely on the fact 
that an individual is being charged and is at the centre of this investigation compared to 
mock-jurors who were persuaded to change their mind. This resistance to persuasion may 
be due to a focus being established as to the individual in question, which is further 
supported by the use of references in response to the questions. Individuals who do not 
have the propensity to reach a fast conclusion (low in cognitive style) were more open to 
alternate explanations, thus attributing responsibility to a number of different individuals. 
This is in comparison to those high in these measures, who were much more likely to 
attribute blame to the individual (managing director) in question. 1 in 5 mock-jurors who 
weren’t persuaded stated they failed to change their mind because the evidence was not 
strong enough during the discussion. Furthermore, it seems that mock-jurors were split in 
their response to the CMC modality, describing it as both ‘dynamic’ and ‘positive’, but 
also ‘slow’ and ‘tedious’.  
Finally, given the anonymity of the environment, analysis was conducted as to 
mock-jurors attitudes towards their anonymous jury partners. Mock-jurors across ethnic, 
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gender and persuasion divides did not differ in their ratings of friendliness, aggressiveness 
and sociability of their confederate mock-juror. There was a propensity for all mock-jurors 
to state they were talking to another participant who was of British ethnicity, which is 
perhaps not so surprising given the research was carried out in Britain, with a British 
researcher.  
 
5.9   Discussion  
Persuasion can occur positively or negatively, that is a persuasive argument can 
have a positive effect on the receiver whereby they accept, process, and adopt the proposed 
attitude, belief, or decision. Alternatively, a persuasive message can have a negative effect 
in that the receiver deliberately, and as a direct consequence of the arguments, strengthens 
and increases an opposing attitude. This research has highlighted that computer-mediated 
communication (CMC) leads to enhanced resistance to persuasive messages when the 
environment is synchronous and anonymous. However, it is male persuasion that resulted 
in the significant yet negative result. In other words, males were significantly more likely 
to resist persuasion than change their verdict. Thus, these findings fail to support the first 
hypothesis made in this chapter.   
Kimbrough, Guadagno, Muscanell, and Dill (2013) claim that women are more 
frequent users of social media, using text-based platforms to a higher extent that do males. 
Despite this, gender differences have continued within such synthetic mediums. For 
example, women tend to engage in communal activities inside synthetic environments, 
despite having the ability to behave and chose as they wish. Seemingly, men and women 
behave in a way that is consistent with social and gender expectations despite having free 
choice to act as they choose. This suggests that resistance seen within males demonstrates 
a level of dominance and competition compared to females, who still wish to form a bond 
or relationship with their anonymous communication partner and are thus less likely to 
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challenge and resist persuasive attempts in comparison (Fox, Bukatko, Hallahan, & 
Crawford, 2016; Guadagno & Cialdini, 2002; 2007). Future research should seek to 
investigate whether non-anonymous interactions in this modality would lead to similar 
effects.  
Further evidence supporting the resistance to persuasive messages in this medium 
comes from confidence in verdict choices. Here, non-persuaded mock-jurors had higher 
confidence in their verdicts pre-, and post-discussion compared to persuaded mock-jurors. 
It is this certainty in opinion which has been found to increase resistance and act as a 
crystallising agent: improving permanence and impact (better known as the crystallisation 
hypothesis; Clarkson, Tormala, & Rucker, 2008). Research has linked this hypothesis with 
varying attitudes such as greater resistance to persuasion (Babad, Ariav, Rosen, & 
Salomon, 1987; Tormala & Petty, 2002) and a reduced need to process information 
(Maheswaran & Chaiken, 1991). These findings support the work of Tormala, Clarkson, 
and Petty (2006) who manipulated attitude certainty and found that as certainty increased, 
attitudes became increasingly predictive of behavioural intentions and consequently, 
resistant to subsequent attack.  
In addition to persuaded mock-jurors having lower confidence in their verdict 
choice, persuaded mock-jurors also expressed lower confidence during the discussion, as 
measured using LIWC software. This increased expression of doubt and uncertainty 
follows from London et al.’s (1970a) findings whereby the persuadee expressed more 
doubt in their speech than persuaders. It highlights the doubt persuaded mock-jurors had in 
their initial verdict may have contributed to confederate mock-jurors having a slightly 
easier job at persuading such individuals to change their verdict during the online 
synchronous chat. Decisions made under uncertainty often result in a lack of confidence in 
these initial choices and inevitably lead to individuals seeking advice from other sources; 
in this case, the confederate mock-juror. The greater one’s uncertainty, the greater the 
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increase in susceptibility to the confidence heuristic (Wesson, 2005), and this is supported 
by the current findings regarding low confidence in speech and persuaded outcomes.  
An interesting finding emerged for ethnic groups, whereby South-Asian mock-
jurors scored higher on the delusional thinking scale (PDI-R; Peters et al., 2004) than 
British participants. A high score on this measure indicates a propensity to reach a 
conclusion fast and jump to conclusions (Freeman et al., 2008). Furthermore, a jumping to 
conclusions bias is associated with the premature termination of data collection as 
individuals display a hyper-salience of hypothesis-evidence matching (Speechley, 
Whitman, & Woodward, 2010). This data-gathering bias emphasises how individuals high 
in delusional thinking seek less information and have an impulsive tendency to terminate 
evidence collection (Garety & Freeman, 1999). This is further supported by the current 
findings showing South-Asian mock-jurors having, on average, a shorter duration of 
discussion than the British mock-jurors, as well as speaking for half the time. This 
difference in the ethnic groups however does not directly influence persuasive outcomes, 
supporting hypothesis two and providing credence to previous research finding no 
interaction effects for culture and communication medium (Reinig & Mejias, 2004; 
Stewart, Setlock, & Fussell, 2007).  
To the extent that the preponderance of arguments is both novel and persuasive, a 
change in attitude in relation to the dominant position will occur. This is known as the 
persuasive arguments theory (PAT; Burnstein, 1982; Vinokur & Burnstein, 1974) and has 
been found to occur both when arguments are manipulated (Silverthorne, 1971) and when 
they freely occur (Ebbesen & Bowers, 1974). This theory is partially supported by the 
qualitative comments provided by mock-jurors post-discussion comments, showing that 
over half of the persuaded mock-jurors changed their verdict due to the confederate mock-
juror challenging their initial viewpoint and/or highlighting evidence that they themselves 
had initially missed. Exposure to arguments that have not been considered can influence 
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the persuasive impact these arguments will have on decision outcomes. Informational 
influence (acceptance of another’s evidence about reality; Deutsch & Gerard, 1955) is 
thought to be at its peak when it is emphasised that an answer, the ‘correct’ answer, is 
needed and when the discussion itself enables elaboration of novel and credible arguments 
(McGuire, Kiesler, & Siegel, 1987). Thus, the extent that the CMC enables arguments to 
be aired that are deemed both credible and novel contribute to a shift in opinion, with dual-
process models of persuasion indicating this process takes the systematic route whereby 
individual’s weigh up the quality of the arguments presented rather than relying on biases 
that can contribute to a heuristic route to processing information (Di Blasio & Milani, 
2008; Guadagno & Cialdini, 2007).   
 CMC is considered a lean form of communication; the current online environment 
is socially constrained and has the inability to exchange verbal, social and paralinguistic 
cues. The context enabled mock-jurors to be anonymous when communicating, perhaps 
meaning that a change in verdict was down to the persuasiveness of the arguments 
presented (Chaiken & Eagly, 1983). With motivation and interest in the subject being 
equal, it is argued that the absence of such distractors as social stimuli and non-verbal 
intonation means that individuals employ careful and logical reasoning and are thus more 
likely to take the central and systematic route to processing information (DiBlasio & 
Milani, 2008). This can in turn lead to reduced persuasion if the arguments lack validation 
or do not stand up to scrutiny. For example, information shared online in an anonymous 
way has been shown to lose credibility (Dennis, 1996) and have less influence on the 
shifting of opinions not only when the participant themselves are anonymous (McLeod, 
2000) but also when their communication partners are anonymous (Haines, Hough, Cao, & 
Haines 2014; Sassenberg & Postmes, 2002).  
 The LIWC analysis revealed that the persuaded group had a larger frequency of 
cognitive processing and informal language when compared directly to the non-persuaded 
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groups. The impact is difficult to interpret within the bounds of the current research but it 
suggests that the persuaded group were involved in more effortful processing of the 
persuasive message. Socially, the increase in informality for persuaded interactions 
suggests that the social interaction flowed better and could be considered as more easy 
going. This is evidenced in previous research, which has reported that obscenity in speech 
significantly increases the impact of the persuasive message as well as the intensity of the 
speaker (Scherer & Sagarin, 2006), which has also been found to carry over into the online 
space (Cavazza, & Guidetti, 2014; Jay & Janschewitz, 2008).  
The research reported in this chapter serves to expand on the use of CMC for 
understanding persuasion (previous research having primarily focused on asynchronous 
and artificial CMC environments) by utilising a real-time communication context akin to 
current social media platforms. This research supports the notion that CMC is a lean media 
context despite modern advances in synchronicity and emoticons - impeding persuasive 
appeals. Given the increasing ways in which individuals can now interact online, it is 
appropriate to expand the context still further. Accordingly, Study 3 investigates 
persuasion in VR, with mock-jurors interacting in a space suspended in reality (neither 





Chapter Six:  The Virtual Reality Modality (Study 3) 
 
6.1   Introduction 
  Virtual reality environments (VREs) are increasing in popularity and offer novel 
contexts within which to investigate human cognition. Research using immersive 
technology is being conducted in increasingly diverse fields, resulting in positive results 
for efficiency and accuracy of performances in the real-world (Dando & Tranter, 2016; 
Suh & Prophet, 2018). This can range from individuals experiencing high-pressure 
situations in a realistic yet risk-free way (Wilson, 2008), modelling threats in order to 
improve real-world resilience (Rizzo, et al., 2011; Wang, Tsai, & Chien, 2012), coaching 
individuals in cognitive coping strategies (Difede et al., 2007; Rizzo et al., 2013a; Rizzo et 
al., 2013b; Rizzo, Hartholt, Grimani, Leeds, & Liewer, 2014), training techniques for job-
related sills such as investigative training and surgery techniques (Kuykendall, 2010; 
Teteris, Fraser, Wright, & McLaughlin, 2012), and recreation of virtual crime scenes for 
use in courtroom testimony (Bailenson et al., 2006).  
Dando and Tranter (2015) have argued that the advancement of such technology 
offers opportunities for psychological researchers to understand a broad range of social 
cognitive behaviours outside of the traditional FtF contexts. Recently, Taylor and Dando 
(2018) began to investigate the role of social cognition using immersive technology for 
information-gathering purposes. They demonstrated how an interactive and immersive 
VRE can serve to increase eyewitness memory and reduce retrieval errors when 
communicating using avatar-to-avatar communication.    
Gender has begun to be investigated regarding its influences on attitude change 
using VR.  Guadagno, Blascovich, Bailenson, and McCall (2007) found evidence of 
gender in-group favouritism when individuals interacted using avatars. This effect was 
greater for women, who displayed enhanced opinion change as a result of interacting with 
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the same gendered avatar. This provides a good example of how gender differences 
diverge across multiple digital modalities. Nevertheless, research into gender differences in 
DMs, especially VR is extremely limited, and so little is understood about gender 
interactions and behaviours in synthetic environments. Nevertheless, Second Life 
platforms have recorded gender traditional behaviours where females appear to engage in 
more communal activities than males (Guadagno, Muscanell, Okdie, Burk, & Ward, 2011). 
Furthermore, Palomares and Lee (2010) found women were more apologetic and tentative 
when communicating through a female avatar compared to gender mismatched avatars, 
which were reported to lead to counter-typical language. 
Jensen, Farnham, Drucker, and Kollock (1999) found that having the ability to hear 
someone’s voice increased levels of cooperation. They posited this was due to participant’s 
perception of social proximity. Additionally, Zanbaka, Goolkasian, and Hodges (2006) 
revealed that virtual characters with human voices were just as effective at changing 
attitudes as real people. Furthermore, they found gender interactions occurred in a similar 
pattern to a real-world study. In order to expand on the current studies and facilitate an 
increased sense of presence within the VRE, a headset is used in the current VRE enabling 
direct conversations to take place in real-time, whilst keeping participants physically 
anonymous, interacting through customisable avatars. As a result of implementing voice-
enabled communication, it is hypothesised that persuasion will occur more often in females 
due to an increased level of media richness and social proximity (compared to Study 2 for 
example). In other words, it is thought that this modality will enable females to utilise 
paralinguistic cues and develop communal bonds with their jury partner in real time, thus 
leading to increased persuadability inside of the VRE compared to males.  
A significant requirement when using VREs to study phenomena attributable to the 
real world is the ability for participants to experience immersion and a sense of presence 
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within the synthetic modality. Presence, in this context, referring to the psychological 
sense of being somewhere other than your physical body (Draper, Kaber, & Usher 1998). 
Four factors are thought to underlie the concept of presence. These include control, 
sensory, distraction and realism and together, these capture a person’s feeling of existing 
within a VRE (Witmer, Jerome, & Singer, 2005). Presence needs to be substantial in order 
to elicit realistic responses and behaviour in the subjects of interest. As a result, a measure 
of presence (PQ; Witmer & Singer, 1988) is administered in the current study to accurately 
capture participant’s sense of presence and realism, thus adding credence to any results 
captured. It has been postulated that higher degrees of presence effects depth of processing, 
enabling individuals to process information affectively, implicitly and heuristically 
(Grigorovici, 2003). If this holds, then arguments offered in a highly present environment 
could facilitate processing via the peripheral and heuristic route (Chaiken, Liberman, & 
Eagly, 1989; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986b).  
Lee (2014) commented that there is a significant underrepresentation of non-white 
avatars online. This could in part be due to the research favouring Caucasian participant 
samples and/or a lack of technological ability to truly represent racial minorities. The 
current research therefore supports participant’s ability to customise their avatar, which in 
turn enhances the richness and presence of the environment which could potentially 
contribute to the decision-making process. In this thesis, a strict focus is placed on 
immersive and collaborative VR, whereby the VRE is centred through the eyes of an 
avatar. Thus, corresponding movements in reality results in the appropriate changes to 
fields of vision to reflect the direction of gaze. This allows for a realistic VR experience. 
Given that the purpose of the paradigm is to persuade the participant, and high degrees of 
presence is assumed to increase human performance (Bombari, Schmid Mast, Canadas, & 
Bachmann, 2015), it reasonable to expect that a VRE with a high degree of presence will 





In summary, two predictions are made for this experimental study which emerge from the 
existing research literature: 
1) Females will have increased persuadability compared to males; 
2) The immersive and collaborative VRE will result in high levels of presence and 
persuasion outcomes. As a result, more participants will be persuaded than not. 
 
6.2   Method 
 
6.2.1   Participants. Sixty-seven participants took part in the current study: 17 
British males, 16 British females, 17 South-Asian males, and 17 South-Asian females. Of 
the British sample, 84.85% (N = 28) classified their ethnicity as English, 1 (3.03%) as 
Irish, 1 as Welsh (3.03%), and 3 declined to comment (9.09%) but stated their parents were 
born and raised in Britain. 64.70% of the South-Asian sample stated their ethnicity as 
Pakistani (N = 22), 11.76% (4) as Bangladeshi, 11.75% (4) as Indian, 2.94% (1) as 
Afghani, and 8.82% (3) declined to comment but stated their parents were born and raised 
in South-Asia. Ages ranged from 18 to 43, with a mean age of 22.53 years (SD = 5.22).  
This study consisted of 8 confederate mock-jurors (4 British females, 2 British 
males, 1 South-Asian male, and 1 South-Asian female), with a mean age of 21.25 (SD = 
2.12). Participants and confederates were recruited using opportunity and snowball 
sampling in the West Midland and London areas, and attended the University of 
Wolverhampton or the University of Westminster for the research. Participants were given 
the choice between receiving course credits (if they were studying psychology) or being 
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paid £10.00 for their time. The confederate mock-jurors were paid £5 per mock juror for 
participating in the research.  
 
6.2.2   Materials and procedure. Now follows information on the materials and 
procedures that differ to the procedures outlined in Study 1. As in the previous two studies, 
this study uses the same JM paradigm. 
 
6.2.2.1   The visual headset. The head-mounted display (HMD) was an Oculus Rift 
Development Kit 2 (DK2) headset. It had a resolution of 960 x 1080 per eye and a refresh 
rate of up to 60 Hz. In addition, it had a low persistence OLED display, comprising a 100º 
field of view which increased presence and eliminated motion blur and judder; two of the 
biggest contributors to simulator motion sickness (Shafer, Carbonara, & Korpi, 2017). 
Precise, low-latency positional tracking used near infrared CMOS sensor to track real-
world head movements and facilitated a full 360 º viewing direction if required. Adjustable 
eye pieces meant that individuals wearing prescription glasses were additionally able to 
wear the HMD without discomfort or a reduction in visual quality (See Figure 6.1).  
 
 




6.2.2.2   The audio headset. A Cooler Master Ceres-300 gaming headset was used. 
The detachable omni-directional microphone captured real-time sound as individuals 
conversed, whilst 40mm drivers were utilised to transmit noise-cancelling immersive audio 
between the participants and researchers. An in-line remote allowed adjustment of volume 
for audio customisation. Previous uses of multi- modal VR systems which include realistic 
sound have been shown to result in higher presence (Taffou, Chapoulie, Guerchouche, 
Drettakis, & Viaud-Delmon, 2012).  
 
6.2.2.3   The virtual reality environment (VRE). Once participants had read the 
case summary and completed the pre-questionnaire they were fitted with the HMD; the 
researcher adjusting the fitting of the headset and calibrating the participant’s vision. The 
bespoke virtual environment was designed and customised specifically for this research 
using Unreal Engine 4 software, displayed on Intel Core i7-4720HQ, 2.60GHz CPU 
Windows 8.1, 64-bit NVIDIA GeForce GTX 980M Graphics Card, 16.0 GB of RAM 250 
GB SSD laptops (three in total: one each for the participant, confederate and researcher). 
Once wearing the HMD, participants were asked to customise their avatar. This 
included choices of gender, hair, shirt and skin colour. The HMD enabled participants to 
move their head to see and control the mouse cursor, whilst the keyboard facilitated the 
Figure 6.2.  Participant’s view of the avatar customization selection panel. 
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selection of their choices (see figure 6.2). Once a selection had been made, the participant 
then entered into the VRE. The immersive and collaborative VRE comprises of a single 




The avatars were positioned on the chairs, facing opposite each other around the 
table. This is a stationary position, so participants could not move from the table. The field 
of vision is created through the eyes of their custom avatar, allowing participants to see 
their own body if they look down to their lap but not their current facial features. Both the 
participant and the confederate can only see each other using the HMD, whilst the VRE 
enables the researcher to view the entire environment (Figure 6.3) on a separate ‘control’ 
computer. The confederate and the participant did not meet each other physically until 














Once both the participant and confederate were inside the VRE (see figure 6.4), the 
researcher explained how the discussion (see researcher instruction script in Appendix D) 
would work, through the audio headset. All discussions were audio and video recorded 
from the researcher’s ‘control’ computer.  
 
 
Figure 6.4. Confederate (left) and Participant (right) inside the VRE, discussing the JM 
paradigm.  
 
6.2.2.4    The presence questionnaire (PQ). A multifaceted measure of presence 
was administered to enable the researcher to quantity the extent to which participants felt 
immersed within the VRE and how likely they were to ‘forget’ real-world stimuli. The 
Presence Questionnaire (PQ) created by Witmer and Singer (1988) consists of 32 self-
report items, asking participants to comment on their perceptions, involvement and 
interactions with the VRE, as well as how quickly they adjusted to the VR experience. The 
scale includes four sub-factors: involvement, adaption/immersion, sensory fidelity and 
interface quality (Witmer, Jerome & Singer, 2005) and has been shown to be highly 
internally consistent with high reliability scores (Witmer & Singer, 1988).  
The VRE within this study did not permit individuals to touch, manipulate or 
interact with objects within the environment, nor did it require the use of any control 
devices. Therefore, an adapted measure of the PQ scale was used, excluding unrelated 
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questions and resulting in a total of 25 self-report items. These were measured on a Likert 
scale ranging from 1-7, with a total presence score (after adjusting for the reverse score 
items) resulting in a possible range between 25-175. The scale is provided in Appendix O.  
 
  6.2.2.5   Simulator sickness. VREs can cause symptoms of motion sickness if 
inconsistent body orientation clashes with the motion received from the HMD (see cue 
conflict theory; Kolasinski, 1995). This is minimised in the current study due to 
participants sitting down both physically and virtually for the entirety of the research 
study. Nevertheless, to ensure that the current VRE environment did not cause any adverse 
side-effects for participants, a simulator sickness questionnaire was administered prior to, 
and after the VRE to monitor for symptoms such as nausea, headaches, dizziness and 
severe disorientation which have the potential to impact on social cognition.  
6.2.2.5.1   The pre-simulator sickness questionnaire (pre-SSQ). Individual 
differences are known to influence the severity of sickness felt inside a simulation. For 
example, individuals with a history of motion sickness, current illnesses such as the flu, 
fatigue, and alcohol consumption (being hungover) have all been found to increase the risk 
of sickness (Stanney & Kennedy, 2009; Stanney, Kingdon, Graeber, & Kennedy, 2002). 
Therefore, to measure a participant risk and enable a baseline analysis of the simulator 
sickness to take place, a pre-SSQ measure was utilised prior to exposure of the VRE. This 
measure was first administered by Reed-Jones (2011; see Appendix P).  
Just over 31% of mock-jurors stated that they had a history of motion sickness. 
5.7% of the mock-jurors self-reported they were currently hungover, whilst 9.4% stated 
they were feeling unwell at the start of the research. Individuals who indicated that they 
felt unwell or had a history of motion sickness were advised they may face an increased 
risk of simulator sickness and were given the choice to stop the study without penalty (no 
participants chose to do this). These questions allowed for analysis of scores obtained from 
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the SSQ to be representative of the VRE immersion, rather than any propensity to 
simulator sickness.  
6.2.2.5.2   The simulator sickness questionnaire (SSQ). The SSQ (Kennedy, Lane, 
Berhaum & Lilienthal, 1993) is considered ‘the gold standard for measuring simulator 
sickness’ (Johnson, 2005, p. 29) and comprises 16 self-report questions, using a Likert 
scale from 0 (none) to 3 (severe; see Appendix Q1). The scale provides scores for the total 
severity of sickness (Ts), as well as the three subscales that make up the Ts; consisting of 
nausea (N), oculomotor discomfort (O) and disorientation (D). Table 6.1 contains the 
scoring procedure for the SSQ, whilst Appendix Q2 outlines an example of the SSQ 
worksheet. Here, all scores have a low range score of zero highlighting no reported 
symptoms. Across the total and subscale scores, a higher value represents a higher level of 
simulator sickness symptoms experienced by the participant. 
 
Table 6.1 
SSQ Scoring Procedure  






General discomfort 1 1  
Fatigue  1  
Headache  1  
Eye strain  1  
Difficulty focussing  1 1 
Increased salivation 1   
Sweating 1   
Nausea 1  1 
Difficulty concentrating 1 1  
Fullness of head   1 
Blurred vision  1 1 
Dizzy (eyes open)   1 
  
197 
Dizzy (eyes closed)   1 
Vertigo   1 
Stomach awareness 1   
Burping 
 
1   
Total severity (Ts) [1] [2] [3] 
Weights: N = 9.54, O = 7.58, D = 13.92, Ts = 3.74 
 
N = [1] * 9.54  
O = [2] * 7.58  
D = [3] * 13.92  
Ts = ([1] + [2] + [3]) * 3.74  
 
    6.2.2.6    Demographic questionnaire. In addition to the demographic questions 
outlined in Chapter 3 and administered to previous participants in Studies 1 and 2, further 
questions were asked in Study 3. Some items were designed to screen participants’ in 
terms of their capacity to use the VR technology (problems with vision or hearing). If any 
issues arose which were not able to be corrected (eg, wearing glasses), they were given the 
opportunity to try the VRE and stop their participation if they felt they could not interact 
comfortably (either visually or aurally). Only 1 person stated they had issues with their 
eyes which hadn’t been corrected but this did not cause issue with their interaction with the 
VR equipment, and they voluntarily completed the study.  
 Additional data capture questions included the types of video games played and 
how often participants spend gaming/using a computer per week. This allowed the 
researcher to gauge the ease and experience at which participants used such technology 
(See Appendix R).   
 




6.3.1   Mock-juror persuasion. Nearly double the amount of mock-jurors changed 
their verdict (n = 44; 66%) compared to those who resisted persuasion (n = 23, 34%).  
 
6.3.1.1   Ethnicity and persuasion. To understand further if ethnicity affected the 
persuasion outcome reported above, a test for independence chi-square was conducted. 
This revealed a non-significant effect, !"(1) = .12, p = .730. Descriptive analyses show a 
higher frequency of South-Asian mock-jurors being persuaded (n = 23) than not persuaded 
(n = 11), and this distribution mirrors the British mock-jurors (n = 21 v. 12; see Figure 
6.5).  
 
Figure 6.5 showing Persuasion broken down into Ethnic groups, compare to the overall 
VR sample (n = 67).  
 
6.3.1.2   Gender and persuasion. A chi-square test for independence revealed an overall 
non-significant result of gender, !"(1) = .47, p = .494. Females (n = 23) and males (n = 21) 
were more persuaded than not (female n = 10; male n = 13) but the distribution across the 
































Figure 6.6.   Percentage of persuasion broken down by gender groups, compared to the 
overall sample (n = 67). 
 
 
6.3.1.3   Ethnicity, gender and persuasion. Two chi-square tests for independence 
were conducted on persuaded and not-persuaded samples to investigate gender and 
ethnicity. These revealed non-significant effects for both persuaded, !"(1) = .38, p = .537, 
and non-persuaded groups, !"(1) = 1.05, p = .305 (see Figure 6.7).  
 
























































6.3.2   Confidence in verdict choice. A comparison of pre- and post-confidence of 
verdict choice was investigated using a series of between-factor ANOVAs for ethnicity, 
persuasion and gender across the two time points (see Table 6.2). The ANOVAs show that 
none of the groups significantly differed in their confidence levels either before, or after 






Table 6.2  
Descriptive and inferential statistics for pre- and post-confidence in verdict across three 
variables 
Factor Levels 
Pre-Discussion (%) Post-Discussion (%) 
M SD F p M SD F p 
Persuasion 





Persuaded 71.74 20.37 80.87 22.8 
Gender 




Female 67.50 15.86 77.73 23.55 
Ethnicity  





Asian 69.85 18.24 74.26 22.60 




6.3.2.1   Percentage change in confidence of verdict choice. Once the percentage 
change scores for confidence were converted (as outlined previously in Chapter 3), 
ANOVAs revealed non-significant Gender, F (1, 63) = .95, p = .334, Ethnic, F (1, 63) = 
.23, p = .587, PDI-R high or low, F (1, 30) = .16, p = .688, and NfCC high or low, F (1, 
30) = .53, p = .472 effects. Persuasion produced a significant result for Levene’s statistic (p 
> .05) and so the Welch’s F was utilised. This revealed a significant difference in 
percentage change scores, Welch’s F (1, 61.26) = 39.19, p < .001, ηp2 = .57, 95% CI 
[26.17, 38.29]. Mock-jurors who were persuaded had an average mean change score of 
42.50% (SD = 22.69, 95% CI [35.43, 49.57]) whereas those who were not persuaded had 
an average change score of 13.48% (SD = 3.04, 95% CI [7.18, 19.78]).  
 Further analysis was conducted to investigate whether this difference in confidence 
change between the persuaded groups was positive or negative in direction (thus whether 
individuals increased or decreased in confidence overall). Due to low expected cell 
frequencies (< 5), and contingency table being larger than 2x2, a Fisher-Freeman-Halton 
test was performed. This resulted in a significant association for persuasion and direction 
of absolute confidence change, !" (2) = 20.73, p < .001, φ. = .56.  
To understand at which level the significant association exists, the data was further 
broken down, and standardised residuals were calculated and analysed (see Table 6.3). 
These revealed significant effects for absolute confidence in verdict choice on persuasion; 
that is, those individuals who were persuaded were significantly less likely to have no 
change in confidence, whereas those not persuaded were significantly more likely to have 
no change. There was no significant effect in decreased or increased confidence for 





A 3x2 contingency table containing frequency data (n) and standardised residuals (z) for 
persuasion and direction of confidence  
    Direction of absolute confidence in verdict choice  
    Increased Decreased No Change 
Persuaded 
N 37 4 1 
z 1.2 0.1 -2.4* 
Not Persuaded 
N 10 2 11 
z -1.6 0.1 3.3** 
Note. *p < .05, **p < .001 
 
6.3.3   Mock-juror cognitive style. Cognitive style consists of delusional thinking 
(PDI-R) and the need for cognitive closure (NfCC) (see Table 6.4). All inferential results 
revealed non-significant effects across persuasion and gender (p > .05), except for 
delusional thinking and ethnicity. Here, South-Asian mock-jurors scored significantly 
higher on delusional thinking than British mock-jurors. Spearman’s rho correlational 
analysis was conducted on the total scores for each cognitive scale and revealed a non-
significant relationship between the two measures, r = .22, p = .08.  
 
Table 6.4 
Summary descriptives and ANOVA analyses of the total PDI-R and NfCC scores as a 
function of Gender, Ethnicity and Persuasion 
  NfCC PDI-R 
Factor Level M SD F p M SD F p 




 Female 155.03 16.42 62.70 47.47 
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154.47 17.05 73.68 42.92 







150.26 15.92 59.09 59.09 
 
 
6.3.3.1   High or low on cognitive style.  The distribution of PDI-R scores for 
mock-jurors ranged from 0-219, with an overall mean across the entire sample of 56.30 
(SD = 41.48). Seventeen mock-jurors from the overall sample were classified as low in 
their delusional thinking, falling within the lowest quartile of total PDI-R scores (= or < 
23; M = 15.00, SD = 5.77). Sixteen mock-jurors were categorised as high in delusional 
thinking scoring equal to, or more than 81 on the PDI-R scale (M = 113.19, SD = 38.26).   
NfCC total scores ranged from 117-195, with a mean average of 152.12 (SD = 
16.73). Sixteen mock-jurors fell within the top quartile of scores (= or > 163) and were 
classified as high on their NfCC (M = 173.94, SD = 8.22, while 18 fell in the lowest 
quartile and were thus considered as low in their NfCC (= or < 142; M = 131.67; SD = 
7.54).  
Univariate ANOVAs were conducted on the categories described; the aim being to 
investigate the differences between mock-jurors scoring high or low on cognitive style 
across duration and pre- and post-confidence in verdict choices. Chi-square analyses were 
also conducted on high or low cognitive style, and persuasion. The results of these 
statistical analyses can be seen in Table 6.5 - The key finding being that mock-jurors who 
scored high on PDI-R also had a higher pre-discussion confidence in their verdict 
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compared to those who scored low in delusional thinking, who had significantly lower 
confidence in their initial verdict choice.  
 
Table 6.5 
Descriptive and inferential statistics for mock-jurors scoring high or low in cognitive style, 
for Duration of discussion, Pre- and Post-confidence in verdicts, and Persuasion 
Note P = persuaded, NP = not-persuaded.  
 
6.3.4   Duration of jury discussion. The average length of the jury discussions was 
501.45 seconds (SD = 379.02). A univariate ANOVA revealed a significant difference, F 




PDI-R       
 Duration M =  645.25 
SD =  568.36 
M = 423.29 
SD = 186.53 
F = 2.33 .137 ηp2 = .26 
 Pre-
Confidence 
M = 76.56 
SD = 21.35 
M = 61.76 
SD = 12.86 
F = 5.90 .021 ηp2 = .40 
 Post-
Confidence 
M = 73.44 
SD = 26.56 
M = 73.53 
SD = 24.16 
F <.01 .992 ηp2 <.001 
 Persuasion n P =   8 
n NP = 8 
N P = 11 
 N NP = 6 
χ2 = .73 .491 φ = .15 
 
NfCC 
      
 Duration M =  411.44 
SD =  378.98 
M = 533.72 
SD = 315.09 
F = 1.05 .312 ηp2 = .18 
 Pre-
Confidence 
M = 75.67 
SD = 15.45 
M = 68.06 
SD = 16.73 
F = 1.81 .188 ηp2 = .23 
 Post-
Confidence 
M = 73.75 
SD = 22.55 
M = 80.56 
SD = 13.71 
F = 1.16 .289 ηp2 = .19 
 Persuasion n P = 12 
n NP = 4 
N P = 11 
 N NP = 7 
χ2 = .75 .477 φ = .15 
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(1, 65) = 8.07, p = .006, ηp2 = .33, 95% CI [409.00, 593.90] whereby mock-jurors who 
were not persuaded had a longer jury discussion (M = 674.35, SD = 420.56, 95% CI 
[492.48, 856.21]) than those who were persuaded, (M = 411.07, SD = 325.05, 95% CI 
[312.24, 509.89]). No significant effects were found for Ethnicity, F (1, 65) = .01, p = .925, 
Gender, F (1, 65) = 1.82, p = .182, or cognitive style: PDI-R F (1, 31) = 2.00, p = .168, , 




6.3.5   Mock-juror linguistic analysis.  
6.3.5.1   Word count (WC). To investigate whether the amount of words spoken 
during the jury discussion differed across the variables of interest, univariate ANOVAs 
were analysed. Ethnicity, F (1, 65) = .62, p = .433, Gender, F (1, 65) = 3.57, p = .063, and 
Cognitive Style NfCC F (1, 32) = .94, p = .340, and PDI-R F (1, 31) = 2.25, p = .143, all 
produced non-significant results. However, WC for persuasion was significant, Welch’s F 
(1, 34.76) = 10.47, p = .003, ηp2 = .40, 95% CI [577.01, 885.01]. Non-persuaded mock-
jurors spoke almost double the amount of words throughout the discussion (M = 1081.09, 
SD = 697.73, 95% CI [779.37, 1382.81]), than mock-jurors who were persuaded (M = 
548.02, SD = 512.77, 95% CI [392.13, 703.92]). A linear regression revealed that 
persuasion accounts for 15% of the variation in WC, Adj. R2 = .15.  
 
6.3.5.2   LIWC categories.  To investigate language and its effect on ethnicity, 
persuasion and gender, a series of between-factor MANOVAs were conducted on the 10 
primary categories arising from the LIWC analysis. Non-significant multivariate effects 
were found for gender, Wilks’s Λ =.75, F (10, 56) = 1.86, p = .070, and persuasion, 
Wilks’s Λ = .76, F (10, 56) = 1.79, p = .083. However, ethnicity revealed a significant 
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multivariate effect for the primary LIWC categories, Wilks’s Λ = .55, F (10, 56) = 4.55, p 
<.001, ηp2 = .45. Follow-up between-factor ANOVAs (using Bonferroni’s correction) and 
their descriptive statistics are represented in Table 6.6, showing that analytic thinking, tone 
and affective language significantly differed across the ethnic groups. In particular, the 
South-Asian participants had higher affect and tone in their speech compared to the British 
participants, who had higher uses of analytical linguistic categories.  
 
Table 6.6  
Descriptive statistics and univariate main effects of linguistic categories for ethnicity (n = 
67) 
Linguistic Category 
Ethnicity  Inferential statistic  
Significance 
value Effect size 
British South-Asian F p ηp
2 
Analytical Thinking M = 11.75 SD = 6.23 
M = 5.89 
SD = 4.43 19.78 <.001 .23 
Clout  
M = 46.35 
SD = 17.45 
M = 46.67 
SD = 19.69 <.01 .944 <.001 
Authentic  
M = 32.70 
SD = 20.43 
M = 35.76 
SD = 25.42 .29 .589 <.01 
Tone 
M = 34.70 
SD = 22.55 
M = 54.13 
SD = 26.27 10.52 .002 .14 
Total Function 
words 
M = 61.90 
SD = 2.97 
M = 61.61 
SD = 4.12 .10 .749 <.01 
Affective processes 
M = 4.75 
SD = 1.64 
M = 6.25 
SD = 2.37 9.07 .004 .12 
Social processes 
M = 10.62 
SD = 11.91 
M = 2.41 
SD = 3.41 3.17 .080 .05 
Cognitive Processes 
M = 18.24 
SD = 2.61 
M = 20.13 




M = 5.75 
SD = 1.92 
M = 5.92 
SD = 1.89 .14 .711 <.01 
Informal Language  
M = 9.20 
SD = 4.48 
M = 9.00 
SD = 3.83 .04 .846 <.01 
Note. df = 1, 65.  
  
 
6.3.5.3   Confidence in linguistic style. Linguistic confidence (epistemic modality) 
was analysed using LIWC analysis, thus outputs express high and low confidence as a 
percentage of the total words within each discussion.  A 2 (Gender: male v female) x 2 
(Ethnicity: south-asian v british) x 2 (Persuasion: persuaded v not persuaded) between-
factor MANOVA was conducted on the two DVs being measured (high and low 
confidence in linguistic style). This revealed no significant multivariate main effects for 
Gender, Wilks’s Λ = .96, F (2, 58) = 1.11, p = .336, Ethnicity, Wilks’s Λ = .94, F (2, 58) = 
1.90, p = .159, and Persuasion, Wilks’s Λ = .92, F (2, 58) = 2.44, p = .096. Additionally, 
there were no significant interactions for Gender x Ethnicity, Wilks’s Λ = .92, F (2, 58) = 
2.41, p = .099, Gender x Persuasion, Wilks’s Λ = .97, F (2, 58) =  .86, p = .429, Ethnicity x 
Persuasion, Wilks’s Λ = .92, F (2, 58) =  2.67, p = .08, and no significant trilateral 
interaction for Gender x Ethnicity x Persuasion, Wilks’s Λ = .99, F (2, 58) =  .26, p = .77.  
 To understand the interaction between the dyadic pairings and persuasion, a further 
2 (Persuasion: persuaded v not persuaded) x 2 (Dyadic paring: mock-juror v confederate 
mock-juror) between-factor MANOVA was conducted on high and low epistemic 
modality. This revealed no significant differences in linguistic confidence for the Dyadic 
pairs, Wilks’s Λ = 1.00, F (2, 129) = .05, p = .95, and no significant interaction between 




6.3.5.4   Linguistic style matching (LSM). To understand the differences between 
persuasion groups on linguistic synchronicity, an independent t-test was conducted on the 
mean total LSM scores. This produced a non-significant effect, t (65) = -1.20, p = .236, d = 
.31 indicating that the LSM scores did not differ for persuasion.  
6.3.5.4.1   LSM over time. LSM was broken down into even quartiles for each 
individual jury discussion, which allows LSM to be calculated and compared, thus 
allowing a better understanding of the role synchronicity of language plays in persuasion. 
A 2 (Persuasion: persuaded v not persuaded) x 4 (Time: 1, 2, 3, 4) mixed-factor ANOVA 
revealed a non-significant main effect for Time, F (3, 195) = .32, p = .811. The main effect 
of persuasion was significant, F (1, 65) = 5.26, p = .025, ηp2 = .07, whereby LSM 
significantly differed for persuaded outcomes. Here, the synchronicity of linguistic style 
was lower for persuaded participants than for non-persuaded participants (M persuaded = 
.738, 95% CI [.71, .76]; M not persuaded = .786, 95% CI [.75, .82]). The persuasion X 
time interaction was also significant, F (3, 195) = 2.82, p = .040, ηp2 = .04, (see Figure 6.8). 
Post-hoc analyses revealed that LSM significantly differed for persuasion at times 1 and 4, 






Figure 6.8. Mean LSM total score for mock-jurors discussion per quartile, as a function of 
persuasion. Error bars denote ± SE (standard error of the mean).  
 
 
6.3.6.   Mock-juror qualitative content analysis (QCA). Qualitative analysis of 
the mock-jurors’ responses to the questionnaires, both before and after the jury discussion 
were collated and scored in accordance to the QCA codebook. Below is a summary of the 
key findings, with the full descriptives presented in Appendix table M3.  
6.3.6.1   Descriptive group comparisons for the pre-questionnaire.  
Theme 1: Facts used to inform decision-making. Most mock-jurors used the core 
arguments as a basis but expanded beyond the evidence provided, citing their own 
knowledge or experience in line with the given arguments (47.7%). 20.9% of mock-jurors 
focused solely on the core arguments. Together, this shows that the majority of participants 
were engaged with the material provided as well as the persuasive arguments contained in 

























Theme 2: References to the accused. Across all but one of the variables being 
investigated here (cognitive style, gender, ethnicity and persuasion), most mock-jurors 
referenced the company itself rather than the individual being prosecuted. The exception 
being 43.5% of the not-persuaded mock-jurors who reference both the company and the 
individual within their reasonings and evidence pre-jury discussion. It is interesting to note 
that those who were not-persuaded to change their verdict (whether guilty or not) engaged 
with scenario as a whole, taking into account both the company and the individual; thus, 
conceivably inoculating their arguments from the persuasive messages within the jury 
discussion.  
Theme 3: Reasoning for verdict choice. QCA code 8 depicts reasoning for the 
chosen verdict surrounds a moral argument, referencing fairness and justice. Surprisingly, 
13.6% of mock-jurors whom initially reasoned that their choice was based on a moral 
argument, later changed this reasoning post-discussion despite not changing their verdict. 
‘The managing director shouldn't take all the responsibility. The company may be guilty 
but the MD should not be arrested’ [FB16]; ‘In essence, I wasn't comfortable putting the 
blame onto the company when even the most up to date defences couldn't prevent theft’ 
[MB16]. This is in direct comparison to the persuaded sample, where no-one fell into this 
category.  
Nearly a fifth of the persuaded group (18.2%) explained their verdict choice was 
based on the case file evidence only: ‘The defendant is not responsible for the negligence. 
This is because his company was hacked by sophisticated hackers’ [MA9]. Here, 
participants failed to expand on the arguments and/or used vague reasoning. For example, 
‘The factors I have stated are important because with my understanding of this scenario, I 
believe that Datastore Ltd were not responsible for the negligence due to the fact that 
hacking methods are very skillful and sophisticated’ [FA7]. Alternatively, 4.3% of the non-
persuaded sample fell within this QCA sub-theme. It suggests that using surface-level 
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information leads to reduced-impact arguments and thus such individuals become more 
susceptive to a change of opinion when exposed to contrary persuasive statements.  
Perhaps not so surprisingly, a higher percentage of not-persuaded mock-jurors used 
analytical reasoning to explain their decision (13% compared to 2.3% from the persuaded 
group). This indicates the use of systematic reasoning, utilising the central route of 
processing and thus resisting subsequent persuasive messages.  
Three mock-jurors referred to a lack of evidence or certainty when explaining their 
initial verdict choice; all of which were British males. 11.1% of the participants who were 
low in the NfCC, and 11.8% of those low in delusional thinking indicated a lack of 
certainty and evidence when clarifying their verdicts choices. No mock-jurors high in 
cognitive style scored QCA code 12. Thus, British males, low on cognitive style referred to 
the lack of evidence, ‘more investigation is needed’ [MB12], and found it hard to reach a 
conclusion with the evidence presented. For example, ‘Did he stray from his usual 
practice, could more have been done by security company to protect the file? Hard to 
answer this info therefore could not unanimously commit the managing director. I would 
just be guessing that the managing director had done something’ [MB19].  
Theme 4: Attribution of responsibility. Individuals low on NfCC tended to blame 
the company for the negligence depicted (61.1%). Whereas those high in the NfCC and 
wish to reach a conclusion fast tended to focus on the hackers, blaming them for the events 
depicted (42.8%, compared to 5.6% for low NfCC participants). It is much easier to blame 
the hackers in this scenario, as this was not the issue for debate; the controversial issue 
being whether the defendant and the company ‘Datastore’ were responsible. Thus, those 
high in the NfCC, who tend to jump to conclusions and wish to reach a decision early 
perhaps relied on the peripheral route of processing, choosing the ‘easier and more 
obvious’ option.   
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Theme 1: Facts ignored in the decision-making process. A high percentage of 
mock-jurors (34.3%) claimed they ignored the background information. This implies that 
participants focused on the arguments supporting their verdict choices, and ignored 
irrelevant information that is not considered ‘evidence’ (the background information 
depicted in paragraphs 1-4 of the case summary). There were no significant differences 
across variables for this QCA theme.  
Theme 3: Reasoning for ignoring these facts. Following on from Theme 1 above, 
most mock-jurors either ignored the information they did as they perceived it to be 
irrelevant or failed to provide a reason.  Females were more likely to use analytical 
reasoning when explaining why they had ignored such information (15.2% v. 5.9% males), 
and thus less likely to simply state it was irrelevant (9.1%); males scored higher in the 
‘irrelevant’ sub-theme (35.3%), failing to expand their reasoning as to why this is the case. 
In other words, females described in more detail their reasoning, indicating further thought 
and assessing both sides of the argument when forming their verdict choices.  
6.3.6.2   Descriptive group comparisons for the post-questionnaire.  
Theme 1: Facts used to inform decision-making. Once they had discussed the case 
with the confederate mock-juror, very few participants continued to rely solely on the 
background information (4.5%).  Instead the majority of mock-jurors expanded on the 
arguments made by both the prosecution and defence. The lack of differences across the 
variables suggest that after discussing the case, mock-jurors used evidence that 
incorporated real-world knowledge or examples, irrespective of whether they were 
persuaded or not (‘Most companies do have measures in place in order to deal with 
hacking etc. However, data encryption is ever changing and upgrading’ [FB4]).  
Theme 2: References to the accused. Interestingly, South-Asian participants were 
more likely to reference the company as an entity in their reasoning for the final verdict 
(55.9%). However, less than a third (30.3%) of the British sample solely used the third 
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person plural pronoun ‘they’ or referenced DataStore. This pattern was not found prior to 
the interaction, indicating that exposure to a discussion which contradicts and challenges 
initial judgments brings about cultural differences in linguistic style. There were no 
meaningful differences across the persuasion groups, or indeed for gender and cognitive 
style with regards to referencing the accused post-discussion.  
Theme 3: Reasoning for verdict choice. Exactly the same result (13.6%; n = 6) 
regarding moral reasoning and persuasion was found in the post-questionnaire as the pre-
questionnaire. This shows that despite changing their verdict, persuaded mock-jurors still 
reason fairness and justice, but now for the opposing choice.  Therefore, to persuade 
individuals with a moral reasoning for their initial verdict, perhaps the confederate mock-
jurors appealed to this cognitive processing, thus using arguments of fairness and justice to 
change the mock-jurors opinion. For example, one mock-juror commented that ‘He (the 
confederate mock-juror) made some excellent points with regards to the justice system and 
how it works and also how the managing director cannot be 100% blamed for the 
situation’ [FB17]. Whilst another mock-juror who was persuaded and reasoned this was 
due to moral arguments stated, ‘my partner made me see how it was unfair to blame this 
one man for the fault of an entire company’ [FB3].  
Another interesting finding concerns the lack of evidence (QCA code 12). Once 
again, this mirrors the pre-questionnaire where individuals low in NfCC and delusional 
thinking reported that their verdict was due to a lack of evidence both in the jury 
discussion and case summary. It implies such mock-jurors experienced a level of cognitive 
dissonance and didn’t receive enough information or evidence to make a firm and final 
verdict choice ‘the arguments are theoretical… the lack of evidence does not prove 
whether he is or isn't guilty’ [MB7]; ‘it would be unfair to put an innocent man in prison 
without further info, there should be reasonable doubt’ [FB11]. Alternatively, no-one high 
in these measures mentioned the lack of certainty and evidence in their questionnaires 
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despite this being an argument to which confederates put across in the jury discussion (see 
Appendix D).  
Theme 4: Attribution of responsibility. There was a similar distribution for 
attribution of responsibility across the persuaded and non-persuaded groups, with the 
majority attributing guilt to DataStore/the managing director. However, 13.6% of the 
persuaded group seemed to reach a half-way house, claiming that DataStore as a company 
was guilty, but the individual (managing director) him/herself was not guilty (QCA code 
601). Thus, this argument feeds into QCA code 8, which incidentally has the same 
percentage of mock-jurors (see above in Theme 3). No-one who wasn’t persuaded fell into 
this category. Further, it is interesting to note that all of the mock-jurors who fell into QCA 
code 601 were female, and 83.3% (5 out of 6) of the individuals in this category were 
British. It seems that british females go further than the case summary in their reasoning, 
highlighting the gap between the company being guilty, and the difference of this to the 
managing director being guilty.  
Theme 5: Persuasiveness of the confederate. Of those not persuaded, the highest 
scoring category related to QCA code 156, which depicts that the confederate said some 
persuasive points, but these were not enough to change mock-juror’s opinion (43.5%). 
Thus, it is noted that the discussion was persuasive, despite some mock-jurors being 
resistant to changing their verdict as a result of this. In contrast, 59.1% of the persuaded 
sample state they changed their verdict due to the persuasive messages pointing out new 
ways of thinking or interpreting the information. For example, ‘the jury partner did state 
some good points which helped change my decision and the way that I was thinking 
towards it’ [MA14].  
4.3% of the not-persuaded individuals stated that the confederate mock-juror was 
too rigid and didn’t listen to their point of view, perhaps serving to crystalise the mock-
jurors’ viewpoints even further. However, 4.5% of the persuaded group similarly stated 
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that despite being persuaded they felt their confederate mock-juror was rigid in their 
exchanges; ‘They were persistent on the fact that they believed that there should have been 
the up to date safety measures. I do feel the discussion was a little single sided’ [MA10]. 
This shows that a very small number of participants felt that the conversation was pushy or 
one-sided, and of those that did, it did not have an influence on the persuasion outcome.  
Theme 6: Communication during the discussion. Over half (52.2%) of the mock-
jurors thought the discussion using the VRE was pleasant and friendly, whilst 10.4% failed 
to provide feedback on the communication during the jury discussion. 8.7% of the not-
persuaded sample stated that the discussion was interesting and productive, ‘Very 
interesting and was good to see what decisions the other person came to and how’ [FB6]. 
This is despite the fact they ultimately disagreed with the confederate mock-juror.  
Theme 6: Communication as a result of the VRE. Most people (91%) did not 
comment on the environment (it was not specifically asked in the questionnaire). Of those 
that did, all of them were persuaded. 4 out of 6 that commented mentioned the VRE in a 
positive light. For example, one mock-juror mentioned that communicating using the VR 
headsets inside the environment was ‘very easy, hearing their voice and seeing head nods 
and shakes despite it being in VR felt quite natural’ [MB16]. Another mock-juror 
mentioned that they could understand using the VRE in legal setting having experienced 
the VRE in the discussion, ‘No it was not hard to communicate. In some circumstance I 
would think it is less intimidating than being in court surroundings or having to see the 
person outside’ [FB12].  
Theme 7: Additional comments. Of the mock-jurors who decided to comment 
further (17.9%), most views were focused on the VRE. Persuaded mock-jurors tended to 
comment positively: ‘The oculus rift was cool’ [MA6]; ‘VR was fun!’ [MB20]. Whereas 
8.7% of the not-persuaded mock-jurors had something negative to say about the VRE. 
Considering that no-one in this sub-group commenting positively on the environment, it 
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indicates that a negative opinion of the environment used to discuss persuasive messages 
influences subsequent persuasion: ‘The other avatar never looked directly at me. Use of 
body language would be interesting aspect to be in the research or further research’ 
[FB15].  
 
6.3.7   Presence inside the VRE. Presence was analysed using the presence 
questionnaire, (PQ) assessing the extent to which mock-jurors ‘forgot’ the real-world and 
became immersed in the VRE. The minimum and maximum scores range from 25-175, 
with a larger score indicating a higher degree of presence. Across the entire sample, mock-
jurors scored a mean average of 116.25 (SD = 19.49).  A series of univariate ANOVAs 
revealed non-significant VRE immersion effects for Gender, Welch’s F (1, 51.10) = .01, p 
= .928, Ethnicity, F (1, 65) = .03, p = .868, Persuasion, F (1, 65) = .21, p = .649, NfCC 
Welch’s F (1, 22.65) = .05, p = .827, and PDI-R F (1, 31) = 2.66, p = .113.  
 
6.3.8   Simulator sickness (SSQ). To understand whether mock-jurors who 
claimed to have a history of motion sickness or were currently feeling unwell at the start of 
the research correlated with subsequent higher scores in the simulator sickness 
questionnaire (SSQ), a Spearman’s correlation was conducted. This revealed a non-
significant relationship between the pre-SSQ and SSQ post-VRE discussion, r (53) = .18, p 
= .202. The SSQ is comprised of three subscales: disorientation (Range: 0 - 389.76), 
oculomotor (Range: 0 - 212.24) and nausea (Range: 0 - 267.12) which contribute to the 
overall score of simulator sickness (Range: 0 - 314.16). A higher value in either categories 
representing an increased feeling of simulator sickness.  As seen in Figure 6.9, mock-jurors 
felt very little effects of simulator sickness overall (Mode = 0; M = 21.32, SD = 29.52), 
with the majority of participants self-rating no, or very little effects of nausea (Mode = 0; 
M = 12.96, SD = 24.39), oculomotor (Mode = 0; M = 20.14, SD = 24.39) or disorientation 
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(Mode = 0; M = 23.48, SD = 35.21) as a result of the VRE. A univariate ANOVA for total 
SSQ and Persuasion additionally revealed that SSQ did not affect mock-jurors persuasion 













6.3.9   Confederate mock-jurors. 
6.3.9.1   Word count. To investigate whether the confederate mock-jurors varied in 
their word count to participants (referred to as ‘status’ of mock-juror), and whether 
persuasion was influenced as a result, a 2 x 2 between-factor ANOVA was conducted. This 
revealed a non-significant effect for status, F (1, 130) = 1.64, p = .20, as well as a non-
significant interaction between status x persuasion, F (1, 130) = 1.69, p = .19, indicating 
that the confederate mock-jurors did not dominate, or sit back and neglect the 
conversations, with both parties contributing equally to the discussions, which did not 
influence or interact with persuasive outcomes.  
 
Figure 6.9. Bar graph showing the total mean SSQ scores, broken down by the 




6.3.9.2   Social ratings of the confederate mock-juror. Mock-jurors were asked to 
rate their jury partner on a Likert scale from 1-5 concerning how friendly (1 = very 
unfriendly, 5 = very friendly), aggressive (1 = very aggressive, 5 = very passive), and 
sociable (1 = very sociable, 5 = very unsociable) they perceived their discussion partner. 
Mann Whitney U tests were carried out for ethnicity, persuasion and gender (see Table 
6.7). South-Asian mock-jurors rated their confederate mock-juror, of the same ethnic 
group, as significantly more passive and less aggressive than british mock-jurors 
interacting with a british confederate.  
 
Table 6.7 (continued overleaf) 
Descriptive statistics and Mann Whitney U results for mock-jurors’ ratings of the 
confederate mock-juror, for ethnicity, gender and persuasion groups 
 Sociable 




British = 21.91 
175.00 -.35 .727 -.05 
Gender Male = 25.45 Female = 20.85 200.50 -1.29 .197 -.19 
Persuasion 
Persuaded = 22.44 
Not persuaded = 
24.25 




Table 6.7 (continued) 
Descriptive statistics and Mann Whitney U results for mock-jurors’ ratings of the confederate mock-juror, for ethnicity, gender and persuasion groups 
 
 Friendliness Aggressiveness 




British = 32.77  
520.50 -.54 .592 -.06 South-Asian = 38.40 British = 29.47 411.50 -2.09 .037 -.25 
Gender Male = 32.63 Female = 35.41 514.50 -.62 .538 -.07 
Male = 31.40 
Female = 36.68 472.50 -1.24 .217 -.15 
Persuasion 
Persuaded = 34.94 
Not persuaded = 
32.20 
464.50 -.58 .563 -.07 
Persuaded = 32.07 
Not persuaded = 
37.70 




6.3.9.3   Physical perceptions of the confederate mock-juror. Mock-jurors were 
asked who they thought they were interacting with inside the VRE, given the anonymity of 
the research paradigm. Mock-jurors, on the whole, correctly identified who they were 
talking to (when asked what the confederate mock-juror’s ethnicity and gender was): 100% 
of the male mock jurors identified their jury partner was female;  91.7% of females 
correctly identifying their partner as male; 81.8% of british mock-jurors correctly 
identifying the confederate as british; 64.7% south-asian mock-jurors correctly identified 
the within-group confederate mock-juror, with 29.4% of the group believing they were 
talking to a british individual.  
 
6.3.10   Summary of results. Almost 66% of participants were persuaded to 
change their verdict choice following discussion with an avatar-version of the confederate 
mock-juror inside an immersive virtual reality environment. Ethnicity did not influence 
this distribution, nor did gender. However, when both of these variables were combined 
and broken down, it revealed differences specifically within the British sample, whereby 
British males had an almost 50:50 split regarding persuasive outcomes. Yet British women 
were more likely to be persuaded (over 70%) than not. Differences in persuasion across 
ethnic and gender divides however did not significantly differ, and there were no gender 
differences observed in the South-Asian sample.  
 Results regarding the influence of confidence in verdict choice both before and 
after the discussion revealed that meta-cognitive confidence in decisions did not 
significantly differ for persuasion, gender and ethnic groups. However, the change in 
confidence, measured pre- to post-discussion, did reveal that persuaded mock-jurors 
increased their confidence, on average by 42.5% whereas not persuaded mock-jurors on 
average, increased their confidence by 13.48%.  
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 The two cognitive style measures were not related and did not result in any 
differences for gender or persuasion. Interestingly, delusional thinking highlighted how 
South-Asian mock-jurors scored much higher (mean of 73.68) than British participants 
(mean of 38.39). Additionally, analysis on individuals scoring either high or low in 
cognitive style further revealed how participants high in delusional thinking had higher 
pre-discussion confidence compared to those low in this measure but post-confidence did 
not significantly differ, nor did persuasion or duration in either cognitive style measure.   
 On average, the jury discussion lasted for just over 8 minutes. There was a 
difference in duration of discussion between the persuaded groups though, with persuaded 
mock-jurors reaching a unanimous decision quicker (06:51) than mock-jurors who 
disagreed with the confederate mock-juror (11:14). Not only were persuaded mock-jurors 
quicker, but they also said fewer words (548); almost half the contribution when compared 
to non-persuaded mock-jurors who said, on average 1081 words in around 11 minutes. 
Word count significantly influenced persuasion, accounting for 15% of the variation.  
 Analysis of linguistic style using LIWC software revealed similarities for gender 
and persuasion. However, ethnicity displayed significant differences. For example, South-
Asian participants spoke with greater affect and tone compared to British participants, who 
themselves spoke with a higher rate of analytical reasoning in their speech, with the 
confederate mock-juror of the same ethnic background. Analysis of the epistemic modality 
dictionary and its output regarding high or low in expressed confidence and doubt showed 
similarities across all variables (gender, ethnicity and persuasion), as well as no differences 
between the mock-jurors speech, and the confederate mock-jurors speech – despite the 
confederate mock-juror being the persuader in this scenario, and the mock-juror being the 
persuadee.  
 Linguistic style matching (LSM) showed no differences in synchronicity of speech 
for persuaded groups. However, when LSM was broken down into quarterly time units, it 
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revealed a difference in persuasion whereby persuaded mock-jurors increased their LSM 
initially but then decreased in synchronicity when the discussion was coming to an end. 
Non-persuaded mock-jurors LSM shows an almost reverse effect in that individual 
decreased in LSM initially but in the last quarter of the discussion, increased their 
synchronicity of language to that of the confederate mock-juror.  
 Most mock-jurors used the core arguments as a basis for their pre-discussion 
decisions but expanded beyond the evidence provided, citing their own knowledge or 
experience in line with the provided arguments. Mock-jurors who were not-persuaded 
primarily referenced both the company and the individual when explaining their reasoning 
for the initial verdict, which is in comparison to persuaded mock-jurors, who primarily 
referred only to the company itself rather than the individual, indicating a more holistic 
view of the scenario for non-persuaded mock-jurors. Furthermore, not-persuaded 
individuals were more likely to use analytical reasoning to justify their verdict than mock-
jurors who would go on to be persuaded.  
 Post-discussion, there was a lack of differences across the variables when asked 
what evidence they used to inform decision-making: mock-jurors used evidence that 
incorporated real-world knowledge or examples, irrespective of whether they were 
persuaded or not. South-Asian participants were more likely to reference the company as 
an entity in their reasoning for the final verdict (55.9%), yet less than a third (30.3%) of the 
British sample solely used the third person plural pronoun ‘they’ or referenced DataStore. 
Individuals low in NfCC seemed to experience some form of cognitive dissonance, in 
reporting a lack of evidence and information to make a firm and final decision. Most 
persuaded participants stated they changed their verdict because the confederate mock-
juror highlighted missing information or revealed new ways of interpreting the evidence.  
Commenting on and analysing the VRE as an environment revealed that over half 
of all participants commented on the VRE in a pleasant and friendly manner when it came 
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to the ability to communicate. Of those that commented in a negative light, all were not-
persuaded to change their mind indicating a negative perspective on the environment 
influences subsequent shifts in opinion. To assess the extent to which mock-jurors ‘forgot’ 
the real-world and became immersed in the VRE, presence was measured. It revealed high 
scores across the various variables implying the VRE was successful in being immersive 
and this did not contribute to differences in persuasive outcomes. Simulator sickness was 
also analysed, showing very low scores in all sub-themes demonstrating that the VRE 
created in this study did not have adverse effects for most mock-jurors, and for those that 
did mention they felt sick, it did not affect their performance and social cognition inside 
the VRE.  
Finally, social ratings for the confederate mock-jurors were taken to understand 
mock-jurors’ perceptions of the confederates when interacting using an avatar. It revealed 
that South-Asian participants rated their South-Asian confederate as more passive and less 
aggressive than the British mock-jurors rating their British confederate. There were no 
other differences for ratings of sociability and friendliness for either ethnic, gender or 
persuaded groups. Given that participants interacted with the confederate via a real-time 
voice equipment, most mock-jurors identified their partner’s ethnicity and gender 
correctly.     
 
6.4   Discussion 
 This final experiment investigated persuasion in an immersive virtual environment, 
mirroring the JM method employed in the previous two experimental chapters. The 
primary findings show how the majority of participants were persuaded to change their 
verdict post-discussion. Participants experienced high levels of presence whilst discussing 
the jury scenario which supports the second prediction made in this chapter. This second 
hypothesis envisaged high levels of presence given the immersive and collaborative nature 
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of the synthetic environment, which predicted would in turn, lead to increased success 
rates for persuasive outcomes, which the findings support. Presence is considered to be a 
central and distinctive feature of a VRE (Grigorovici, 2003) and is interchangeable with 
immersion (McMahan, 2003). Indeed, a comprehensive literature analysis by Suh and 
Prophet (2018) revealed that immersive technologies enhance collaboration and 
engagement. The high level of presence found within the current study indicates that the 
VRE enabled participants to have a sense of ‘being there’; immersed in the synthetic 
discussion with another avatar. Furthermore, hearing a human voice in real-time arguably 
served to increase cooperation and persuasion outcomes and so this too may have 
contributed to the VRE persuasion effect. Here, participants interacted with the confederate 
mock-juror through a headset, which relayed real-time human voice which is in line with 
Zanbaka et al.’s (2006) work, revealing that attitude change was just as effective when 
using avatars with human voices as real speakers. This enhanced interactivity increases the 
social aspect of presence (Skalski & Tamborini, 2007), with social presence in turn 
improving real-time exchanges. It appears that here too the interactive and collaborative 
nature of the VRE, alongside good levels of presence and participants inhabitation of an 
avatar, increased persuasion outcomes.  
These findings support one of the few studies which have attempted to investigate 
the impact of interactivity by allowing participants to change the order in which pre-
recorded persuasive messages were shown (Skalski & Tamborini, 2004; 2007). The 
research investigated the impact of interactivity and social presence on the processing of a 
persuasive message, utilising the framework of the heuristic-systematic model within 
synthetic communication modalities. Skalski and Tamborini found that an interactive agent 
instilled a greater sense of presence in participants, whilst presence itself increased the 
focus towards the avatar and the arguments portrayed. This supports the concept that 
presence can increase motivation for information processing. The current findings 
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presented in this chapter lend further credence to the area of attitude change and VR, 
highlighting how immersive synthetic realities can be an effective means to persuading 
someone to change their mind. Furthermore, it serves to expand the existing literature, 
enabling the measurement of realistic bilateral exchanges.   
The first prediction made in this chapter refers to gender differences in persuasion 
outcomes, with females thought to behave in a manner consistent with gender stereotypes - 
wising to form a bond with their opposing avatars, being more communal in nature and 
thus more prone to changing their verdict choice. Despite the current findings revealing no 
gender differences, variances did emerge for the British sample - males were at the chance 
level for persuasion, yet British women were more likely to be persuaded (over 70%) than 
not. Perhaps this finding is reflective of previous research which has predominantly 
focussed on Caucasian samples, reporting that women prefer to focus on creating and 
maintaining relationships and tend to be much more accepting of other people’s 
perspectives (Eagly & Carli, 1981). Thus, this study which has manipulated ethnicity and 
gender serves to ‘water down’ gender effects - indicating that gender may not be a sole 
cause of differences previously observed in varying media rich modalities, but rather an 
interaction between ethnicity and gender.  
Differences in linguistic style across the ethnic groups were significant in this 
study. Here, South-Asian participants spoke with greater affect and tone compared to 
British participants, who themselves had a higher rate of analytical reasoning in their 
verbal output during the discussions with an avatar of the same ethnicity. Higher levels of 
analytical style captures concrete and logical thinking (Pennebaker, Chung, Frazee, 
Lavergne, & Beaver, 2014). This result indicates that the British sample were more formal 
and hierarchical in their linguistic output which lends itself to differences reported 
historically regarding Ind/Col cultures. For example, Nisbett and Masuda (2003) argue that 
individualistic cultures are more inclined to attend to a focal object and categorise this in 
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an attempt to establish rules governing behaviour. However, caution may be needed in the 
interpretation of these findings given that analytical linguistic style is a new addition to the 
LIWC software, derived from previous research into written college essays (rather than 
verbal speech), measuring academic performance on a categorical-dynamic index.  
LSM results revealed inverse effects for persuasion at times 1 and 4 of the jury 
discussions. For the first quarter, mock-jurors who were persuaded increased in their 
synchronicity of language to the confederate. Conversely, mock-jurors who resisted 
persuasion initially decreased in their LSM upon realising the confederate mock-jurors had 
the opposing viewpoint. Yet in the final quarter of the discussion, whereby unanimous 
agreements were made for the persuaded mock-jurors, LSM reduced between the two 
avatars and this was significant when compared to non-persuaded mock-jurors who 
increased in their LSM scores during this final quarter. If engagement rather than rapport is 
the key to coordination (Niederhoffer & Pennebaker 2002; as argued in Study 1’s 
discussion), then this implies that once a unanimous decision was made, LSM reduced as 
participants engagement in the conversation waned. Comparably, non-persuaded 
interactions continue to debate and argue until a decision is made to stop the discussion– 
implying that individuals were highly engaged until the termination of the discussion. 
Verbalising your point of view and engaging in debate to argue your point of view can 
bolster resistance (McGuire, 1964; Tormala & Petty, 2002). Perhaps non-persuaded mock-
jurors become motivated to attempt to persuade the confederate mock-juror which could 
account for the increase in LSM towards the end of the discussion.  
 Previous studies have commented on the role that avatars play on decision-making 
and behavioural outcomes. Indeed, the Proteus effect states that individuals conform their 
online behaviour to match that of their digital selves (Yee & Bailenson, 2007). The current 
study restricted the customisation of the avatars down to skin, hair colour and gender given 
the novelty of the environment and the restrictions placed upon the creation of such an 
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immersive VR. Furthermore, given that this VRE utilised immersive HMD technology, 
participants were often unable to monitor and observe their customisation given their 
‘embodiment’ of the avatar inside the VRE. Thus, analysis of avatar choices was not 
deemed appropriate for this study. Nevertheless, it was clear that the majority of 
participants did customise their avatar in a similar vein to themselves (choosing the same 
gender and skin colour). Furthermore, comments on the additional demographic questions 
(Appendix R) revealed that of the participants who stated they use an avatar whilst online 
(n = 22), most, when they had the opportunity to customise their avatar, did so to reflect 
their real-life features and/or personality (E.g., ‘I wanted it to look as realistic as me as 
possible so the person I was talking to felt a reassurance of who she was talking to’ 
[MB4]). This in itself supports research that most individuals choose to express themselves 
online in a way that is similar to their everyday self (Taylor, 2002). However, it would be 
interesting to further explore this idea through manipulation of avatar embodiment in 
future research.  
 Despite avatars representing the presence of mock-jurors as well as confederates, in 
fact all participants remained physically anonymous. Furthermore, the avatars were static, 
and although head movements mirrored the movements of participants in the real-world, 
behavioural cues/indicators were absent. Future studies could consider expansion into the 
field of non-verbal behaviours (e.g., Dodds, Mohler, & Bülthoff, 2011) given the recent 
rise in haptic feedback for VREs. Utilising tracking displays to recreate bodily movements 
and gestures inside the VRE might serve to increase the realness and presence felt, and 
further research would benefit from investigation of the role these behaviours can have on 




Chapter Seven: Persuasion Across Modalities: A Meta-Analysis. 
 
7.1   Introduction  
The previous experimental chapters investigate cognitive, linguistic style, ethnicity, 
and gender on persuasion in three distinct contexts (FtF, CMC and VR). However, each 
context has been analysed in isolation thus far. This chapter serves to directly compare 
results across modalities, and so provides an overview of the findings presented in this 
thesis, highlighting the similarities and differences across modalities, and interpreting these 
results with reference to the relevant empirical and theoretical literature. All three 
modalities are clearly different, and as such it was expected that the context would have an 
impact on persuasion outcomes. The novelty of this research is such that formulating 
hypotheses was challenging, although a series of hypotheses have been tentatively 
formulated throughout. However, for this chapter no hypotheses are articulated, rather this 
chapter is exploratory in nature and includes all data points spanning the entirety of this 
thesis.  
 
7.2   Method 
7.2.1   Participants. For this analysis all 197 mock-juror participants were 
included, comprising all three communication modalities (FtF n = 66; CMC n = 64; VR n 
= 67). Overall, the sample contained 50 British males, 48 British females, 49 South-Asian 
males and 50 South-Asian females. Mock-jurors’ ages ranged from 18 to 63, with a mean 
of 24.54 years (SD = 8.20, n = 179).  
 
7.2.2   Credibility of the jury method paradigm. All mock-jurors were asked 
whether they believed the case scenario and judge’s instructions, provided in a jury booklet 
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was credible. These data have not been previously reported, rather it was deemed more 
appropriate to report these data utilising the overall sample given the previous three studies 
have all utilised the same paradigm. This question was asked using a four-point Likert 
scale, ranging from ‘very credible’ to ‘very incredible’. Seventy four percent (73.6%) 
stated that they found the scenario ‘quite’, or ‘very credible’, adding realism and credibility 
to the arguments presented.  
 
7.3   Results 
The results reported here bring together the existing data from all three 
environmental modalities to compare, contrast and analyse any similarities and differences 
to the variables of interest, particularly with regard to persuasion outcomes and 
environmental modality.   
7.3.1   Persuasion. In each of the previous research chapters (Chapters 4-6), 
persuasion was broken down into gender and ethnicity to investigate differences across the 
two groups for persuasion. Here, males were evenly split between being persuaded and 
not: 49 males were persuaded, and 50 resisted the persuasive attempts. Breaking this down 
further, twenty-two British males were persuaded, compared to 28 who were not. This 
mirrors the South-Asian males, where 27 persuaded while 22 were not (see table 7.1).  
However, more females were persuaded (n = 62) than not (n = 36). In particular, British 
females were more likely to be persuaded (n = 32), than not (n = 16). South-Asian females 
mirrored this pattern, but more South-Asian women resisted persuasion (n = 20) than the 
British sample. A binomial logistic regression was performed to ascertain the effects of 
modality, gender and ethnicity on persuasion outcomes. The model was non-significant, !" 





7.3.1.1   Persuasion across environmental modality. Table 7.2 summarises the 
breakdown of persuasion groups across each of the three studies manipulating 
environmental modality for ease of reference.  
 
Table 7.1 




Persuaded Not Persuaded 
FtF  n 46 20 
%s 69.7 30.3 
%p 41.4 23.3 
z 1.4 -1.6 
CMC  n 21 43 
%s 32.8 67.2 
%p 18.9 50.0 
z -2.5 2.8 
VR  n 44 23 
%s 65.7 34.3 
%p 39.6 26.7 




There was a significant association between environmental modality and persuasion, !" (2) = 21.56, p <.001, Cramer’s V = .33. The FtF environment produced similar 
persuasion outcomes to the VR environment, with persuasion equally as successful in both 
FtF and VR contexts. However, persuasion outcomes in CMC were markedly different - 
with as many people resisting persuasion as were persuaded in the other two studies. 
Indeed, examination of the standardised residuals indicate that the low proportion of 
persuasion in CMC compared to the other modalities (z = -2.5) contributed to the 
Note. n = observed count; %s = percentage within study; %p = percentage 




significant result. Likewise, the high proportion of resistance to persuasion (z = 2.8) in 
comparison to FtF and VR modalities show that the CMC environment behaved in a 
significantly different manner to the other two contexts.  
  
 
7.3.1.2   Direction of persuasion. The Pilot study (reported in Chapter 3) revealed an even 
split for participants initially choosing guilt or innocence. As demonstrated in Table 7.3, 
there is a pretty even split regarding the direction of persuasion across the sample. 
However, the standardised residual for individuals who initially chose a ‘not guilty’ 
verdict, and resisted persuasion (NG-NG) suggests a significant deviation from what is 
expected (exceeding -2; Sharpe, 2015), thus implying a significant difference between the 
observed and expected frequency counts. A one-sample goodness of fit chi-square test 
however, was non-significant, !" (3) = 7.73, p = .052, φ = .20 for direction of persuasion. 
Hence, verdict choice does not significantly affect persuasion outcomes, and a change 
from one verdict to another is not considered harder or easier to induce. Thus, findings 
within this thesis cannot be attributed to the strength of evidence provided in the case 
summary arguments.  
 
Table 7.2 












G-NG 59 29.9 49.3 1.38 
NG-G 52 26.4 49.3 0.38 
G-G 53 26.9 49.3 0.53 
NG-NG 33 16.8 49.3 -2.32 




7.3.2   Confidence in verdict choices. To understand the interaction and 
differences in verdict confidence across all three studies and persuasion groups, two 3 
(Study: FtF v CMC v VR) x 2 (Persuasion: persuaded v not-persuaded) between-factor 
ANOVAs were conducted for the pre- (Time 1), and post- discussion timepoints (Time 2). 
Two between-factor ANOVAs were utilised which allows analysis across the variables 
contained within each Time frame and thus not skew results. There was a significant main 
effect for persuasion at Time 1, F (1, 188) = .5.78, p = .017, ηp2 = .03, with the persuaded 
group having lower initial confidence in their verdict (M = 66.49, SD = 19.24) than those 
who resisted persuasion (M = 73.06, SD = 20.57). There was no significant main effect for 
the three types of environmental modalities (Study) on pre-discussion confidence of 
verdict choice, F (2, 188) = .38, p = .681. Additionally, the interaction for persuasion x 




Figure 7.1.   Percentage confidence in initial verdict choice (Time 1) by Persuasion and 
Study. Error bars denote ± 2 standard error of the mean.  
 
 Time 2 reflected the 3 x 2 ANOVA results at Time 1, with a significant main effect 
for persuasion, F (1, 189) = 15.66, p < .001, ηp2 = .08. Subsequent pairwise comparisons 
revealed a mean difference of 12.76 (SE = 3.22), with the mean for persuasion in the final 
verdict choice being significantly lower (M = 68.12, SD = 21.59) than the mean confidence 
for non-persuaded outcomes (M = 80.13, SD = 20.73). The main effect for study was non-
significant, F (2, 189) = .83, p = .436, as was the persuasion x study interaction, F (2, 189) 
= 2.39, p = .094 (see Figure 7.2). Across both time points, those who were persuaded had 
lower confidence in their initial and final outcomes, despite changing their verdict. On the 
other hand, those who resisted persuasion and thus did not change their verdict had higher 
confidence across both before and after the jury discussion, and this carried across all three 





Figure 7.2. Percentage confidence in final verdict choice (Time 2) by Persuasion and 
Study. Error bars denote ± 2 standard error of the mean.  
 
7.3.2.1   Absolute confidence change in verdict choice. Absolute confidence 
change was calculated in line with the existing chapters and Table 7.4 summarises the 
average change in confidence for verdict choice across the main variables. This shows that 
the confidence change for FtF and VR modalities were very similar, with an average of 
30% change in confidence from pre- to post-discussion, irrespective of change in verdict. 
The CMC modality however, had almost half this change, indicating that exposure to 
persuasive messages via Google Hangouts did little to change their confidence in the 
verdict. Gender, Ethnicity and Cognitive Style samples had similar mean confidence 
changes showing no substantial differences. Persuasion shows the biggest differences in 
confidence, with those who changed their verdict having a large change in confidence (M = 
40%) compared to those who resisted persuasion, having a mean change of 12%.  
 
Table 7.3  
The mean (M) and standard deviation (SD) for absolute change in confidence (0-100%) 
for verdict choice across Study, Gender, Ethnicity, Persuasion and Cognitive Style groups 
Factor Levels M SD 
Study FtF 31.86 25.71 
 CMC 18.36 18.50 
 VR 32.23 24.46 
Gender Male 25.46 24.69 
 Female 29.55 22.95 
Ethnicity British 25.96 24.65 
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 South-Asian 29.01 23.09 





















To understand the interaction between environment and persuasion when absolute 
confidence had been calculated, a 3 (Study: FtF v CMC v VR) x 2 (Persuasion: persuaded 
v not persuaded) between-factor ANOVA was conducted on absolute confidence for 
verdict choice. This revealed a significant interaction between study and persuasion, F (2, 
186) = 7.36, p = .001, ηp2 = .07 indicating that any difference between absolute change in 
confidence is dependent on whether that person is persuaded or not, and the environmental 
modality they discuss the verdict in (see Figure 7.3 for a graph of this interaction). Simple 
effects analysis was conducted via syntax. This allows for exploration of the interaction by 
examining the difference between groups within one level of the IV, as interpretation of 
the main effects can be considered misleading and otherwise incomplete. 
Given there were six tests of simple effects, the criterion for significance was 
adjusted to .0083 to control for Type 1 error. Subsequent simple main effects indicated that 
the interaction effect resulted from the persuaded sub-sample, with a significant univariate 
result for confidence change, F (2, 186) = 6.77, p = .001, ηp2 = .07. Post-hoc tests revealed 
both FtF and VR modalities had increased absolute confidence change compared to the 
CMC modality (FtF > CMC: Mdiff = 17.40, p = .001; VR > CMC: Mdiff = 16.31, p = 
.001). The VR and FtF modalities show a similar confidence change for verdict choice 
(FtF = VR: Mdiff = 1.09, p = .789; see Figure 7.3). The not-persuaded sample did not 
produce a significant result for absolute confidence change, F (2, 186) = 1.88, p = .155. 
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The absolute confidence change was not different across the three studies, with post-hoc 
pairwise comparisons confirming no significant mean differences across the three 
modalities when mock-jurors were not persuaded (all p’s > .01).  
 
 
Figure 7.3. Interaction of Environmental modalities (Study: FtF, CMC and VR) and 
Persuasion (persuaded or not-persuaded) on absolute confidence change in verdict choice.  
 
7.3.2.2   Direction of absolute confidence. Absolute confidence direction for all 
three studies was entered into a 3 x 3 crosstabulation (see Table 7.5) to understand whether 
environmental modality influenced the direction of confidence for verdict choice. This 
revealed very similar results for the FtF and VR studies, whereby the majority of mock-
jurors increased their confidence post-jury discussion, regardless of persuasion outcome. 
Interestingly, the same amount of mock jurors were observed decreasing their confidence 
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across all three studies, and this remained low across the environmental modalities. As 
seen in Table 7.5, a high proportion of the CMC mock-jurors did not differ in confidence 
for their decision, despite the majority of participants resisting persuasion.  
 
Table 7.4 
A 3 x 3 absolute confidence direction x study crosstabulation test for independence. 
Statistics show observed counts (n), and standardised residuals in brackets (z) 
 FtF CMC VR 
+ 41 (.3) 31 (-1.4) 47 (1.1) 
- 6 (.0) 6 (.0) 6 (.0) 
/ 16 (-.5) 27 (2.0) 12 (-1.5) 
Note. + = increase in confidence for verdict choice from pre- to post-discussion; - = 
decrease in confidence for verdict choice from pre- to post-discussion; / = no change in 
confidence for verdict choice from pre- to post-discussion.  
 
A chi-square test for independence was conducted to assess whether persuasion led 
to an increase, decrease or unchanged confidence in verdict. Across both persuaded and 
non-persuaded groups, very few mock-jurors decreased their confidence post-jury 
discussion. The chi-square statistic was significant, !" (2) = 55.33, p < .001, φ = .54, with 
analysis of the standardised residuals indicting that both the increase (persuasion z = 2.8; 
not-persuaded z = -3.1) and no change cells (persuasion z = -4.1; not-persuaded z = 4.6) 
significantly contributed to the chi-square value, albeit in opposing directions. 
Additionally, follow-up goodness of fit chi square tests confirmed these results: Persuaded !" (2) = 26.99, p < .001, Cramer’s V = .26; Not-Persuaded !" (2) = 119.68, p < .001, 




7.3.3   Cognitive style. Due to an increased data set, cognitive style was correlated 
to understand whether the two variables were related. Due to parametric assumptions being 
violated for PDI-R regarding skewness (1.27, SE = .174), Spearman’s rho was conducted. 
This revealed a non-significant relationship between the two cognitive style measures, r 
(195) = .11, p = .130.  
 To compare cognitive style distribution of scores across different modalities, 
gender and ethnic groups researched in this thesis, two 3 (Study: FtF, CMC, VR) x 2 
(Gender: male, female) x 2 (Ethnicity: South-Asian, British) between-factor ANOVAs 
were conducted for each cognitive style measure (PDI-R and NfCC). There were non-
significant main effects (all F’s < 2.43, all p’s > .091) and non-significant two-way 
interactions for NfCC, all F’s < .66, all p’s > .517. Delusional thinking also produced non-
significant main effects for both modality and gender, all F’s < 1.25, all p’s > .288, 
indicating that the average cognitive style scores did not significantly differ across each 
study and thus subsequent findings indicate that study may not be considered an 
extraneous variable regarding cognitive style.  
However, the main effect for ethnicity was significant, F(1, 183) = 18.84, p < .001, 
ηp2 = .09, with mean scores showing British participants produced a mean score of 41.04 
(SE = 3.42) compared to the South-Asian participants, scoring a significantly higher 
average of 62.00 (SE = 3.40). The two-way interactions were non-significant, all F’s < 
2.98, all p’s > .051.  
Furthermore, the three-way interactions for both NfCC, F(2, 184) = 1.70, p = .185 
and PDI-R, F(2, 183) = 1.20, p = .303 were non-significant.  
 
7.3.3.1   High and low in cognitive style. As with previous data sections, cognitive 
style was split into quartiles using data from across all three studies; the top and bottom 
25th representing mock-jurors scoring high or low in NfCC and delusional thinking.  Fifty-
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two mock-jurors fell into the low PDI-R (< 26), 46 scored highly in PDI-R (> 69), 51 
mock-jurors were low in NfCC (< 145), and 47 were high in this NfCC (> 169).  
 Looking at the distribution of mock-jurors falling into the above categories, chi-
square tests for independence were conducted for gender, ethnicity and persuasion across 
both cognitive style measures. Thus, highlighting patterns of the distribution across these 
new categories, and better understanding whether the three variables have differences in 
cognitive style. Gender and NfCC was not-significantly associated, !"(1) = .99, p = .418, 
neither was ethnicity and NfCC, !" (1) = .37, p = .686, or persuasion and NfCC, !"(1) = 
1.59, p = .229. Gender and PDI-R was non-significant, !"(1) = .05, p = .843, as was 
persuasion and PDI-R, !"(1) = .21, p = .688. However, ethnicity was significantly 
associated with delusional thinking, !"(1) = 17.82, p < .001, φ = .43, with a high number 
of British mock-jurors scoring low in PDI-R (n = 38) compared to South-Asian 
participants (n = 14). This trend is reversed for the high category, whereby 32 South-Asian 
mock-jurors fell into this category, compared to 14 British participants.  
 Regarding confidence in verdict prior to the discussion and confidence in verdict 
post-discussion, individuals high or low in the two cognitive style measures could feasibly 
influence such results. However, this was not the case for both NfCC pre-discussion, F (1, 
95) = .53, p = .466, and post-discussion F (1, 96) = .59, p = .443. These results highlight no 
differences in the mean scores for high and low NfCC mock-jurors’ confidence both before 
and after the jury discussion. Delusional thinking additionally revealed similar findings for 
both the pre, F (1, 95) = 2.04, p = .156, and post-discussion ANOVAs, F (1, 95) = .01, p = 
.915.   
 
7.3.4   Duration of jury discussion. Duration was defined as the total amount of 
time (to the second) that dyadic pairings discussed the jury scenario. To investigate 
whether duration varied as a function of study, a univariate ANOVA was conducted to 
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analyse differences in mean duration. The VR study revealed the shortest duration for the 
jury discussion, on average (M = 505.92 SD = 376.94), followed closely by the FtF 
discussion (M = 646.24, SD = 463.53). The CMC study however, had more than double the 
average duration (M = 1635.94, SD = 764.29). Welch’s F revealed a significant difference 
across the studies for duration of discussion, F (2, 120.57) = 56.98, p < .001, ηp2 = .45, 
95% CI (815.08, 1025.01). Games-Howell post-hoc tests (depicted in Figure 7.4) revealed 
a significant mean difference between CMC and both VR (p < .001, M diff. = 1130.01, 
95% CI [877.32, 1382.71]) and FtF durations (p < .001, M diff. = 989.69, 95% CI [725.08, 
1254.31]). There was no significant difference between VR and FtF studies (p = .139, M 








Figure 7.4. Box plot showing the inter-quartile range (IQR) for duration of jury discussion 
across the three studies presented in Chapters 4 to 6 (FtF, CMC, and VR). Whiskers 
represents top and bottom 25% of scores, whilst individual data points highlight outliers.  
 
To further corroborate findings from the previous chapters regarding gender and 
ethnicity, data from all three studies were combined to analyse the differences in duration 
of jury discussion. This revealed non-significant findings for both gender, F (1, 195) = .09, 
p = .758, and ethnicity, Welch’s F (1, 170.79) = 3.04, p = .083. Persuasion across all three 
studies was in line with previous results, whereby persuaded mock-jurors had much shorter 
durations for the jury discussion (M = 591.88, SD = 530.18) than those who were not 
persuaded and thus maintained their initial verdict choice (M = 1343.60, SD = 775.20), 
Welch’s F (1, 143.23) = 59.36, p < .001, ηp2 = .25.  
Mock-jurors scoring low in delusional thinking had longer jury discussions (M = 
1002.85 SD = 846.89) compared to mock-jurors scoring in the top 25th percentile for 
delusional thinking (M = 812.15, SD = 642.72). This however was non-significant, F (1, 
96) = 1.54, p = .217, ηp2 = .01. In contrast, mock-jurors high in their NfCC had longer 
discussion durations (M = 1052.13, SD = 889.81) than individuals low in this measure (M 
= 904.63, SD = 596.28), although this difference was again, not significant, Welch’s F (1, 
79.44) = .91, p = .342.  
 
7.3.5   Linguistic style. 
7.3.5.1   Word count. Word count data was analysed to understand whether 
duration correlates with word count across contexts. Indeed, observation of the means does 
not follow the duration pattern. Figure 7.5 shows that the longest jury discussion (CMC) 
has the lowest word count average (M = 350.37, SD = 223.25), given that participants had 
to write their arguments anonymously rather than verbalise them to a known entity; be that 
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an avatar (M [word count for VR] = 731.85, SD = 706.57) or real-life person (M [word 
count FtF] = 1010.07, SD = 912.89). These mean scores significantly differed across the 
studies, Welch’s F (2, 101.56) = 24.84, p < .001, ηp2 = .14, 95% CI (601.57, 800.13), with 
Games-Howell multiple comparison tests revealing significant mean differences between 
the CMC condition and both the FtF (M diff = 659.70, p < .001) and VR (M diff = 380.64, 
p < .001) modalities. The FtF and VR studies did not differ on word count (M diff = 
279.06, p = .106). This shows that mock-jurors said more when they were conversing in 
real-time with a mock-juror than if they were completely anonymous and typing their 
responses.  
 
Figure 7.5. Box plot showing the inter-quartile range (IQR) for word count across the three 
studies presented in Chapters 4 to 6 (FtF, CMC, and VR). Whiskers represents top and 




Despite gender not producing a significant finding for duration of jury discussion, 
here word count was significant, Welch’s F (1, 165.48) = 6.45, p = .012. ηp2 = .03, 95% CI 
(601.57, 800.13) with males speaking more (M = 826.08, SD = 833.04) than females (M = 
574.34, SD = 524.87). Ethnicity sub-groups did not significantly differ on word count, F 
(1, 195) = .70, p = .40.  
To understand whether participant mock-jurors, or confederate mock-jurors said 
more during the discussion, and the interaction of any differences across both study and 
persuasion, a 3 (Study: FtF v. CMC v. VR) x 2 (Status: participant mock-juror v. 
confederate mock-juror) x 2 (Persuasion: persuaded v. not-persuaded) between-factor 
ANOVA was conducted for word count. WC for study was significant, as mentioned in the 
above analysis. Persuasion was also significant, F (1, 132) = 85.21, p < .001, ηp2 = .18, 
supporting previous findings in Chapters 4-6 that non-persuaded interactions resulted in a 
higher WC than successfully persuaded discussions. Status had no significant difference in 
mean scores regarding WC, F (1, 382) = .08, p = .774, ηp2 < .01, highlighting that the jury 
discussions were evenly split during conversations.  
A significant status x persuasion interaction emerged, F (1, 382) = 4.26, p = .040, 
ηp2 = .01. However, post-hoc tests revealed no significant mean differences in WC across 
status for either persuaded (p = .182) or non-persuaded (p = .117) outcomes. There was 
also a significant interaction for study x persuasion, F (2, 382) = 23.85, p < .001, ηp2 = .11. 
Subsequent pairwise comparisons using Bonferroni’s correction highlighted significant 
differences in WC for all six post-hoc comparisons (p’s < .05). Study x status, and the 
three-way interaction of study x persuasion x status were not significant for WC (p’s > 
.05).  
 
7.3.5.2   LIWC categories. 
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7.3.5.2.1   Linguistic differences across the three contexts.  LIWC contains ten 
linguistic categories of interest to the current research tapping psychological constructs, 
linguistic dimensions and informal language markers (Power and influence [clout], 
authenticity, tone, function words, affective, social and cognitive processes, drives, 
informal language and analytical thinking). A between-factor MANOVA was conducted 
for the three levels of Study to investigate any differences in the ten dependent variables 
outlined. Homogeneity of variance was violated, Box’s M = 371.28, F (110, 101594.35) = 
3.13, p < .001, meaning Pillai’s trace was employed given it has been shown to be a robust 
statistic when there is heterogeneity of covariances (see Field, 2013). This produced a 
statistically significant effect, Pillai’s trace = .85, F (20, 370) = 19.16, p < .001, ηp2 = .51. 
Follow-up univariate ANOVAs (using Bonferroni’s correction) and subsequent post-hoc 
tests are displayed in Table 7.6.  This highlights significant mean differences for function 
words, affective processes, drives, analytical thinking and informal language. Successive 
pairwise comparisons are outlined in the table, showing a higher degree of affective 
language, drives and analytical thinking in the CMC modality than the FtF and VR 
environmental conditions. Specifically, almost a third of the discussion in the CMC was 
made up of analytical thinking, compared to under 10% for the VR and FtF studies. 
Additionally, there was less informal language during the anonymous CMC condition. The 
VR modality rated the highest for informal language use, followed closely by the FtF 




Descriptive statistics, follow-up univariate ANOVAs and post-hoc comparisons (Tukey and 










FtF CMC VR F p ηp2 
Clout M = 46.34 
SD = 
19.23 
M = 48.34 
SD = 
17.98 






Authentic M = 29.72 
SD = 
20.18 
M = 28.13 
SD = 
20.20 
M = 34.25 
SD = 
22.97 
1.48 .230 .23 - 
Tone M = 39.70 
SD = 
21.05 
M = 36.61 
SD = 
25.74 
M = 44.56 
SD = 
26.22 
1.77 .174 .02 - 
Function 
words 
M = 64.46 
SD = 3.03 
M = 60.49 
SD = 3.37 
M = 61.75 








Affect M = 5.15 
SD = 1.44 
M = 7.27 
SD = 2.34  
M = 5.51 










M = 11.27 
SD = 2.98 
M = 10.16 
SD = 2.51 
M = 11.28 
SD = 3.01 





M = 18.94 
SD = 2.60 
M = 18.92 
SD = 3.41 
M = 19.20 
SD = 2.98 
.17 .841 < 
.01 
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Drives M = 5.47 
SD = 1.75 
M = 8.23 
SD = 2.27 
M = 5.83 








Informal M = 7.46 
SD = 3.77 
M = 2.31 
SD = 1.85 
M = 9.10 








Analytical M = 6.79 
SD = 5.61 
M = 30.49 
SD = 
16.36 
M = 8.77 












7.3.5.2.2   Linguistic differences for persuasion. Next, LIWC categories for the 
persuasion sub-groups (persuaded or not) were analysed across the entire data sample, 
irrespective of environmental modality. This revealed a significant multivariate effect, 
Box’s M < .01, Pillai’s trace = 1.00, F (10, 186) = 8.24, p < .001, ηp2 = .31. Follow-up 
univariate ANOVAs revealed that cognitive processing, F (1, 195) = 8.84, p = .003, ηp2 = 
.04 (M persuaded = 19.57, SD = 2.86; M not-persuaded = 18.31, SD = 3.04), analytical 
thinking. F (1, 195) = 16.71, p <.001, ηp2 = .08 (M persuaded = 11.48, SD = 13.30; M not-
persuaded = 19.92, SD = 15.65), drives, F (1, 195) = 22.93, p <.001, ηp2 = .10 (M persuaded = 
5.83, SD = 2.14; M not-persuaded = 7.34, SD = 2.26), and informal language, F (1, 195) = 
62.98, p <.001, ηp2 = .24 (M persuaded = 8.28, SD = 4.32; M not-persuaded = 3.85, SD = 3.23) 
contributed to this effect. This indicates that mock-jurors who were persuaded produced a 
larger amount of cognitive processes and informal language in their linguistic style. 
Likewise, non-persuaded mock-jurors had greater percentages of analytical thinking and 
instances of drives, such as achievements, power and risk overall in their speech compared 
to persuaded mock-jurors.  
 
7.3.5.2.3   Linguistic differences broken down by gender and ethnicity. Previous 
chapters have broken gender and ethnicity down to investigate any differences or 
similarities in linguistic style within each study and each level of the factors (males, 
females, British and South-Asian). However, this chapter serves to bring these statistics 
into one large database, thus allowing a further breakdown of these factors regardless of 
environmental modalities. Therefore, a 2 (Gender: male v. female) x 2 (Ethnicity: British 
v. South-Asian) between factor MANOVA was conducted on the inclusive ten categories 
of LIWC. This resulted in a significant main effect of Ethnicity, Wilks’s Λ = .73, F (10, 
184) = 6.82, p <.001, ηp2 = 27. Subsequent univariate ANOVAs (adjusting for Bonferroni’s 
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correction) revealed that clout, F (1, 193) = 10.52, p = .001, ηp2 = .05 (M British = 42.85, 
SD =16.81; M South-Asian = 51.21, SD = 19.24), affective, F (1, 193) = 18.542, p < .001, 
ηp2 =  .09 (M British = 5.30, SD = 1.83; M South-Asian = 6.61, SD = 2.37), and social 
processes F (1, 193) = 23.39, p <.001, ηp2 = .11 (M British = 9.97, SD = 2.26; M South-Asian 
= 11.84, SD = 3.12), were significantly different across the ethnic groups. The multivariate 
effect of gender was non-significant Wilks’s Λ = .94, F (10, 184) = 1.08, p = .383, likewise 
the ethnicity x gender interaction was non-significant, Wilks’s Λ = .95, F (10, 184) = 1.00, 
p = .442. 
7.3.5.2.4   Linguistic differences for cognitive style. Exploratory analyses regarding 
the two cognitive style measures were undertaken. A 2 (NfCC: high v. low) x 2 (PDI-R: 
high v. low) between-factor MANOVA was utilised for cognitive style across the ten 
LIWC categories, which revealed non-significant multivariate effects for delusional 
thinking, Wilks’s Λ = .82, F (10, 38) = .84, p = .589, NfCC, Wilks’s Λ = .69, F (10, 38) = 
1.71, p = .113, and the PDI-R x NfCC interaction, Wilks’s Λ = .66, F (10, 38) = 1.98, p = 
.063.   
 
7.3.5.3   Linguistic style matching (LSM).  To examine whether there are any 
differences in the mean total LSM scores across the three studies, a univariate ANOVA 
was conducted. Initial observation of the means indicate higher LSM in the FtF 
environmental modality (M = .88, SD = .05) compared to the CMC (M = .84, SD = .06) 
and VR conditions (M = .85, SD = .06). This was confirmed in the inferential analysis, F 
(2, 194) = 8.49, p < .001, ηp2 = .08, 95% CI (.85, .87). Tukey post-hoc comparisons showed 
significant mean differences between the FtF modality and the other two studies, CMC (p 
< .001) and VR (p = .031). CMC and VR has similar mean LSM scores (p = .265). This 
indicates that FtF discussions have significantly more linguistic synchronicity compared to 
discussions via online transmission.  
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Looking at persuasion across all three studies, the univariate ANOVA revealed 
non-significant differences, F (1, 195) = 2.57, p = .110, ηp2 = .01, supporting previous 
chapters showing little differences in LSM for the persuaded versus not-persuaded mock-
jurors. Further, to collate the entirety of the current data and investigate ethnicity and 
gender interactions, a 2 x 2 ANOVA was conducted. This revealed non-significant main 
effects for gender, F (1, 193) = .71, p = .401, ηp2 <.01, and ethnicity, F (1, 193) = .22, p = 
.636, ηp2 <.01. The interaction for ethnicity and gender was also non-significant, F (1, 193) 
= .03, p = .851, ηp2 <.01 revealing no differences in linguistic similarity across males, 
females, British and South-Asian mock-juror groups.  
 
7.3.5.3.1   LSM over time. A 2 (Persuasion: persuaded vs. not-persuaded) x 3 
(Study: FtF vs. CMC vs. VR) x 4 (Time: 1 vs. 2 vs. 3 vs. 4) mixed-factor ANOVA was 
conducted for the four quartiles of each discussion, with the total LSM score as the 
dependent variable. This revealed a non-significant main effect for time, F (3, 573) = .15, p 
= .929. The two-way interactions consisting of Time x study, F (6, 573) = .59, p = .742, 
and time x persuasion, F (3, 573) = .33, p = .806, were also not significant. Finally, the 
inferential analysis revealed a significant three-way interaction, F (6, 573) = 2.35, p = .030, 
ηp2 = .02.  This interaction has a very small effect size and thus any inferences from this 
three-way interaction should be made with caution.  
 
7.3.5.4   Epistemic modality. The degree of confidence (measured as either high or 
low) in the verdict proposed by mock-jurors is measured through linguistic style via LIWC 
analysis (epistemic modality). To investigate the effects of status, persuasion and study, a 2 
(Status: participant vs. confederate) x 2 (Persuasion: persuaded vs. not-persuaded) x 3 
(Study: FtF vs. CMC vs. VR) MANOVA was conducted for high and low epistemic 
modality, which revealed a violation of equal covariates (Box’s M < .05). There were 
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significant main effects for Persuasion, Pillai’s trace = .02, F (2, 381) = 4.62, p = .010, ηp2 
= .02, and Study, Pillai’s trace = .09, F (4, 764) = 8.85, p < .001, ηp2 = .04. Status produced 
a non-significant multivariate main effect, Pillai’s trace <.01, F (2, 381) = .40, p = .671. 
Further, there were statistically significant interactions for status x persuasion, Pillai’s trace 
= .03, F (2, 381) = 5.29, p <. 01, ηp2 = .03, and persuasion x study, Pillai’s trace =.03, F (4, 
764) = 2.55, p = .038, ηp2 = .01. Status x study, Pillai’s trace <.01, F (4, 765) = .62, p = 
.648, and the three-way interaction were both non-significant, Pillai’s trace <.01, F (4, 764) 
= .85, p = .493.  
Follow-up univariate ANOVAs revealed persuasion had a significant influence on 
low epistemic modality, F (1, 382) = 9.14, p = .003, ηp2 = .02, whereby those who were 
persuaded to change their opinion had a higher percentage of low-confidence words in 
their speech (M = 3.10, SD = 1.50) than the mock-jurors who resisted persuasion (M = 
2.11, SD = 1.14). High confidence in speech did not contribute to the significant main 
effect for persuasion (p > .05).  
Univariate ANOVAs for study revealed significant differences for both low, F (2, 
382) = 13.28, p < .001, ηp2 = .06, and high confidence in speech, F (2, 382) = 4.30, p = 
.014, ηp2 = .02. Post-hoc Tukey multiple comparisons revealed significant mean differences 
for the FtF and VR studies when compared to the CMC condition (see Table 7.7). The 
CMC condition had a significantly reduced percentage of low (M = 2.06, SD = 1.21) and 
high confidence (M = 3.80, SD = 1.17) words during the discussion compared to both the 
FtF (M low-conf = 2.86, SD = 1.48; M high-conf = 4.54, SD = 1.30) and VR environments (M 
low-conf = 3.06, SD = 1.42; M high-conf = 4.47, SD = 1.57).  
 
Table 7.6 
Tukey HSD comparisons for environmental studies across the two dependent variables for 
epistemic modality  
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    95% CI 
Dependent 
variable 
Comparisons  Mean 







Low confidence FtF v CMC .80** .23 .25 1.36 
 CMC v VR -1.00*** .23 -1.55 -.45 
 
High confidence 
FtF v VR 
FtF v CMC 
CMC v VR 

















Note. *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 
 
Finally, the between-subjects comparisons revealed that the status x persuasion 
interaction influenced low confidence, F (2, 382) = 8.90, p = .014, ηp2 = .02. The means 
indicate that persuasion influences this interaction rather than status, with the persuaded 
mock-juror having a higher percentage of low confidence in speech than the not-persuaded 
mock-juror, and no differences occurring across the status conditions. All remaining 
univariate ANOVAs for the main effect and interactions contained within this MANOVA 
did not significantly differ (all p’s > .05).  
To understand the interaction between gender and ethnicity for epistemic modality, 
a 2 x 2 MANOVA was additionally computed. However, the multivariate results indicate 
that neither gender, F (2, 192) = 2.28, p = .105, nor ethnicity F (2, 192) = .37, p = .690, 
significantly influenced epistemic modality. Further, the interaction between these two 
independent variables was non-significant, F (2, 192) = 1.63, p = .198.     
 
7.3.6   Qualitative content analysis (QCA). This section brings together the 
existing descriptives contained within the three studies that make up this thesis; collating 
and exploring the sum of the qualitative data to allow variables (cognitive style, 
persuasion, gender and ethnicity) to be analysed for all three modalities. A total of 2,758 
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QCA codes were analysed for the 197 participants, and it is this data which is summarised 
below. As this sub-section is an inclusion of the existing analyses contained within 
Chapters 4 to 6, the QCA themes will be merged and commented on with regards to pre- 
and post-discussion sections only (see Appendix M4).  
 7.3.6.1   Pre-discussion. Overall, 32.5% of mock-jurors expanded on the 
prosecution’s argument compared to half of this number expanding on the defence’s 
arguments (16.2%). This pattern continued when comparing the persuaded and not-
persuaded groups indicating that this bias towards initial focus on the prosecution’s 
argument did not influence persuasion outcomes. Across all three studies, the highest 
scoring category regarding references to the accused was that of the company only (QCA 
502). The pattern of mock-jurors falling into Theme 2 did not vary across the persuaded 
and not-persuaded groups (46.8%; 46.5% respectively), thus indicating references to the 
accused in responses prior to the jury discussion was not indicative of persuasion 
outcomes.  
Those who reasoned using the case file evidence only (QCA code 141) and did not 
expand in anyway were more likely to be persuaded (18%) by the jury discussion 
(compared to 7% in the not-persuaded sample). Further, double the frequency of South-
Asian mock-jurors (18.2%) fell into this code compared to the British sample (8.2%), and 
low NfCC individuals also relied heavily on background information (15.7%) to much 
more of an extent than individuals high in the NfCC (4.7%). Perhaps in a bid to explain 
their reasoning sufficiently enough to counter any rebuttals, individuals high in the NfCC 
expanded their thought processes, utilising information and evidence that went beyond that 
of the brief (which is kept deliberately vague as a paradigm) in order to allow a firm 
decision to be made. In addition, males were twice as likely to fall into QCA code 13 
(7.1%) which focussed on analytical reasoning and has an absence of any emotions than 
the females (3.1%) across all studies. 
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Regarding attribution of guilt, the frequency to which participants referenced the 
company/the accused vs. somebody else was nearly 50:50, which held across the 
persuasion groups. This indicates that initial responses regarding attribution of 
responsibility is not indicative of persuasion outcomes.  
When asked what, if any, facts they ignored when making their initial decision, the 
highest scoring QCA code was ‘background information – QCA code 4’ (44.7%). This 
highlights that the majority of participants read the scenario closely, focussing on the 
evidence provided and the arguments made by opposing counsels rather than the 
background information which set the scenario into context and thus failed to provide 
evidence towards the charge of negligence. Further, when asked why they had ignored this 
information, 28.9% stated the information was not important or relevant to their decision. 
British mock-jurors were more likely to reason analytically when explaining why they had 
ignored certain evidence, as were the males when compared to their opposing sample 
groups.  
 
7.3.6.2   Post-discussion. As with the pre-discussion, the highest scoring category 
in Theme 1 was expansion on the prosecution’s argument (27.4%), with very similar 
frequency counts across all levels of the variables (ethnicity, gender, cognitive style and 
persuasion). Interestingly, those who were not persuaded quoted an absence of evidence to 
a higher degree (25.6%) than those who were persuaded (12.6%).  
8.1% of the not-persuaded mock-jurors referenced background information as the 
primary reason for their final decision, the same statistic as the pre-discussion responses 
indicting little change in their reasoning and thus not changing their verdict choice. Just, 
0.9% (n=1) of the persuaded sample mentioned background information as a reason for 
changing their verdict in the post-discussion (compared to 13.5% at the pre-discussion).  
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The fact that a person was being charged (the managing director) seemed to be an 
important factor in the decision making of British and female samples, with almost double 
the frequency of respondents falling into QCA code 401 than South-Asian and male 
groups. Additionally, more people noted this as a reason for their change in verdict choice 
(13.5%) than those who resisted persuasion and stuck with their initial decision (8.1%; be 
it guilty or not guilty).  
Theme 2 had a pretty even split regarding references to the accused, referring to the 
company (32.5%), the individual (32.0%) or both (28.4%). This even pattern follows 
across persuasion and other variable groups with no clear differences across the samples. 
Theme 3 on the other hand, revealed differences between the persuasion groups. More 
people referenced moral reasons as their motivation to change their opinion (10.8%) 
compared to just one person in the non-persuaded group (1.2%). Due to the confederates 
following a set script and points made not differing across the confederate mock-jurors, 
this does not simply mean that mock-jurors were more likely to be persuaded if they were 
presented with a moral argument. Rather, mock-jurors with a predisposition to change their 
opinion were more likely to be persuaded when moral reasoning was presented and 
discussed whereas the not-persuaded mock-jurors do to mention any moral reasoning when 
justifying their verdict choices. Males were less likely to use moral reasoning in their 
verdict choice statements (2%), whereas 11.2% of the female sample (n = 11) fell into the 
QCA category.  
QCA code 142 highlights mock-jurors’ reasoning for primarily choosing not guilty 
due to expansion of the defence’s argument, and thinking about the scenario in a different, 
more holistic way. Nearly a third of persuaded mock-jurors utilised this reasoning in their 
statements (27%) compared to just 9.3% of mock-jurors who were not-persuaded. This 
does not seem to be due to it being ‘easier’ to persuade someone to change from guilty to 
not guilty, as there is a relatively even split regarding guilty reasoning (QCA codes 9 and 
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10) across the persuaded and not-persuaded groups. Perhaps then, expanding on the 
evidence provided not only in the defence’s statement, but also on the background 
information to bolster your argument was more productive at changing mock-jurors’ 
opinions.  
British mock-jurors had a much higher percentage of individuals stating that they were 
not persuaded due to a lack of evidence strength (13.3%) compared to the South-Asian 
participants (3%), who were more likely to simply state they were not persuaded and not 
expand on their statements. Of those who were not persuaded to change their mind 
however, a large proportion (33.7%) conceded that despite not being persuaded, the 
confederate did say some persuasive points. Of those who were persuaded, their main 
reasoning surrounded the fact that they felt the confederate mock-juror challenged their 
point of view and highlighted areas of the evidence or scenario which they had not thought 
about/missed out initially (58.6%). Thus, over half of the persuaded mock-jurors conceded 
that the confederate was successful in changing their opinion and did so by successfully 
challenging their initial point of view using reasoned arguments.  
   More persuaded mock-jurors (20.7%) stated communication was balanced and fair 
than the not-persuaded mock jurors (5.8%). Perhaps not surprisingly, the non-persuaded 
mock-jurors had higher rates in the ‘negative QCA categories’, with 15.1% stating they 
thought the communication was rigid (compared to 6.3% of persuaded mock-jurors).  
 
7.3.6.3   QCA comparing the three environmental modalities.  This paragraph 
serves as an ephemeral summary of the key themes under which the three environmental 
modalities differ/are comparable. Of interest here are the responses to the post-discussion 
questionnaires following environmental exposure; of particular relevance are the responses 
regarding how persuasive the mock-jurors found the confederates.  
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The majority of mock-jurors who stated they were not persuaded due to the 
evidence not being strong enough (QCA code 152) were in the CMC condition (14.1%, n = 
9), with a much lower frequency appearing in the FtF (4.5%, n = 3) and VR (6%, n = 4) 
settings. This is despite the evidence being exactly the same across all three studies, 
indicting that exposure to arguments in an anonymous instant messaging context appeared 
to be perceived as weaker compared to the FtF and VR conditions.  
Assessment of the communication during the jury discussions reveal that the CMC 
modality had a higher frequency for QCA code 24, specifying that participants felt the 
communication was rigid and argumentative (17.2%, n = 11). The FtF condition received 
9.1% (n = 6) in this category whereas the VR environment had the least complaints 
regarding rigid conversations, at 4.5% (n = 3). In fact, the VR condition received very little 
negative comments on the communication interactions, with over half of the sample 
(52.2%, n = 35) quoting that the communication was friendly, pleasant and easy.  
 
7.3.7   Confederate ratings. Confederate ratings were taken across all three 
studies, which asked for the mock-jurors to assess how ‘friendly’ and ‘aggressive’ they 
perceived their communication partner to be during the discussion. Gender, persuasion and 
ethnicity were compared to better understand whether defined differences affected the 
outcome of these subjective ratings. Mann-Whitney U tests revealed non-significant effects 
for Gender when reporting on Friendliness U = 4345.00, p = .186, r = .09, and 
Aggressiveness U = 4696.50, p = .667, r = .03, of the confederate mock-juror. Ethnicity 
ratings of Friendliness was also non-significant, U = 4778.00, p = .848, r = .01. However, 
ratings of aggressiveness varied between the sample groups for ethnicity, U = 4058.50, p = 
.027, r = .16, with South-Asian mock-jurors rating their fellow south-asian confederate as 
more passive (Mdn = 3; mean rank = 107.01) than the British sample rating the British 
confederates (Mdn = 3; mean rank = 90.91).  
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Persuasion was significant for ratings of friendliness, U = 3538.50, p = .001, r = 
.23. The descriptive statistics show persuaded mock-jurors rated their confederate as 
friendlier on average (Mdn = 4.0; mean rank = 110.12) than those who resisted persuasion 
(Mdn = 4.0; mean rank = 84.65). Ratings of aggressiveness was close to significant, U = 
4080.00, p = .052, r = .14, with analysis of the mean ranks indicating the persuaded mock-
jurors perceived their confederate as being more passive than the not-persuaded mock-
jurors (mean rank = 105.24; Mdn = 3.0; mean rank for not-persuaded group = 90.94, Mdn 
= 3.0).   
The Kruskal-Wallis H test is a rank-based non-parametric alternative to a one-way 
ANOVA, and an extension of Mann-Whitney U which allows for the comparisons of more 
than two groups. This was conducted to compare confederate mock-juror ratings of 
friendliness and aggressiveness across all three environmental modalities. Subjective 
ratings of aggressiveness were significantly affected by environmental modality, H(2) = 
8.15, p = .017. Pairwise comparisons used adjusted p-values controlling for Type I error 
(see Table 7.8 for descriptive statistics) showed a significant difference between the CMC 
and FtF study for ratings of confederate aggressiveness (Adj. p = .041, r = .22), as well as 
the CMC study and VR study (Adj. p = .038, r = .22). There were no significant 
differences in aggressiveness ratings for the FtF and VR studies (Adj. p = 1.00, r < .001), 
indicating very similar mean ranks for aggressiveness across these two studies. 
 
Table 7.7 





Study N Mean Rank 
FtF 66 106.13 
CMC 64 83.98 






Ratings of how friendly the mock-jurors found the confederate mock-juror across 
the three studies also revealed a significant result, H(2) = 31.400, p < .001. Pairwise 
comparisons among the three groups with adjusted p-values revealed significant 
differences in friendliness ratings for the CMC vs FtF studies (Adj. p < .001, r = .47), as 
well as the CMC vs VR studies (Adj. p < .001, r = .36). The difference in the mean ranks 
for the FtF v VR studies was not significantly different (Adj. p = .661, r = .11). Table 7.9 
presents the mean ranks for all three studies, revealing that the CMC modality has 
significantly lower friendliness ratings for the jury discussion than the FtF and VR studies.  
 
Table 7.8 
Descriptive statistics for ratings of friendliness of confederate mock-juror across all three 
studies  
Study N Mean Rank 
FtF 66 119.55 
CMC 64 68.42 
VR 67 107.97 
Note. A higher ranking indicates a confederate being more friendly than unfriendly.  
 
 
7.3.7.1   Confederate word count. To understand whether there were any 
extraneous differences in word count across the confederate mock-jurors, a univariate 
ANOVA was conducted, containing 4 levels of the manipulated IV (British male, British 
female, South-Asian male, South-Asian female). Due to Levene’s statistic being significant 
(p < .001), Welch’s F was adopted. This showed a non-significant difference in word count 
Note. A lower rank indicates aggressiveness. A higher ranking indicates a 




for the four confederate mock-juror categories, Welch’s F (3, 103.81) = 1.91, p = .133, 
demonstrating that across gender and ethnic divides, different confederate mock-jurors did 
not differ for the number of words spoken/written during the jury discussions.    
 
7.3.8   Summary of results. Looking across all three studies, the distribution for 
persuaded to not-persuaded differs from males to females, with more females showing a 
persuaded outcome whilst males have a much more even ratio of dispersion.  When 
comparing persuasion across studies, Study 1 (FtF) had a very similar number of mock-
jurors persuaded (69.7%) to Study 3 (VR; 65.7%) whereas Study 2 (CMC) shows a 
complete reversal of this effect in that the number of people persuaded in the other two 
studies matched the number not persuaded in the CMC modality (67.2%). This indicates 
that the novel VR is as successful at inducing persuasion as FtF conversations whereas 
CMC seemingly contributes to the resistance of the same persuasive messages.  
 To investigate whether a verdict of guilty or not guilty was easier to obtain give the 
evidence provided, a chi-square test highlighted that a choice of either verdict does not 
significantly affect persuasion outcomes, and the varying differences in changing from one 
verdict to another is not considered easier or harder to induce a change in opinion - the 
findings for persuasion across the three studies cannot be attributed to the strength of 
evidence provided in the case summary.  
 Across both time points (pre and post-discussion) confidence in verdict was found 
to significantly differ between persuaded and not-persuaded groups. Overall, those who 
were persuaded to change their verdict had lower confidence in their initial and final 
verdict compared to those who resisted persuasion. Despite a non-significant interaction, 
the graph depicting confidence in verdict at Time 2 for the three studies, split by 
persuasion (see figure 7.3), indicates that confidence post-CMC interaction has a large 
difference when comparing persuaded and not-persuaded verdicts. However, the FtF and 
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VR show an overlap in their findings, reflecting similarities regarding percentage 
confidence in verdict post-discussion.     
 To compare the change in confidence from time 1 to time 2, absolute confidence 
change was calculated. Once again, this revealed similarities for the FtF and VR studies, 
with both showing a 32% change in confidence regardless of verdict outcomes. This is 
compared to just 18% for the CMC study, with findings from Study 2 indicating this low 
change in confidence being due to a significant number of mock-jurors not being 
persuaded. Analysis of absolute confidence direction further revealed that the CMC study 
had a high proportion of mock-jurors who did not change their confidence post-discussion. 
Persuasion showed the biggest change in confidence, with those who were 
persuaded changing their confidence by 40% (in an upwards direction), whereas not-
persuaded mock-jurors had an average change of just 12% due to the majority of mock-
jurors not changing their confidence across the time frames. Differences for persuaded 
mock-jurors across the studies regarding absolute confidence change was significant but 
the not persuaded changes in confidence did not significantly differ across the three 
studies.   
 Cognitive style across all studies did not have a relationship between the two 
measures, which was confirmed when analysing the larger data set. With a larger data set 
available, mock-jurors who were high or low in the two cognitive style measures revealed 
non-significant findings for all but ethnicity and delusional thinking. The finding showing 
that South-Asian mock-jurors were more likely to score high in PDI-R than British mock-
jurors, and the reverse was true for those low in PDI-R.  
The time taken to discuss the jury paradigm and come to a conclusion, be that 
unanimous or not, revealed similar findings for FtF and VR studies, with the VR study 
having a slighter quicker discussion duration (08:26 mins) than FtF (10:46 mins). 
However, the CMC study which required mock-jurors to write their thoughts rather than 
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verbalise them had a significantly longer duration of discussion (on average lasting for 
27:16 mins) and this significantly differed for both FtF and VR datasets. Despite CMC 
having the largest duration, it had the lowest word count of all the studies (mean of 350) 
whilst FtF had the largest contribution from mock-jurors (1010, and VR having an average 
word count of 732). It shows how mock-jurors contribute much more to the discussion 
when conversing FtF with their jury partner, and this contribution to word count decreases 
as the modalities become restricted; with a lower word count for VR and a significantly 
lower contribution when responses are anonymous and written using CMC.  
Overall, persuasion outcomes followed the findings from the previous three studies 
in that persuaded interactions were significantly shorter (09:52 mins) than interactions 
which failed to reach a unanimous conclusion (22:24 mins). Cognitive style and ethnicity 
were similar in their duration of discussion times and word count responses across all three 
studies. The word count for gender highlights that across all three studies males 
spoke/wrote more on average than females, despite their duration of discussion not 
differing across the groups. Confederate mock-jurors and mock-jurors were evenly split on 
word count, with no significant differences across the persuaded groups for all three 
studies. This indicates that findings cannot be attributed to differences in confederates, 
even when persuasion and study are included in the analysis.  
A higher degree of affective language, drives and analytical thinking emerged in 
the CMC modality compared to FtF and VR environmental conditions. Specifically, almost 
a third of the discussion in the CMC was made up of analytical thinking language, 
compared to under 10% for the VR and FtF studies. Additionally, there was less informal 
language during the anonymous CMC condition. Here, the VR modality rated the highest 
for informal language use, followed closely by the FtF study. Finally, the FtF modality had 
significantly higher usage of function words than the CMC and VR environments, which 
did not differ for the linguistic sub-theme.     
  
261 
Persuaded mock-jurors had a higher percentage of cognitive processing and 
informal language in their speech, but significantly lower ratings of analytical thinking and 
drives (outlining achievements, power and risk) compared to the not-persuaded sample. 
British females, South-Asian males and South-Asian females displayed similarities in 
linguistic style across all ten linguistic sub-themes. Similarly, cognitive style revealed no 
significant difference for the ten linguistic sub-themes for mock-jurors either high or low 
in NfCC and PDI-R. However, ethnic differences emerged whereby South-Asian 
participants used more clout, affective and social processing in their discussions than 
British mock-jurors. However small effect sizes emerged for the majority of the LIWC 
findings for ethnicity.  
LSM showed how the FtF modality had a higher rate of synchronicity for mock-
jurors interacting with their confederate compared to both the VR and CMC environments, 
both of which are considered leaner in media richness. Ethnicity, gender and persuasion 
produced similar scores for LSM across the groups. When the duration of discussions were 
split into quartiles and LSM was measured within each of these segments, LSM did not 
differ for environmental modality or persuasion as the conversations progressed.  
Participants who were persuaded to change their opinion had a higher percentage of 
low-confident words (more doubt) in their speech than the mock-jurors who resisted 
persuasion. However, high confidence in speech did not contribute to the significant main 
effect for persuasion. When comparing the three studies, epistemic modality revealed how 
the CMC environment produced significantly lower rates of low and high confidence in 
speech when compared to both FtF and VR studies. The FtF and VR studies did not differ 
in ratings of expressed confidence in speech.  
 The qualitative content analysis combining all data from the three studies shows 
how more mock-jurors expanded on the prosecution’s argument when rationalisng their 
initial verdict choice than those who expanded on the defence’s. Individual’s reasoning 
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based on the case file evidence meant that they were more likely to be persuaded - they had 
not expanded their reasoning outside of the case summary and so were more likely to be 
introduced to new and novel arguments (nearly 60% of persuaded mock-jurors stating they 
were persuaded due to the confederate highlighting evidence they had not considered or 
missed). Males were twice as likely to reason analytically and have an absence of emotions 
when explaining their initial verdict compared to their female counterparts.  
 Concession to the fact that the company is partly responsible but not entirely to 
blame was more prevalent in persuaded mock-juror statements (10.8% vs 4.7% not-
persuaded. Perhaps a compromise enables an ease to change verdict choice and thus reason 
a half-way arrangement in the post-discussion questionnaire. Of those not persuaded, a 
high number conceded that the confederate said some persuasive points despite this not 
altering their decision. Likewise, both persuaded and not-persuaded individuals 
commented equally on the discussion being friendly and pleasant. 
Mock-jurors who commented that the evidence provided was not strong enough 
primarily came from mock-jurors interacting in the CMC environment despite evidence 
being universal across the studies. This implies that evidence and arguments in a restricted 
and lean modality such as CMC is perceived to be weaker than when these same 
arguments are presented in either VR or FtF. Furthermore, participants were more likely to 
comment that the discussion was rigid and argumentative when interacting in a written, 
anonymous format (Study 2).  
When ratings of the confederate mock-jurors were taken from across all three studies, 
it revealed that persuaded participants were more likely to rate their confederate as 
friendlier and less aggressive (ie, more passive) than mock-jurors who were not persuaded. 
Both the VR and FtF modalities produced similar rankings for aggressiveness ratings in 
that mock-jurors within these two studies perceived the confederate as more passive. The 
CMC environment however was significantly lower on this ranking highlighting how 
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mock-jurors perceived their anonymous partner to be more aggressive in this medium than 
either of the FtF or VR participants. This finding was further replicated for ratings of 
friendliness: CMC mock-juror ratings show significantly lower friendliness scores than the 
VR and FtF studies, who themselves scored similarly, with high mean ranks indicating a 
friendliness perception of their confederate discussion partners.    
 
7.4   Discussion 
This thesis sought to investigate persuasion within differing environmental 
modalities by employing a modernised version of the jury paradigm across three contexts 
(FtF, synchronous CMC, and immersive VR). Furthermore, it aimed to examine the impact 
of cognitive style, gender and ethnicity on the persuasion process. Finally, language was 
investigated to understand the impact, or otherwise, of linguistic style, linguistic 
synchronicity and epistemic modality on persuasion outcomes, in addition to gaining an 
understanding of the linguistic relationship across cognitive style, gender and ethnic 
measures. The results of each empirical chapter have been reported in full in the relevant 
sections of this thesis. Therefore, it is not the intention to reiterate what has already been 
stated. Rather, this discussion concerns itself with the primary findings emerging from the 
above reported analyses of relevance to the overarching aims.   
The primary findings to emerge from this final comparison analyses were, i) 
persuasion outcomes in VR contexts mirrored that of FtF, but persuasion in CMC was 
significantly reduced, ii) overall, non-persuaded participants were more confident in their 
verdict choices pre-discussion, and their confidence levels remained stable post-discussion. 
Persuaded participants were less confident with their pre-discussion choice, but their 
confidence increased substantially despite having changed their initial verdict, iii) overall, 
ethnicity and gender had no impact on persuasion outcomes, iv) cognitive style as 
measured using the NfCC and PDI-R did not mediate nor predict persuasion outcomes, and 
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v), persuaded participants displayed enhanced cognitive processing and informal language, 
but lower rates of analytical reasoning compared to non-persuaded participants. Each of 
these primary findings are now discussed in turn.  
 
7.4.1   Persuasion. As noted above, the VRE produced similar outcomes for 
persuasion as the FtF modality. Yet the anonymous CMC context revealed the reverse in 
that mock-jurors, on average, were more likely to resist persuasion attempts. This is in line 
with previous research finding fewer opinion changes in chat-based CMC than FtF (Di 
Blasio & Milani, 2008). Wilson (2003) also found that CMC was substantially less 
effective than FtF for both achieving persuasion and applying persuasive strategies.  
Additionally, CMC has been found to be less effective in a variety of negotiation, choice, 
and execution tasks (Wilson & Morrison, 2000), advocating that the act of interactive 
communication using a lean digital modality hampers successful communication and 
makes tasks much more difficult to accomplish.  
This supports the HSM predictions made in Table 1.1, where richer mediums (FtF) 
enable multi-channel processing, promoting the utilisation of both heuristic and systematic 
arguments in their decision-making. If complementary, these multiple cues have an 
addictive affect and can enhance one’s processing of the persuasive argument (successful 
persuasive outcome). CMC on the other hand restricts the ability to utilise multi-channel 
processing by restricting heuristic cues (such as non-verbal behaviour, paralinguistic cues, 
utilisation of stereotypical variables). This enhances cognitive load for participants, 
requiring them to process the arguments systematically, negatively biasing persuasion 
outcomes given that the default position of the HSM is the principle of least cognitive 
effort.  
 Furthermore, these findings support the Media Richness theory (MRT: Daft & 
Lengel, 1986) whereby textual communication constrains transmission of non-verbal and 
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paralinguistic cues, in turn negatively impacting on decision-making and the process of 
communication (Hammick & Lee, 2014; McGrath & Hollingshead, 1993). The 
impoverished modality confines an individual’s ability to translate and interpret social and 
contextual cues (Muscanell, 2009), breaking down the interaction to simple written text. 
This diminishes the ability to signal an interruption or clarify a given point, making the 
interaction during the CMC modality disjointed and detached compared to FtF and VR 
(Jensen et al., 1999; Straus & McGrath, 1994). The low persuasion result within the CMC 
medium possibly reflects difficulties in interrupting or clarifying judgments. This is 
supported by the qualitative analysis, with participants commenting that they perceived the 
discussion as more rigid and argumentative. Individuals also remarked that persuasive 
arguments were not considered strong enough to change their mind, despite these same 
arguments being used across all three modalities to greater effect. It suggests that 
participants’ processing was biased by the lack of available cues and the increase in 
cognitive effort needed given the difficulties the CMC environment has in conveying and 
transmitting persuasive messages, and thus the arguments that do get aired are considered 
weaker as a result (see Patterson, 1982).   
Despite Study 2 being a socially lean modality, it does allow for synchronous 
communication and has the ability to convey emotions (via emojis). Yet despite this 
advancement towards a more ‘naturalistic’ (akin to direct and instant messaging services 
popularly used) and instant way to communicate online, this research has shown that text-
based chats continue to restrain effective and persuasive communication. For example, 
being able to transfer sarcasm. Hence, despite Study 2 advancing the persuasion paradigms 
previously employed by increasing the ‘richness’ of CMC (see Baltes et al., 2002), at its 
heart is a modality which remains anonymous and lacks visual and auditory cues, instead 
relying on the transmission of typed messages.  
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Writing increases cognitive load, requiring simultaneous or rapid switching 
between a variety of processes (see Torrance & Galbraith, 2006). For example, the time 
taken to receive and read the information, time taken to formulate a response while 
attempting to avoid spelling mistakes, the speed to which thought processes run in parallel 
to typing ability, responding to the appropriate responses when multiple chunks of 
conversation filter through, and keeping concentration levels high. In FtF, on the other 
hand, when waiting to respond, the other communication partner verbalises their opinions 
whilst the receiver listens, processes, retrieves and relates to existing thoughts, whilst 
subconsciously monitoring and imitating body language etc. For example, the listener can 
utilise both routes for the HSM, enabling them to co-occur and create additive effects were 
appropriate. In CMC, however, it takes time to type and respond, leaving the recipient in a 
state of limbo given the restriction of peripheral cues. This is reflected in the duration 
differences across the modalities. Participants in Study 2 took nearly three times as long to 
reach a decision than the FtF and VR contexts yet reported significantly fewer linguistic 
responses. The time difference in achieving tasks within synchronous text-based mediums 
vs FtF contexts has been consistently reported within the literature, in addition to CMC’s 
prevalence for fewer comments and reduced effectiveness (see Baltes et al., 2002).  
The VRE constructed in this thesis on the other hand, was richer in its ability to 
transmit cues than other forms of digital modalities (for example, Study 2) because it 
supported real-time audio chat and interactive, immersive visual perception of their 
communication partner. Both FtF and the VR interactions benefit from simultaneous 
feedback and exchange of verbal and non-verbal cues to emphasise the message and 
opinions of the speaker. For example, openly showing agreement and understanding via 
nodding of the head. Interestingly, Jensen et al. (1999) found that voice conditions result in 
higher levels of cooperation compared to text-based chat modalities. This could be due to 
the enhanced level of social proximity and immediacy felt in FtF and VRE conditions and 
  
267 
the ability for the two processing routes of the HSM to co-occur. The findings also serve to 
replicate Xu and Behring’s (2014) findings, who measured persuasion in a similar manner 
to the current research, finding that audio chat led to enhanced persuasion and consensus in 
a survival-rank task compared to when participants used a text-based chat.  
Dual-process models of persuasion serve to provide a framework of understanding 
persuasion within interactive, social settings. Media-rich environments such as the FtF 
modality, and to a lesser extent the VRE, allow heuristic and paralinguistic cues to be 
received and processed as part of the decision-making process (see Khan & Sutcliffe, 
2013). Di Blasio and Milani (2008), Guadagno and Cialdini (2002), and Petty and 
Cacioppo (1986a) amongst others reason that the FtF environment is rich in contextual, 
non-verbal, and relational stimuli, all of which combine to distract attention away from 
careful consideration of the message content, leading more participants to engage in 
automatic processing of the persuasive message. This requires less focus and motivation on 
behalf of the participant, who can utilise a variety of cues and implicit biases to inform 
their decision-making, such as in-group favouritism (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Zhang, 
Lowry, Zhou, & Fu, 2007) and source attractiveness (DeBono & Harnish, 1988; Nisbett & 
Wilson, 1977). Social influence is perceived to be easier in such contexts. Indeed, the 
current results add credence to the notion that FtF interactions elicit higher levels of 
persuasion than mediums which serve to restrict these cues (e.g., Study 2).  
CMC is far more task-orientated than FtF, given that this lean and anonymous 
medium is arguably less influenced by emotions, paralinguistic cues, body language or 
visual stereotypes. Thus, subjects are more likely to reflect and focus on the content of the 
message itself, processing the information systematically. If indeed the CMC context 
promotes the processing of information in a systematic manner as implied in previous 
research, the current findings which highlight reduced persuasion outcomes in Study 2, 
could imply that either a), the arguments created in the jury method scenario and 
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confederate’s script did not stand up to scrutiny or b), mock-jurors did not have the ability 
to exert high levels of mental effort, and were not motivated to think in a critical manner 
(Petty, Cacioppo & Goldman, 1981).  
We reason that Option A is unlikely to hold given that the jury paradigm remained 
consistent across all environmental modalities. Despite the argument that FtF and VR 
modalities foster the peripheral route to persuasion as noted in Chapter 1, the dual-process 
models to persuasion can interact simultaneously. For example, the bias hypothesis in the 
HSM states that an ambiguous message (such as the jury method case summary) biases 
systematic processing in that heuristic cues are stimulated and can override the rational 
processing of the message and thus be independent to motivation. For instance, being 
presented by an expert versus a layperson, or communicating in a media-rich modality 
versus an anonymous and restricted context (see Chaiken & Maheswaran, 1994). Perhaps 
individuals were unwilling to invest high levels of elaboration in Study 2 given the 
cognitive effort needed to transcribe their thoughts and arguments in a concise and rapid 
manner. According to the ELM model, this would indicate that a reduction in elaboration 
would lead to a bias towards peripheral cues. However, due to the lack of peripheral cues 
available, scrutiny of the messages conveyed over this medium served to influence 
persuasion outcomes in a negative manner. It is considered difficult for the central route of 
processing to be induced. Arguments must be considered compelling, credible and stand-
up to scrutiny in order for successful persuasive messages to influence outcomes. The 
arguments created for this study were not manipulated in this manner and thus it could be 
argued that when most peripheral cues are removed from an interaction, messages lack 
influential rigour leading to the reduced persuasion outcomes seen within Study 2.    
Not only did the CMC condition restrict the confederate’s ability to change mock-
jurors’ verdicts, but ratings of the confederate in this modality was much more negative 
compared to the VR and FtF conditions. The notion that non-verbal nuances are expressly 
  
269 
linked to the likability of a conversational partner is not new. Okdie and colleagues (2011) 
found that communicating via CMC led to enhanced negative impressions due to the 
restrictions involved in maintaining and developing a conversation. Chaiken and Eagly 
(1983) claimed that the heuristic route relies on simple rules often ascertained from non-
verbal cues (e.g., the communicator’s gender or perceived personality) to base their 
subsequent decisions on. They found that likability of the communication partner was a 
significant determinant of persuasion within video and audio media - the more salient the 
non-verbal cues and the more likeable the communicator, the greater the persuasive impact 
upon individual’s verdicts and decisions. As one of Cialdini’s six principles (Cialdini, 
1984), it has been supported by a number of more recent studies finding a link between the 
use of expressive non-verbal behaviour and likability within a conversational partner 
(Ambady et al., 2000; Okdie et al., 2011). This lends itself to the suggestion that CMC may 
be beneficial to begin a conversation, but it is not effective at facilitating group decisions 
and transmitting persuasive messages. On the flip side, the more likeable the 
communicator and the more salient their cues are (greater the ability for multi-channel/ 
heuristic processing), the greater the persuasive outcomes are likely to be. 
Little research has been conducted comparing real world effects to virtual reality 
environments. Yet, the emergent research has, in the majority, reported effects observed 
and enacted in a VRE to be parallel to the real-world, indicating that VR facilitates 
transferable skills, and thus can lead to equivalent, or better real-world performances 
(Dando & Tranter, 2016; Freeman et al., 2016). This is highlighted in Zanbaka et al.’s 
(2006) study, finding that cross-gendered interactions resulted in enhanced persuasive 
outcomes across both modalities, and that virtual speakers were as effective at changing 
attitudes as real people. Furthermore, Yee, Bailenson, Urbanek, Chang, and Merget (2007) 
concluded that social norms and behaviour observed inside virtual environments follow the 
same rules and social norms as those observed in the physical world. Thus, as the findings 
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here concur, individuals behaving in a similar manner inside VREs to that of known FtF 
outcomes means that, a) the above research and theories applied to FtF research can by 
extension, be applied to the VR concept, and b) it becomes possible to examine unique 
research questions that have not yet been possible to undertake in the real-world.  
 
7.4.2   Choice confidence. Confidence refers to the expression or feeling of 
certainty. Verdict confidence was measured in this research in an attempt to analyse and 
measure the metacognitive aspect of decision certainty. Accordingly, two individuals 
might reach the same conclusion, but have differing confidence in this same decision or 
attitude. Yet, the more confidence an individual places in their own thoughts and opinions, 
the greater its subsequent impact on judgements and behaviour. Supported both when 
meta-cognitive confidence is measured and manipulated (Briñol & Petty, 2004), it is better 
known as the self-validation hypothesis (Briñol & Petty, 2009; Petty, Briñol, & Tormala, 
2002). This theory provides an understanding to one of the key findings to emerge from 
this thesis: persuaded individuals were less confident in their initial choice compared to 
those who resisted. Despite persuaded mock-jurors increasing in confidence once the 
discussion was over, the confidence levels in this new verdict were still comparatively 
lower than non-persuaded individuals, who themselves showed little change in certainty 
for their unwavering verdict choice despite exposure to contradictory arguments. 
Seemingly, individuals with lower confidence in their thought-processes are predisposed to 
influence by persuasive messages, despite environmental context. The HSM predicts that 
this occurred systematically, given that individuals had large differences in their actual and 
desired confidence, and thus were motivated to achieve an accurate and correct answer to 
satisfy the sufficiency principle. Epistemic measures of confidence that have been 
investigated within the realms of decision-making and influence have concluded that 
greater certainty often leads to greater resistance in persuasion. Indeed, Tormala and Petty 
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(2004) argue that this primarily occurs when elaboration is high (see ELM in Chapter 1). 
The results reported here back existing research in this area, with linguistic measures of 
confidence across all three studies revealing higher percentages of doubt in persuaded 
interactions; further supporting the concept that subjective confidence in attitudes is a 
predictive factor in one’s susceptibility to persuasion.  
However, it should be noted that despite non-persuaded individuals having larger 
confidence scores both pre- and post-discussion, their subjective confidence did not change 
when compared across the two time points. In other words, their resistance to the 
persuasion attempts did not enable individuals to become more certain of their initial 
verdict choices, seemingly contradicting Tormala and Petty’s (2002) pioneering research. 
However, the authors did note that resistance to persuasive messages perceived to be weak 
resulted in attitude certainty being unchanged. The arguments created within this research 
were not designed to manipulate or constrict the credibility and strength of arguments 
presented. Indeed, the original JM paradigm which this research paradigm is based on (see 
London et al., 1970a & b), did manipulate arguments in so much that it biased participants 
viewpoints prior to discussion. Yet it is interesting to note that they found individuals who 
changed their verdict choice had lower certainty in their post-discussion decision than 
persuaders. And yet despite persuaded mock-jurors having a reduced certainty in their final 
verdicts compared to non-persuaded mock-jurors, persuaded individuals had larger 
confidence change scores.  
 
7.4.2.1   Modality influence on choice confidence.  There has been little attention 
paid to the effects of persuasive communication in digital modalities on conviction in 
decisions. Given the plethora of research into persuasion, and the arguments for the 
influence of confidence on this process, it seems amiss not to touch upon the findings 
reported in this thesis on this topic area. 
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Given that the majority of participants in the CMC condition were not persuaded, 
this digital modality also showed reduced levels of confidence change compared to the FtF 
and VR studies, which once again produced equivalent results. This reflects Di Blasio and 
Milani’s (2008) research, where not only were there lower numbers of persuaded 
participants in a written chat discussion, but the extent of their change was also lower 
compared to FtF. One argument for the lower absolute confidence observed in the CMC 
condition could be that more people were not persuaded, and thus tended not to increase 
their confidence as a result. However, the interaction results between modality and 
persuasion suggests an alternate explanation (see Figure 7.3). Here, persuasion groups 
were divided across the modalities to understand the interaction between the two. The 
findings revealed that those who were persuaded in the FtF and VR conditions has similar 
rates of confidence change (over 40%). Yet the CMC modality contrasts these two 
contexts, with a confidence change of almost half this amount for persuaded mock-jurors. 
It indicates that not only was CMC a modality in which it was harder to persuade, but 
those who were persuaded to change their verdict were not as confident in this final 
decision when compared to the richer modalities investigated within the other two studies, 
ostensibly putting instant messaging interaction at a disadvantage when it comes to its 
ability to persuade. It seems to suggest that metacognitive confidence influences 
persuasion outcomes, and this is dependent on environmental context.   
 
 
7.4.3   Gender and ethnicity. The non-significant finding for gender and 
persuasion outcomes (p = .051) was approaching significance. Figure 7.6 displays the 
findings for successful persuasion across genders for ease, with lighter shades indicating 
leaner modalities. It displays findings from across the 3 studies, highlighting how males 
were consistently below females in their persuadability, yet both genders decreased in the 
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CMC context; with males being significantly more likely to resist persuasion. When this 
was broken down further, it became apparent that females were significantly more likely to 
be persuaded when interacting in a FtF modality, which is in direct contrast to text-based 
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Figure 7.6. Illustrative diagram outlining gender divides for persuadability across three 
modalities varying in media richness. Percentages represent participants successfully 
persuaded whilst arrows indicate the difference and direction in persuasion as the 
modalities become leaner.   
 
 
This study contributes to the existing literature showing that women perform 
differently in decision-making tasks when communicating FtF compared to CMC (Dennis, 
Kinney, & Hung, 1999). Women interacting using text-based online platforms find it 
difficult to form communal bonds due to the impoverished output which becomes 









diagram above, female persuasion decreases as the modalities become more restricted, 
supporting the MRT (Daft & Lengel, 1986).  
The results presented here also expand on findings from Guadagno and Cialdini 
(2002; 2007), who examined same-sex dyadic persuasion. They found females were highly 
sensitive to non-verbal cues, producing higher agreement in the FtF condition compared to 
CMC. The authors explain this finding in terms of the social roles theory, stating females 
produce higher agreement rates due to the FtF modality enabling cooperation and an 
establishment of a relationship with their conversational partner. On the other hand, CMC 
restricts such peripheral cues which females rely upon to develop and establish a 
relationship, ascertain their partner’s motivation and using nuances to determine their 
verdict and decisions. This is supported in the current data, with females being near the 
chance level for persuasion when using CMC, implying that the persuasive messages had 
little effect on the changes in verdict choice within this modality. However, Guadagno and 
Cialdini (2002; 2007) also noted that males were unaffected by the reduction in media 
richness stating it was unimportant to their social motivation of competition and 
independence. The restrictive medium in the present study however elicited significant 
resistance from males suggesting that, like females, they are sensitive to the non-verbal 
restriction of media richness, albeit more pronounced. 
Eaton, Visser, & Burns (2017) revealed that priming gender affected the 
persuadability of individuals. When female gender was made salient, both men and women 
demonstrated much weaker attitudes and enhanced superficial processing of the messages 
received. Male salience however, enabled participants to process the message in a much 
more thoughtful manner, with increased cognitive processing, seemingly in line with the 
social roles concept that men are more analytical and rational compared to women. 
Perhaps then, the salience of one’s gender was made more apparent during the anonymous 
CMC interaction given the reduction in media richness and thus the enhancement of self-
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awareness. This is evident in research conducted by Okdie et al. (2011), finding that the 
CMC modality made participants much more self-focussed and self-aware compared to 
FtF. These findings help to explain the gender differences in susceptibility to persuasive 
messages, indicating that females take a heuristic route to processing messages whereas 
men, who focus more on the rational arguments presented, utilise the systematic route to 
processing information. This is evidenced further in the present study, with male responses 
to pre- and post-questionnaires highlighting their propensity to reason analytically and 
have an absence of emotions when explaining their reasoning for initial verdict choices 
compared to female mock-jurors.  
One possible explanation for this pattern of findings lies in the fact that the other 
two media-rich environments allowed real-time audio, thus gender identification of the 
opposing speaker could be easily ascertained. Yet in the CMC modality, this was 
impossible given the anonymity the medium affords. Perhaps then, males were less likely 
to monitor and restrain their opinions and thoughts. Indeed, research investigating same-
sex dyadic interactions highlight how males when interacting with another male enhance 
their gender stereotypes, leading to increase levels of competition and disagreements 
(Carli, 1989). Perhaps an inability to ascertain the opposing gender yet a propensity to 
make assumptions of same-gender interactions (50% of males believed they were 
communicating with a male confederate, whilst 28% were unsure; 44% of females 
believed they were communicating with a female confederate, whilst 22% were unsure – 
thus only 22% of males, and 35% of females were correct in identifying the gender of their 
anonymous communicative partner) led to an increased sense of self (Okdie et al., 2011) 
and enhancement of gendered social roles (Postmes & Spears, 2002).  
Research into gender differences within VR is extremely limited meaning that very 
little can be inferred inside such synthetic environments. As a result, the present studies 
serve to grow this area of research, with findings reported here indicating similar 
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persuasive outcomes across genders within this novel modality. It proposes that a VRE 
serves to equalise gender effects when both areas of social roles can be satisfied. I.e., 
ability to form communal bonds via real-time audio for women, and the ability to 
scrutinise arguments and assert dominance in a relatively anonymous fashion for men.  
 
Ethnicity is fast becoming a pervasive feature of social structure, playing a part in 
everyday interactions and political debate given the increasing numbers of societies 
becoming ethnically diverse (Verkuyten, 2018). Yet cultural psychology has almost 
exclusively tended to focus on the extremes of individualistic and collectivist cultures 
(Ind/Col). For example, there is consensus amongst previous research that Asian ethnicities 
are more holistic in their thinking, defaulting to the heuristic route when processing 
persuasive messages, whereas Westerners, such as Caucasian American or Europeans, tend 
to be more analytic and thus are more motivated to elaborate on persuasive messages and 
engage in a more systematic manner (e.g., Berry, Poortinga, Breugelmans, Chasiotis, & 
Sam, 2011; Nisbett, Choi, Peng, & Norenzayan, 2001; Nisbett & Masuda, 2003; Varnum, 
Grossman, Kitayama, & Nisbett, 2010). The research contained within this thesis extends 
the extremes of Ind/Col concepts, investigating foreign-, and first-born individuals that 
span the continuum of such classifications yet are still considered within the binary 
concept of Ind/Col (see Oyserman et al., 2002). The results show that slight changes in 
these ethnic categories serves to diminish reported ethnic differences in social cognition, 
indicating similarities for South-Asian and British persuadability which hold across FtF 
and DMs. In turn, this points to similarities in the routes taken to process the persuasive  
messages during the jury discussion.   
One might suggest that the lack of findings for ethnicity could be due to a lack of 
diversity within dyadic teams, given this research focussed on homogenous ethnic groups 
to enable a direct comparison. And yet, research which has manipulated DMs across 
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homogenous and heterogenous cultural groups have found similar effects. For example, 
Setlock and colleagues (2007) investigated Chinese and American ethnic groups, finding 
no differences for culture or modality (audio and video) on persuasion, with persuasion 
outcomes measured in a similar way to the current study - summing differences in pre- to 
post-discussion rankings. Furthermore, their measurement of word count revealed 
similarities across the two cultural groups for both DMs, remaining consistent with the 
current findings presented in this chapter.    
Perhaps integration of ethnic groups is serving to dampen previous reports of 
differences, with this pattern of findings being accounted for by situational ethnicity. This 
concept specifies that identification of one’s ethnic group can either be displayed or 
concealed contingent on the social situation (Okamura, 1981). For example, physical 
surroundings, presence (or absence) of others or type of task (Belk, 1974). If the concept of 
‘felt’ ethnicity is situationally determined (Stayman & Deshpande, 1989), then perhaps the 
fact that the research was conducted in English, by a white Caucasian researcher, in 
primarily British universities influenced the outcomes reported here. For example, Western 
learning places critical thinking and debate at the heart of its educational system, with 
students often taught by communicating and determining whether or not the information 
received is verifiable (Garrison, 1991; Kühnen et al., 2012). The majority of the current 
research was conducted within two British universities, aiming to instil critical thinking. 
Furthermore, the jury paradigm actively promotes debate and a need to evaluate the 
information presented, which may have served to situationally dampen any ethnic 
differences. 
When comparing the current lack of ethnic differences to existing research, one 
aspect of the published data became apparent – there was a lack of reporting of any null 
results. Perhaps then, these findings reflect a publication bias, given that the current null 
findings are unlikely to have been published in a peer-reviewed journal if previously 
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observed (Franco, Malhotra, & Simonovits, 2014). The ‘file draw problem’ (bias towards 
selecting statistically significant studies to write up for publication; Lederman & 
Lederman, 2016) seemingly dominates the published literature. It suggests that cross-
ethnic diversity is ‘watering down’ any social cognitive differences previously observed in 
cultural domains, and the current results are reflective of the true population which 
represents increased integration and long-term migration (Berry, 1997; Tranter & Hobbs, 
2017).   
 
7.4.4   Cognitive style. Individuals in the general population high on delusional 
thinking have previously been found to request less information and be more confident in 
their decisions (Huq, Garety & Hemsley, 1988). Likewise, high scores on the need for 
cognitive closure (whether situationally induced or individually manipulated) report 
similar effects, whereby individuals tend to ‘seize’ and ‘freeze’ upon seemingly reliable 
and valid decisions (Kruglanski, Webster, & Klem, 1993). Indeed, Colbert and Peters 
(2002) reported that high delusional ideation in the general population was correlated with 
higher scores on the NfCC scale. Yet, the present study reported no association for 
delusional ideation and the NfCC, in addition to biases associated with high scores on 
these measures failing to influence persuasion outcomes. This is despite research attesting 
to individuals making simplified judgements and ‘shortcuts’ when scoring highly on these 
measures, indicating a heuristic route to processing information (Kossowska, 2007; Klein 
& Webster, 2000) and a greater openness to persuasion attempts during dyadic jury 
interactions (Kruglanski, Webster, & Klem, 1993; Richter & Kruglanski, 2004). It may be 
that individuals low in NfCC and PDI-R are less likely to freeze and seize upon 
information as stated, but this was not shown to influence persuasion outcomes in the 
current research and thus indicates a lack of preference for the heuristic route to 
persuasion. It shows that biases in processing associated with these measures did not 
  
279 
influence decisions upon exposure to persuasive messages across the three modalities. One 
possibility proposed by Ross et al. (2016) is the data gathering bias is not directly 
associated with delusional ideation but rather analytical cognitive style, enabling 
individuals to critically evaluate information and engage in effortful analytical processing. 
It implies that a measure of delusional ideation would not result in significant effects as it 
does not adequately assess biases associated with data-gathering, the core of which was 
being measured and assessed in relation to persuadability. 
Interestingly, and unusually, South-Asian participants scored higher on average for 
delusional thinking compared to British participants, who primarily fell into the low 
category for this measure. It is not entirely clear as to why this occurred, but it should be 
noted that the creation of the PDI-R primarily utilised white british participants in their 
sample. Consequently, this demographic was used to ascertain validity and reliability of 
the 21-item scale (Peters et al., 2004) highlighting a lack of ethnic and cultural diversity for 
this measure, and making it much harder to attribute findings across ethnic and cultural 
divides. 
The unique findings reported here could be accounted for by religious belief. For 
example, research conducted by Britain’s largest independent social research agency has 
recently reported that over half of the British population consider themselves to have no 
religion (NatCen, 2017). Whereas South-Asian countries are often noted to have 
predominantly religious-based societies (Bose & Jalal, 2002; Russell, 2015; WorldAtlas, 
2018). Question 8 and question 11 on the PDI-R asks whether participants ‘feel especially 
close to God’ or ‘feel they were chosen by God in some way’. A high score which depicts 
thinking about this issue ‘frequently’ and ‘believing it to be true’ contributes to higher 
PDI-R results reported here, and could possibility be accounted for by religious affiliation. 
Investigation into new religious movements have noted significantly higher delusional 
ideation but such individuals have reported feeling less distressed and preoccupied with 
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these beliefs (measured on sub-scales within the PDI-R; Peters, Day, McKenna, & Orbach, 
1999; Ross et al., 2016).  
Pennycook, Cheyne, Seli, Koehler, and Fugelsang (2012) discovered that analytical 
cognitive style was negatively associated with religious and paranormal beliefs, even when 
controlling for age, sex, cognitive ability, religious engagement, political ideology, and 
education. It supports the claim by Ross et al. (2016) that delusional ideation is associated 
with analytical cognitive style, suggesting that high scores on PDI-R is associated with 
lower analytical cognitive style and higher rates of religious beliefs. For example, atheists 
lack of belief has been claimed to be derived from logical, intelligent, and rational thinking 
(Caldwell-Harris, Wilson, LoTempio, & Beit-Hallahmi, 2010; Hunsberger & Altemeyer, 
2006). It therefore seems logical to assume that individuals who reject religious beliefs 
display a more analytical cognitive style, processing information via System 2 in a 
deliberate and effortful manner (see Kahneman, 2003), and perhaps take the systematic 
route to persuasion. Despite a lack of relationship between PDI-R, NfCC and persuasion 
outcomes in this body of research, it would be beneficial for future researchers to consider 
this aspect of delusional thinking when designing and conducting further studies. Perhaps 
incorporating the 9-item religious belief and 5-item religious engagement scales developed 
by Pennycook et al. (2012), as well as a measure of analytical processing (e.g., the 
cognitive reflection test; Frederick, 2005) into future methodologies would be beneficial.  
 
7.4.5   Linguistic style. Using language to investigate persuasion is beneficial in 
that it is rich, convenient and quantifiable. The analysis of words used in the jury 
discussions served to illuminate mock-jurors’ social cognition - investigating what mock-
jurors pay attention to, and reflecting their psychological state when exposed to counter-
attitudinal messages. Given that the majority of the English language comprises of function 
words, yet conscious attention is rarely paid to their usage in everyday exchanges, they can 
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reveal valuable insight into mock-jurors implicit thinking processes and psychological 
states, thus reflecting an individual’s ‘linguistic style’ (Chung & Pennebaker, 2007; 
Pennebaker, Mehl, & Niederhoffer, 2003; Tausczik & Pennebaker, 2010). The findings in 
the current research revealed that linguistic style consistent with successful persuasion 
outcomes comprises of enhanced cognitive processing and informal language but lower 
instances of analytical reasoning.  
Cognitive processes, measured by LIWC, contain words relating to insight (‘think’, 
‘know’), causation (‘because’, ‘effect’), discrepancy (‘should’, ‘would’), tentative 
(‘maybe’, ‘perhaps’), certainty (‘always’, ‘never’), and differentiation (‘hasn’t’, ‘but’). 
Together, they indicate active thinking on behalf of the individual. Here, higher scores 
depicted successful persuaded outcomes, perhaps reflecting individual wishes to 
understand the cause and meaning of the arguments presented, elaborating to a higher 
extent (see Figure 1.2). Individuals scoring highly on analytical thinking are argued to 
engage in effortful deliberation using reason and logic, depicted by the increased use of 
nouns, articles and prepositions (Jordan & Pennebaker, 2017). Once again, this indicates a 
more systematic route to processing information when successfully persuaded, and points 
to this route having more success in changing mock-jurors’ minds when they actively 
engage in the discussion. Initially called the categorical versus dynamic index (CDI: 
Pennebaker et al., 2014), it is scored on a continuum, with lower scores depicting a 
narrative (dynamic) style of thinking.  
Narrative thinking is often seen in impulsive individuals’ linguistic style, their 
reasoning grounded in intuition and personal experience, apparent through increased use of 
pronouns, auxiliary verbs and common adverbs (Jordan & Pennebaker, 2017). It may 
reflect a systematic route of processing information for non-persuaded mock-jurors, with 
individuals breaking down the scenario and analysing the confederate’s persuasive 
arguments in a logical and complex manner (Boyd & Pennebaker, 2015). Likewise, 
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persuaded mock-jurors’ linguistic style conceivably reflects a more heuristic route to 
processing information, with under 10% of linguistic style in FtF and VR modalities 
containing analytical language, further supporting the argument above regarding richer 
modalities facilitating the peripheral route to persuasion. Furthermore, Jordan and 
Pennebaker (2017) found that narrative language is much more personal and informal, 
which concurs with the current findings regarding persuaded mock-jurors scoring low on 
analytical thinking (and thus higher on the narrative side of the spectrum) but high on 




Chapter Eight: Application, Limitations and Future Directions 
 
8.1   Introduction 
Throughout the empirical chapters of this thesis the results have been introduced 
and discussed. In addition, the preceding chapter has presented full analyses across 
contexts, and offered a discussion of all three data sets previously presented in Chapters 4 
to 7. Throughout, these data have been discussed with reference to the theory and available 
empirical literature relevant to the context presented in each chapter. Hence, an additional 
final discussion chapter is unnecessary because it would simply repeat discussion topics 
already presented. However, thus far this thesis has not discussed the application of any of 
the findings, nor have future direction or limitations been fully introduced or discussed and 
so this final chapter will consider these aspects within the body of research presented. In 
addition to presenting a body of empirical laboratory research designed to inform the 
psychological cognitive literature and develop paradigms for understanding cognition in 
novel contexts, this thesis was also concerned with supporting practitioners who are tasked 
with interacting with others in persuasive contexts. To that end, this final chapter will also 
consider the practical implications of the results reported, the limitations of this research 
and how future researchers might move towards improving and expanding on the work 
reported here. 
 
8.2   Applications  
The increasing use of social media and serious gaming technology (Wilson et al., 
2016) highlights the importance of investigating exchanges of information across both rich 
and lean modalities. This research has shown that the VRE is as effective as the FtF 
context for persuasion purposes, which has ramifications for real-world effects when 
utilising VR technology to observe, measure and train real-world performances (see Dando 
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& Tranter, 2016; Sandham, Ormerod, Dando, & Menacre, 2015). VEs are currently being 
utilised in military and forensic settings, simulating real-world interactions and behaviours 
in a safe and efficient manner. For example, the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center 
have developed an avatar-based interview simulator which enables officers to practise 
persuasion techniques and develop their skill set prior to real-world interviews 
(Kuykendall, 2010). Alternate contexts for non-coercive investigative interviews (Dando & 
Ormerod, in press; Jenkins & Dando, 2012) can facilitate the use of ‘soft power’ by aiming 
to influence through developing an operational accord and persuading others to change 
their beliefs and opinions through attraction rather than using forceful, coercive techniques 
(Beune, Giebels, & Taylor, 2010; Dando & Tranter, 2015; Nye, 2004). Thus, this 
exploratory research serves to progress and offer additional insight into applied uses of 
VREs for investigative purposes, which in an increasingly global environment, is 
important.  
Online media is often regarded as influential in the promotion of extremist 
propaganda, providing opportunities to communicate, disseminate, recruit, solicit monetary 
funds and conduct attacks (Prentice & Taylor, 2018). Yet the findings here suggest 
persuasion using CMC is ineffective. CMC may still be a useful first point of contact, but 
this form of communication as outlined in this thesis appears not to be an effective 
environment within which to effectively progress a persuasive conversation to the desired 
conclusion. This suggests that media stories concerning radicalisation via CMC may be 
misleading – it is not the medium per se that is enabling and enhancing such behaviour but 
rather something else. Perhaps the profile surrounding social media (either real or faked) 
serves to lure individuals in; seeking out those who hold similar beliefs, with comparable 
platforms and networks acting as echo chambers, narrowing critical perspectives meaning 
that a first interaction has much more of a positive response when exposed to persuasive 
material. This study has contributed to the understanding through which certain persuasive 
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devices are used - in this case, anonymous synchronous communication with an unknown 
communicative partner is not sufficient to solely influence and change opinion.  
As noted, the use of digital modalities provides challenges in establishing the 
credibility and validity of sources when anonymous. Understanding persuasion online is 
becoming increasingly important in an age of increasing political propaganda and 
extremist ideologies. Propaganda, according to Taylor (2003), refers to a process by which 
an idea or opinion is communicated to someone else, by any available media in an attempt 
to persuade the receiver to behave or think in a manner desired by the source. In an era of 
‘fake news’ dominating headlines, online persuasion and propaganda can reach 
increasingly diverse and vast audiences (Parker, May 2018), playing an important part in 
mobilising, informing and influencing groups across the world (see Adesina, 2017; Baines 
& Jones, 2018; Howard et al., 2011). Thus, it may be that individuals are becoming 
increasingly reluctant to trust and thus be persuaded when interacting online in an 
anonymous fashion. This is useful to consider when regarding the spread of fake news and 
online propaganda, which may provide barriers to intelligence gathering professionals 
when interacting anonymously online.  
Creating digital modalities to immerse participants, manipulate variables of 
interest, and measure and collect information regarding the differences in social cognition 
does serve to further understanding of information gathering, influence and persuasion 
online. This research does not claim to change the nature of influence and persuasion in 
digital modalities, but it does serve to support understanding and contribute to the literature 
on this topic.    
 
8.3   Strengths and Limitations 
The current research has a number of strengths and limitations. In the case of the 
latter, many of the limitations are common to most laboratory-based research studies of 
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this nature, and as such are not discussed in any detail here. Rather, relevant limitations 
have been highlighted in the relevant chapters. However, it is worth pointing out again that 
the reduced reality inherent in laboratory work and obvious lack of consequences that 
occur in the real word when asked to make decision and/or when one changes one’s mind 
is an enduring limitation. However, the value of the insight emanating from controlled 
conditions where extraneous variables can be managed is important, and as such the 
benefits offset these limitations to a certain extent. In addition, there are a number of 
strengths and limitations particular to this research that are worthy of additional discussion, 
which are as follows. 
Firstly, one particular strength of the adapted paradigm utilised to measure 
persuasion was that it allowed for an interactive and immediate exchange of information 
between both confederate and participant. This permitted a bilateral and natural discussion 
to occur, with the end goal being to reach a unanimous decision and thus persuade the 
individual to change their verdict choice. This is in direct contrast to traditional unilateral 
methodologies typically seen within the persuasive literature, and so this thesis contributes 
to the domain by offering a more realistic oversight into persuasion - both FtF, and across 
social media platforms. In addition, the use of an ambiguous case study resulted in 
persuasion occurring not as a result of strengths of arguments or credibility of the source 
(as often reported within previous research; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986b), but as a result of 
modality, gender manipulations and the accompanying emergent linguistic styles.   
Despite the novelty of this research, the findings are compatible with long-term 
persuasion outcomes. For instance, the paradigm required participants to self-generate 
arguments, providing individuals with the freedom to choose their verdict choice. It also 
required participants to explain and justify their views to another individual, whilst 
simultaneously evaluating and critiquing the persuasive messages in real-time (rather than 
post-hoc). These elements are associated with increased persistence of persuasive decisions 
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and thus indicate that outcomes measured are not indicative of short-term effects or 
surface-level compliance, but rather durable and potentially resilient viewpoints (Petty & 
Briñol, 2015). Nevertheless, discerning the permeability of changes in verdict choice 
would be beneficial, as it would not only shed light on the durability and success of the 
persuasive messages, but it could also serve to clarify which route mock-jurors took when 
changing their opinions (the systematic route being indicative of increased persistence over 
time; Di Blasio & Milani, 2008). 
One particular limitation of the current research is the relationship between first-
time interactions and long-term exchanges, and how the former informs/impacts upon the 
latter. Often when communicating online, individuals either know the individual offline or 
have an expectation of long-term and/or real-world contact in the foreseeable future and 
can thus utilise a wider variety of persuasive techniques, such as reciprocity or authority 
(Cialdini, 1984). The purpose of the current research was to initiate an understanding of 
persuadability across different modalities, manipulating variables such as gender to 
understand their effect on persuasion outcomes following an initial and brief contact. 
Nevertheless, expansion of these findings could be considered constrained as a result.   
A second limitation is the use of computerised linguistic analysis, such as LIWC 
utilised here, which is undoubtedly a crude measurement for psychological behaviour. For 
example, it does not have the capacity to correctly code for sarcasm or irony. Thus, the 
meaning and intent of words can be lost as a result. Nevertheless, such systems are often 
regarded as a simple way to compute and interpret the cognitive and psychological 
underpinnings of linguistic style in a uniquely quantitative manner and have been used to 
inform understanding across a variety of topic areas, to great effect (Chung & Pennebaker, 
2007; Kacewicz, Pennebaker, Davis, Jeon, & Graesser, 2013; Taylor et al., 2013). LIWC 
has offered insight into what participants pay attention to, examining the subconscious 
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processing of persuasive messages via evaluation of function words, which begins to 
address a gap in the current persuasive literature.  
A further limitation concerns the linguistic findings which summarises the 
exploratory results; evaluating and analysing linguistic output using high level categories, 
making it difficult in some cases to pinpoint the cause of significant linguistic findings. 
Numerous past studies have conducted research in this manner (e.g., Cohn, Mehl, & 
Pennebaker, 2004; Romero, Uzzi, & Kleinberg, 2016) and given the lack of linguistic 
research into the areas covered in this thesis, an exploratory top-down approach was taken. 
Nevertheless, it makes it difficult to ascertain specific elements of the linguistic themes 
analysed. For example, cognitive processing which was significantly higher for successful 
persuasive interactions depicts a variety of responses and subthemes that can be considered 
conflicting. For example, does tentative language or certainty contribute to this effect? It 
would therefore be prudent for future research to investigate the cause of this significant 
finding at the sublevels of the LIWC categories.    
 
8.4   Future Directions 
Like the majority of novel research, the current findings serve to answer some 
questions whilst inevitably raising others. For example, the purpose of this research was to 
establish three distinct environments which vary in media richness, but which are 
considered popular in their usage; serving to contribute to, and expand upon, applied 
cognitive research. Inevitably however, it is unclear whether findings can be generalised to 
other forms of DMs which facilitate bilateral interactions, such as asynchronous CMC 
(e.g., email, blogs), video conferencing (e.g., FaceTime or Skype), or 3-D synthetic 
realities which create third-person avatars and interact via written messages (e.g., Second 
Life, World of Warcraft). Future research should consider expanding the range of DMs 
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under investigation to enable a wider understanding of persuasion across increasingly 
varied digital modalities.  
Similarly, the ability to represent the self online via an avatar offers intriguing 
opportunities, as touched upon in Chapter 6. The Proteus effect claims that individuals 
conform to the stereotypical behaviours of the avatar they represent (Yee & Bailenson, 
2007), with online environments facilitating greater flexibility for self-presentation. DMs 
offer unique opportunities to manipulate visual appearance with increasing ease, enabling 
researchers to investigate the effects of individual differences and characteristics such as 
source attractiveness or in-group favouritism on persuasion in a controlled environment; 
allowing for a better understanding of influence and attitude change online, and its ability 
to translate into real-world effects (see Nowak & Fox, 2018). For example, manipulating 
an avatar to appear more attractive could have implications for investigators by increasing 
positive valence and potentially enhancing persuasion outcomes (e.g., Skalski & 
Tamborini, 2007). It would be prudent for future research to advance understanding of the 
effects of avatar customisation, in addition to the role that immersive avatar interaction has 
on enhancing real-world social cognition to best effect (see Taylor & Dando, 2018).  
Furthermore, when this research was first envisioned and conducted, VREs were 
understandably less advanced. Rapid technological developments have since led to an 
increase in VR ability, whilst prices have become increasingly competitive suggesting an 
increase in general uptake and usage for such equipment. One such advance in technology 
refers to haptic feedback, with Oculus Rift now enabling touch features via tracked 
controllers. Not only could this increase immersion and presence on behalf of the user, but 
it can allow researchers increased opportunities to explore kinesic effects on the persuasion 
process inside a virtual space. For example, previous FtF research has indicated how 
posture and body language can influence confidence, competence and attitude change 
(Burgoon, Birk, & Pfau, 1990; Maslow et al., 1971).  
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A further and related avenue for future research would be to expand on linguistic 
mimicry (here measured through LSM) and investigate the role of non-verbal social 
mimicry on persuasion effects. The chameleon effect (Lakin, Jefferis, Cheng, & Chartrand, 
2003) is the tendency to adopt gestures and mannerisms of one’s interactive partner. This 
has previously been found to increase affiliation and foster relationships. Yet it is difficult 
to manipulate such behaviour in isolation in the real-world. DMs however afford the 
chameleon effect to be manipulated and investigated in a tightly controlled manner. For 
example, Bailenson and Yee (2005) found that when avatars mimicked participants 
behaviour, and participants were not conscious of this effect, avatars were more persuasive 
and received more positive trait ratings than non-mimicking avatars. Yet the authors here 
investigated persuasion in a unilateral, passive context. It would be interesting to further 
investigate the role of behavioural mimicry on bilateral, interactive exchanges, and their 
effect on persuasion outcomes given the recent advances in VR technology.   
A conscious decision was made in the present research to include English-speaking 
participants, who were grouped using broad definitions of culture and ethnicity, in line 
with previous research (e.g., Nisbett & Miyamoto, 2005). Whilst it serves to expand the 
consideration of alternate ethnic groups on persuasion outcomes indicative of an 
increasingly ethnically-diverse population, we acknowledge that there is inevitably 
variation at the country and individual level. Expanding on ethnicity and including 
measures of cultural characteristics (such as the Schwartz Value Survey [Schwartz, 2012], 
The Value Survey Module [Hofstede, Hofstede, Minkov, & Vinken, 2013], or the Cultural 
Values Scale [Yoo, Donthu, & Lenartowicz, 2011]) could add credibility to the findings 
reported here. Furthermore, expanding the paradigm to include research within the 
countries and cultures of interest and potentially conducted in one’s native language could 




8.5   Conclusion 
 With the rise of the internet, persuasion is increasingly important in the 
transmission of social, political and diplomatic exchanges. Growing migration and 
technological change is diminishing physical and psychological boundaries, conceivably 
influencing decision-making. This thesis set out to explore the role of digital modalities on 
persuasion outcomes, examining individual differences such as gender, ethnicity, linguistic 
and cognitive style. It utilised previously-applied psychological methodologies such as the 
jury method paradigm to establish realistic, bilateral exchanges of persuasive messages. In 
combination, this research has shown that interpersonal persuasion is difficult to create and 
sustain when using anonymous, instant messaging software, leading to enhanced resistance 
for males, increased delays and reduced affinity for the conversational partner. The novel 
VRE however established principally analogous results to FtF, indicating a propensity for 
persuasion and increased confidence for change in decisions when employing media-rich 
modalities. This has important consequences for investigators who wish to advance the 
uses of VR to manipulate, collect, measure, and manage persuasive outcomes and social 
cognition to great effect. Expanding and developing our understanding of how judgements 
are formed and modified can serve to increase working relationships and widen the 
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